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FOREWORD 
 
urope’s labour market has been caught up in the seven-year storm 
created by the financial and economic crises. Unemployment has 
grown to record-high levels in the EU and especially within the 
eurozone. At the same time, Europe has experienced unprecedented 
divergences in employment and social outcomes across the member states. 
This long and complex crisis has deprived many people of 
meaningful economic and social opportunities, resulting in a waste of 
human capital. The ‘margins’ of Europe’s labour market are quite large 
today, with many people experiencing precariousness and 
underemployment, if they can find jobs at all. 
As the financial, economic and fiscal crises reinforced each other 
against the backdrop of an incomplete Economic and Monetary Union, 
investors as well as citizens started to lose confidence in the EU project. 
Some governments have lost their ability to promote economic recovery 
and to address longer-term structural challenges affecting Europe’s labour 
markets. 
Key among these challenges are the ageing and shrinking of our 
workforce, the polarisation of the labour market associated with the 
phasing out of routine jobs, growing resource scarcity and climate change, 
and increasing technological competition from other parts of the world. 
Tackling these challenges requires structural public policy responses and 
investments. 
The sovereign debt crisis put pressure both on countercyclical public 
spending and on social investment through public services, human capital 
development and support for people's transitions into the labour market. 
The EU has striven to respond to the economic crisis, the social emergency 
and the longer-term structural challenges by developing a more robust 
repertoire of policy options as well as through stronger policy coordination. 
E
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The Europe 2020 Strategy, agreed in June 2010, established 
employment, social inclusion and environmental targets as core elements of 
Europe’s socio-economic development model. However, due to the 
eurozone crisis, the EU employment rate for 20-64 year-olds has actually 
fallen to 68.3% in 2013 instead of rising towards the 2020 target of 75%, and 
the risk of poverty and social exclusion has grown rather than diminished. 
In 2012, the European Commission put forward an Employment 
Package that articulated an ambitious policy agenda for a job-rich recovery. 
Expanding upon the European Employment Strategy, the package outlined 
measures to boost demand for labour, plans to harness the job creation 
potential of the green, white and digital economy, as well as steps towards 
a genuine European labour market with easier and higher-quality labour 
mobility across countries. 
A recommendation on establishing a Youth Guarantee was then 
agreed in 2013 as a major structural reform (and investment) focused on 
improving school-to-work transitions. The Social Investment Package of 
2013 has shown ways of further modernising the welfare state, focusing on 
'capacitating' expenditure and public services that enable people to 
maximise their participation in the labour market and society. 
All these initiatives were guided by the concept of a dynamic and 
inclusive labour market and by an awareness of the need for proactive public 
policy in helping integrate the less productive workforce into employment. 
This is necessary in view of the Europe 2020 employment target, but also in 
order to combat social exclusion and increase productivity in the longer 
run. 
Compared to the pre-crisis years, the European Semester now 
provides a much stronger and integrated framework for employment 
policy coordination than the original open method of coordination. There is 
growing acceptance of the need for convergence towards certain quality 
standards in employment and social policies, even if these may not be 
enshrined in hard law. That said, a lot of progress still remains to be made 
in properly taking into account the synergies and trade-offs between fiscal, 
monetary and structural policies, including employment and social 
policies, both at European and national levels. 
 
                                                   
 Health, care and related services. 
FOREWORD   iii 
 
The NEUJOBS project has been very helpful in providing analytical 
background in the development of stronger employment and social policies 
in the first half of the 2010s, particularly because of its longer-term 
perspective on demographic, environmental and technological 
developments affecting Europe’s labour markets and the character of work. 
Seminars discussing interim NEUJOBS findings facilitated direct 
exchanges between researchers and policy-makers, enabling the project to 
make an impact in real time. Many valuable synergies emerged between 
the various strands of NEUJOBS and the in-house analytical work of the 
European Commission, particularly the annual reviews of Employment and 
Social Developments in Europe. 
As the NEUJOBS project approaches the final stages of its work 
programme and a new generation of policy-makers enters the European 
Parliament and Commission in 2014, the findings of NEUJOBS can 
certainly provide a lot of useful input in further adapting Europe’s 
economic, employment and social policies to the objectives of smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth. This growth will inevitably need to be 
based on more dynamic and more inclusive labour markets. 
 
László Andor 
European Commissioner 
 for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 
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1. THE FUTURE OF LABOUR IN EUROPE: 
AN OVERVIEW* 
ork is not only an essential part of our daily lives, but also one of 
the top policy concerns across Europe. Unfortunately, the public 
debate of labour issues is all too often driven by political rhetoric 
and short-term concerns. In this volume, researchers from seven European 
countries attempt to explain in easily accessible language what the findings 
from various social sciences mean for the future of labour in Europe. Their 
findings are addressed not only to policy-makers, business persons, fellow 
academics and journalists, but to any concerned individual who is 
interested in the shape, size and character of the labour markets of 
tomorrow and beyond.  
Since February 2011, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
has been deeply engaged as the coordinator of a major research project 
funded by the European Commission called NEUJOBS. This volume 
presents the results and policy recommendations distilled from the 
research and discussions that have taken place among the 29 partner 
institutes in the first half of the NEUJOBS project. A second volume will 
follow with a particular focus on employment in specific sectors, such as 
transport, energy and housing, and for specific groups in the labour force, 
notably women, elderly and migrants.  
Our objective has been to analyse possible future developments in 
European labour market(s) under the main assumption that European 
societies are now facing or preparing to face profound transitions, or what 
we call ‘megatrends’, that will have a major impact on employment, 
particularly for some groups in the labour force or sectors of the economy. 
These natural and societal megatrends will reshape the global conditions 
                                                   
* Chapter 1 was drafted by Ilaria Maselli and Miroslav Beblavý with the objective 
of providing a general overview of the book, writing in their capacity as Deputy 
Coordinator and Coordinator of the NEUJOBS project, respectively. 
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for Europe, posing numerous challenges to societies and policy-makers in 
the area of labour. ‘Societal megatrends’ take the form of demographic 
transition, the ongoing shifts in the economic and political centres of 
gravity worldwide, the growing use of information and communication 
technologies and the related new forms of knowledge-sharing. By ‘natural 
megatrends’, we mean the increasing volatility of climate change, the 
energy transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources and rising 
challenges to resource security, all of which can be expected to have far-
reaching implications for production and consumption patterns of 
European societies. 
Since expectations for the severity of the changes vary, we distinguish 
between ‘friendly’ and ‘tough’ variants of each megatrend in two distinct 
time frames: by 2025 and by 2050. We then use these predictions to model 
global scenarios for Europe. 
In chapter 2, we sketch three strategies for European policy-makers to 
cope with changing global conditions. Policymakers will react to the 
changes by choosing from scenarios ranging from ‘business-as-usual’ to 
‘substantial transformation’ to ‘sustainability’. Not only the choice but also 
the success of the response strategies will largely depend on the global 
conditions that actually materialise in the future. 
This introductory chapter presents an overview of the nine other 
chapters in this volume, which are themselves summaries of a multitude of 
research papers produced in the context of the NEUJOBS project. We have 
elected to highlight here only the most consequential and surprising of the 
findings, leaving the reader to discover the full story in the individual 
chapters. And, of course, all of the original research is freely accessible on 
the NEUJOBS website (www.neujobs.eu). 
1.1 How many workers for how many jobs? 
Among the major variables that are likely to transform European labour 
markets, demographic developments are expected to have the strongest 
impact. There is a consensus on three trends that will impact Europe’s 
labour market in the coming decades: 
 The aging European population is a major policy problem. Even 
under optimistic scenarios, most European countries will see their 
working-age population shrink. By 2030, the European labour force 
will number between 279 and 302 million workers (under a ‘tough’ 
and ‘friendly’ scenario, respectively).  
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 The decrease in the labour supply, combined with the upgrading of 
skills (‘upskilling’) of the population, will lead to wage increases. The 
projections in both the ‘tough’ and ‘friendly’ scenarios suggest that 
higher wages will provide relief for public finances and partially 
compensate for the increase in pension and healthcare bills. 
 Overall employment will be determined not only by demographic 
dynamics, but also by the macroeconomic health of the continent.  
Even under the assumptions implicit in the ‘friendly’ scenario – high 
fertility, extended life expectancy and increased immigration – most EU 
countries cannot escape the prospect in the short term of a declining 
working-age population, while improvements in life expectancy can have 
only a minor impact. Even though migration can bring about immediate 
changes in population growth, it is unlikely to be able to fully compensate 
for a decline in the working-age population due to aging (although 
different countries may have different opportunities to increase their labour 
supply). 
Marcela Veselková et al. explain in chapter 3 the importance of 
recognising that increasing or decreasing working-age populations will not 
automatically lead to changes in the number of workers or in the total 
number of hours worked, as labour supply also depends on labour market 
participation. Two more factors need to be taken into account: the labour 
market participation of this older population and the number of hours per 
week each individual is willing to work. Based on these factors, policies 
aimed at counterbalancing aging need to be targeted by country; for 
instance, labour market participation is still low in Hungary and Italy, 
while efforts to increase the number of hours worked may prove more 
effective in the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark.  
The authors found strong divergences in the evolution of skill levels 
in the labour supply projections for Europe. The evolution of the low-
skilled labour supply is similar in both scenarios; the difference arises from 
the supply of high-skilled labour. In the ‘friendly’ scenario, the potential 
quantity of high-skilled workers reaches almost 105 million in 2030, but 
only 83 million in the ‘tough’ scenario (i.e. 20% lower). This decrease in the 
labour force in terms of both quantity and, in the ‘tough’ scenario, quality 
reduces long-term potential economic growth and makes the rebalancing of 
European public finances more painful. 
However, employment in the next decade will depend not only on 
the demographic dynamics, but also on the macroeconomic conditions of 
the continent, as Marcela Veselková et al. report in the second part of 
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chapter 3. European GDP is expected to grow at an annual rate of 1.2% in 
the ‘tough’ scenario and 1.8% in the ‘friendly’ one. This translates into a net 
job creation that varies from no rise in employment in the ‘tough’ scenario 
to an annual creation of 1.5 million jobs in the ‘friendly’ scenario.  
There is lasting destruction of low-skilled employment in the tradable 
sectors in both scenarios. In the non-tradable sectors, low-skilled 
employment is more protected, but the projections are still pessimistic 
compared to past trends. High-skilled employment in the non-tradable 
sectors is growing fast and is the major contributor to employment creation 
in both scenarios. 
In the ‘friendly’ scenario, employment growth is mainly driven by the 
creation of an additional 15 million jobs in the private services sector 
between 2010 and 2030. The construction sector also exhibits non-negligible 
job creation, with 3.9 million additional jobs over the same period. In the 
‘tough’ scenario, the fall in employment is large in the non-market services, 
with 3.1 million fewer jobs in 2030 compared to 2010. In the private services 
sector, employment creation of only 3.5 million jobs is estimated, which is 
much lower than in the more optimistic scenario. In both scenarios, most 
jobs are destroyed in the agriculture and industry sectors.  
Technological progress also has a major impact on the evolution of 
the employment structure. The development of ICT enables the opening of 
a growing range of services to international competition, and can result in 
the replacement of workers in a factory by machines, or of workers in an 
office by a computer programme. This rising phenomenon induces 
polarisation of labour markets. 
The organisation of human labour will also be significantly 
transformed by the transition away from fossil fuels. We assume that both 
rising costs of energy generation and a declining energy return on 
investment (EROI) will make energy more costly and less abundant. Sooner 
or later, energy consumption will become quite expensive, particularly in 
rural areas. If scarcity should dominate the future of resource use, it might 
have two substantial impacts. First, the share of jobs in activities related to 
supplying society with material and energy would rise due to both lower 
energy returns on energy invested and the declining quality of ore. Second, 
if commodity prices remain high or rise even further, this trend could 
substantially alter business strategies. A decline in continuously available, 
low-cost energy could lead to reduced substitution of human labour by 
mechanical energy, and thus increase the proportion of physical work 
performed in our everyday life. 
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Rising fossil energy prices would also have an impact on sectoral 
employment; energy-intensive goods and services become less attractive as 
energy prices rise. For example, employment in the transport and 
equipment sector is reduced by 15% over the period. However, this price 
increase will stimulate demand in the energy renovation sub-sector, which 
is labour intensive, and thus boost employment in the construction sector. 
As the authors of chapter 6, we argue that the nature of work has also 
been changing. Workplace innovation can be a driver for changes towards 
sustainable forms of productivity gains. What does this mean in practical 
terms? In everyday working life, workplace innovation is translated into a 
number of specific actions such as flexi-time, teleworking, alternative 
payment schemes, employee empowerment and autonomy, task rotation 
and multi-skilling, team work and team autonomy. Evidence supports the 
notion that workplace innovation is beneficial for the economy as a whole, 
as well as for employees and employers. Despite the economic potential 
and more accessible technologies, we observe in the data that innovative 
practices still concern a minority of workers in most European countries. 
Moreover, only limited development has occurred over the last decade in 
this area. The authors suggest various explanations for this resistance, 
ranging from cost-related obstacles to a reluctance to move first and 
uncertainty about the results. New modes of working generate doubts and 
fears, which result in an uneven spread both geographically and across 
different practices.  
Flexi-time, teleworking and alternative payment schemes still 
concern a minority of workers, whereas more qualitative elements, such as 
teamwork, team autonomy and task rotation, are more widespread. 
The Nordic countries are in the lead when it comes to workplace 
innovation: Denmark, Sweden and Finland (as well as the Netherlands) 
rank highest in the diffusion of new ways of working, which are much 
more widespread in these countries than in the Mediterranean countries 
like Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy. In between are the Baltic countries – 
Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania – which occupy the middle rank, creating a 
model of ‘post-communist, almost-Nordics’. The most interesting case is 
Slovenia, which ranks fifth – just after the Nordic countries and the 
Netherlands – and has the same widespread diffusion across all elements.  
We offer one major policy recommendation in our chapter 6 to 
overcome the obstacles and ensure that workplace innovation takes place: 
the public sector should be mandated to lead by example. A successful 
change in an environment that is often considered less productive and 
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hostile to change could send an important message to the wider corporate 
world that workplace innovation leads to increased productivity, efficiency 
and sustainability. 
1.2 Skills, polarisation and inequality: The long-term pattern 
In an economy with a shrinking labour force, the main source of growth 
becomes productivity, which is (among other factors) a function of human 
capital. Therefore, Miroslav Beblavý and Marcela Veselková aim in chapter 
7 to extract and synthesise the findings in NEUJOBS research on the 
relationship between education and labour markets. Their analysis is 
driven by the following research questions: What can we expect as higher 
education is extended to the masses? Which university degrees are worth 
pursuing? Is later tracking of students an answer to educational inequality 
and how likely is it to be politically successful? How can low-skilled 
individuals improve their skills in later stages of their lives – going back to 
school or learning on the job? What does it even mean to be a low-skilled 
worker? 
In order to understand how the universalisation of higher education 
might take place and to explore its consequences, the authors conduct an 
in-depth study of the experiences of the universalisation of upper-
secondary education in six European countries. Their findings are very 
interesting. The enrolment rates in upper secondary education expanded 
rapidly in the post-World War II period, although the pace of expansion 
differed: it was slower in the leading countries, such as the United 
Kingdom or Sweden, and laggards were able to catch up relatively quickly 
once the limiting conditions were removed. As a result, education systems 
are less selective today than they were 60 years ago. Nevertheless, there are 
still significant differences between countries. The authors confirm that 
later tracking and early childhood education might enhance the equality of 
educational opportunities. Despite this finding, elite forms of education 
stubbornly survive, even in the mass and universal stages of education 
systems.  
It is difficult to predict future trends in this field, as they will result 
from opposing forces. On the one hand, continuing advocacy of later 
tracking by international organisations – such as the OECD and UNESCO – 
will create incentives for governments to converge towards ‘best practices’. 
On the other hand, the continuing privatisation of education systems will 
work as a counterforce to the above trend. As a result of the neo-liberal 
revolution, the monopoly of the state as provider of education has been 
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eroded and we are witnessing an increasing privatisation of the public 
sphere. Free choice of school may undermine efforts to increase equality of 
educational opportunities, because freedom in the selection of schools by 
pupils and pupils by schools tends to lead to segmentation and 
segregation.  
After finishing upper secondary education, those entering university 
tend to prefer the humanities and social sciences over the so-called ‘STEM’ 
(science, technology, engineering and mathematics) courses. The authors 
therefore examine whether it is more beneficial to study engineering or art. 
To answer this question, they calculate the net present value of university 
studies five years after graduation for five European countries: France, 
Italy, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.  
Surprisingly, it was not the STEM degrees that ensured the highest 
return on investment, but rather, the social science degrees. Graduates of 
art, the humanities and education obtained the lowest net present value. 
Based on this evidence, the expansion of enrolment in fields such as 
economics, business and law can be explained by rational choice. However, 
despite the different economic fortunes of university graduates, the authors 
found that with the exception of Italy, private investment in education 
largely repays itself after five years.  
What about the prospects for the low-skilled? The ‘low-skilled’ label 
can hide a number of different situations: apart from dropping out of 
school early, it can also be caused by labour market detachment, migration, 
possession of obsolete skills, as well as macroeconomic structural changes. 
In other words, you can be ‘low-skilled’ after leaving school, but you can 
also become so during your working life. For this reason, the numbers of 
low-skilled workers in the labour force will fluctuate over time, depending 
on various circumstances.  
However, the meaning of the term ‘low-skilled’ needs to be clarified. 
An analysis of job advertisements in three countries – the Czech Republic, 
Denmark and Ireland – showed that the set of skills demanded for low- 
and medium-skilled occupations varies widely from one country to 
another. For example, Slovak employers tend to be quite demanding even 
for jobs that are marked as ‘elementary’ in the International Classification 
of Occupation (ISCO). They require not only an upper secondary 
education, but also language abilities and soft skills, such as a strong work 
ethic, a positive attitude or flexibility. Overall, our research indicates that 
the term ‘low-skilled jobs’ might be a misnomer. Since not only the size, but 
also the structure and other characteristics of low-skilled unemployment 
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differ widely from one country to another, these findings should sound a 
strong call to policy-makers, in both EU and national institutions, to take 
not only a differentiated view, but also a holistic and more sophisticated 
view of this phenomenon.  
The likelihood of different societal groups acquiring skills and 
training differs in later stages of life. The results in chapter 7 imply that 
older cohorts are less likely to participate in training. Furthermore, lifelong 
learning is also determined by individual characteristics. Whereas men and 
immigrants are more likely to obtain an upper secondary education in their 
adult life, native-born citizens are more likely to achieve tertiary education. 
Contrary to the existing literature, results here imply that higher-educated 
individuals tend to participate less in training than those with other levels 
of education. 
Overall, the different strands of work in the interplay between 
education and the labour market lead us to assess recent and future 
developments in terms of job polarisation based on skills. Rising demand at 
the upper and lower ends of the occupational skills distribution took place 
during the decade from 1998 to 2008. Job polarisation also occurred in 17 
out of 25 EU countries between 2000 and 2010. The authors analysed labour 
demand and supply with respect to skills and tasks in an attempt to 
anticipate what types of skills mismatch EU countries will encounter over 
the next decade. The European Centre for the Development of Vocational 
Training (CEDEFOP) forecasts that this trend will continue until 2020; new 
jobs will be concentrated in higher and lower skill-level occupations, with 
slower growth in the mid-level ones. Simultaneously, it is expected that 
with the expanding education sector we will see a continuing replacement 
of low-skilled workers by medium-skilled workers. This means that the 
medium-skilled might temporarily assume positions for which they are 
overqualified. The call for policy-makers is therefore to tackle polarisation, 
as it is likely to increase socio-economic inequalities within societies along 
lines of ethnicity, gender, age and skill. 
1.3 What exactly do we mean by ‘work’?  
Human society – willingly or not, slowly or quickly – is in a transition 
away from the use of fossil fuels. This transition is expected to have 
implications that are as numerous and as far-reaching for human labour as 
those resulting from the transition towards the fossil fuel-based industrial 
society. Understanding the future of labour therefore implies more than 
simply looking at which sectors will be more or less successful and how 
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many jobs will be created or destroyed. In chapter 4, Marina Fisher-
Kowalski and Willi Haas question what work actually means, and what it 
is likely to mean under a different pattern of interaction between nature 
and society (the so-called ‘socio-metabolic regime’).  
In quantitative terms, it is observed that the share of time humans 
spend on reproduction, the household and their community/economy 
changes with the socio-metabolic regime. In mature agrarian systems, not 
only were the number of working hours very high but a great majority of 
the population was preoccupied with producing sufficient food for most of 
their lives. In the coal-based industrial regime, the availability of energy 
facilitated the use of additional labour provided cheaply by the first 
demographic transition. A change was observed after World War II: as oil 
becomes dominant, a substitution was observed between labour and 
technical energy. This pattern may soon be reversed due to the increases in 
the price of raw materials, which could substantially alter business 
strategies. We can expect a shift in the dominant mode of cost reduction 
from labour to resources. In this case, it is not the increase of labour 
productivity that would be the key measure, but rather the saving of 
resources, possibly at the expense of more labour.  
Their chapter also considers qualitative characterisations of human 
labour, with attention paid to three basic capacities: physical power, 
knowledge, and rationality and empathy. The prediction is that the long-
term decrease in the use of physical labour will be reversed due to an 
increase of labour demand in sectors such as energy, agriculture, 
construction and repair/renovation, which are notably labour intensive. In 
view of an aging and increasingly culturally heterogeneous and 
demanding population, the authors also assume an increase in the type of 
work that is based on empathy. This is embedded in all those services, such 
as caretaking, that are very difficult to substitute by ICT and almost 
impossible to outsource to other countries because they involve face-to-face 
contact with recipients of the services. 
1.4 What role for the state in the labour market? 
What is, and what should be, the role of the state in a labour market 
comprised of older but more highly-skilled workers facing strong 
international competition and a potentially very different production 
environment? Currently, the competencies of the state fall mainly into two 
areas: the elaboration of institutions to enhance the labour market and the 
provision of services for workers through welfare systems to correct the 
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negative consequences it may have (namely, reducing unemployment risks, 
preventing income loss and enhancing the transition of the labour market). 
National regulators still hold most of the competencies in this field, with 
European integration progressing in first steps over the last decades. 
Western, central and eastern European countries have converged, albeit 
slowly, in terms of their labour market institutions. However, we cannot 
speak of a single ‘European social model’. The level of employment 
protection varies considerably across European countries, and some 
countries tend to put more emphasis on the protection of regular workers 
while others are more focused on protecting temporary workers. 
Furthermore, government spending on labour market policies varies 
considerably. 
Labour market institutions also work differently, depending on the 
sector. Our research found that innovative sectors are much more sensitive 
to extensive protection of incumbents and labour market rigidity.  
Another issue concerns the interplay between different institutions 
that protect income rather than employment and jobs. The results on this 
front are in line with the literature on ‘flexicurity’ in that employment 
protection legislation and unemployment benefits can be considered 
substitutes. The authors of chapter 9, Ferry Koster and Olaf van Vliet, also 
detected a general trend towards reduced employment protection 
legislation over the last decade, which may be the explanation for renewed 
calls from workers for job security.  
As described by János Kovács in chapter 5, when workers were asked 
what mattered to them most with regard to the quality of their work, job 
security (in the sense of stable employment) dominated not only most of 
the ‘post-materialist’ values, but also the ‘traditional materialist’ quality 
features such as decent pay, appropriate physical working conditions 
(including health and safety at the workplace) and fixed working time. 
Moreover, the concept of the presumed ‘north-south’ cultural divide in 
employment discourses should be questioned. The case studies 
demonstrate the strength of global/transnational impacts, including those 
of the EU; they cut across national borders, homogenise the concept of job 
quality to a considerable extent, and turn large, cutting-edge firms into 
islands within which the employees order their preferences for good jobs 
quite independently of the dominant narratives of their countries’ elites. 
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1.5 The state as a service provider: The call for a social-
investment approach to social policies 
An even more important role can be played by the welfare state. Our 
findings call for policy-makers to shift the functions of European welfare 
systems away from correcting the negative impacts of labour markets 
towards a social-investment perspective. As Verena Dräbing explains in 
chapter 8, the underlying assumption of social investment is that welfare 
spending on certain policies can contribute to economic development. Its 
core goals are to enable citizens to help themselves throughout their lives 
and to reduce their neediness. These policies are characterised by three 
areas of focus: societal development; human development and capacitating 
citizens; and the long-term reduction of neediness instead of short-term 
mitigation. The key areas of interest include education, quality childcare, 
training, job-search assistance and rehabilitation. 
Although public perceptions may suggest otherwise, welfare states 
are not de facto immune to change. Following World War II, in an era of 
Keynesianism and predominantly male-breadwinner households, the focus 
of social policies was on the creation of jobs via public investment and on 
the increase in social expenditure on unemployment benefits, pension 
benefits, survivor and disability benefits, public healthcare and education. 
With the onset of the oil shocks in the 1970s, this model began to come 
under pressure. The rise of neo-liberalism as the dominant economic 
paradigm led to a series of privatisations, increased flexibility of the labour 
market and a retrenchment of public spending.  
In the early 1990s, new social risks increased the pressure on 
European welfare states. Among these are risks related to changes in family 
structure and gender roles: a higher prevalence of single-parenthood, 
difficulties reconciling work and care, and the growth in the number of frail 
relatives. In addition, the shift from an industrial to a service economy 
rendered some skills obsolete, resulting in the dismissal of employees. In 
the same vein, the need for low-skilled workers decreased, creating a new 
risk group of workers with low and superfluous skills. Aside from the rise 
of new social risks, aging societies increased the pressure on the welfare 
state while at the same time prompting the question of how economic 
productivity levels can be maintained while the workforce shrinks. 
Specifically, social security needs to take care of single and well-educated 
mothers, as well as older workers dismissed from factories that have 
outsourced their production to China, while at the same time ensuring that 
the workforce as a whole is competitive. The resulting questions of how 
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much welfare can be afforded and which productivity-increasing measures 
are available sparked the rise of the social investment debate. What are 
examples of social investment policies? And are they actually in place in 
European countries? 
Social investment policies are also labelled ‘capacitating’ as they 
enhance labour market participation. Care services for the elderly and 
children are therefore included, as they facilitate female employment, along 
with leave policies. Expenditure on education and active labour market 
policies are included due to their strong focus on human capital 
development, as well as funding of public research. Data on public 
expenditure in this field suggest a tendency towards an increase in social 
investment expenditure on families, active labour market policies and 
education. However, a clear divide across countries is apparent: eastern 
and southern European welfare states continue to spend much less on 
social investment per capita. Nordic countries have been the forerunners of 
social investment, while Christian-democratic countries and, to some 
extent, Anglo-Saxon countries have been catching up. It is clear that 
investment in family policies is on the rise, especially in childcare services, 
but for the most part regime patterns still persist. A slow but general shift 
towards a stronger reconciliation of work and care is thus taking place, 
although overall levels of investment are still lower in southern and some 
eastern European welfare states. 
1.6 What’s next? And after that? 
What are our recommendations for policy-makers at the EU level? Iain 
Begg suggests in chapter 10 a clear line of action: the reconciliation of the 
short-term goals dictated by the crisis afflicting Europe and the long-term 
goals driven by the societal, economic and ecological challenges. These 
transitions are a common concern, so it is vital to stress the collective costs 
and benefits of policy action and to recognise that collective long-term 
gains will often exceed short-term cost savings. An implication is that 
policy-makers should consider a collective discount rate for assessing such 
long-term gains. For example, in its governance processes (notably the 
annual cycle of the European semester and the country-specific 
recommendations), the European Commission and the Council should 
place more emphasis on medium- and long-run objectives for labour 
market institutions, including proposing milestones for their evolution.  
Last but not least, a general line of conduct should follow the 
rationale that, since the relationship between labour market institutions 
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and the behaviour of stakeholders is complex, simplistic policies (whether 
neo-liberal or social-democratic) are likely to be unhelpful. There is also a 
strong risk of either unintended consequences or of outcomes that satisfy 
one set of goals or normative considerations at the expense of another. The 
reform agenda therefore needs to be sensitive to such tensions.  
The success of the socio-ecological transition, however, will depend 
not only on policies, but also on how natural resources and societies evolve. 
Megatrends in the evolution of climate change, resource scarcity, 
population and knowledge-sharing will result in a more or less ‘friendly’ 
world, for which different response strategies will be appropriate. In a 
‘tough’ world, the sustainability transformation strategy might be the most 
suitable because it provides the vision and social cohesion required to 
overcome the hardships and challenges of a world shaped by ongoing and 
future transitions. This strategy is better suited to dealing with 
international volatility and supply shocks by focusing on inter-European 
activities and adaptation, thereby inducing changes towards a resilient and 
sustainable socio-metabolic regime with an emphasis on societal welfare 
rather than on increasing economic activity.  
In a ‘friendly’ world, policy-makers should target an ecological 
modernisation strategy, given that market-based strategies work best under 
more stable and smooth conditions in which economic actors can adjust 
their expectations and implement investment activities accordingly. 
Structural change can then be brought about with relatively minimal 
distortions or negative side effects. Finally, irrespective of the state of the 
world, business-as-usual strategies need to be avoided, as they have 
proved incapable of coping with changing global conditions. 
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2. EMERGING MEGATRENDS AND 
SCENARIOS IN THE SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL 
TRANSITIONS* 
his chapter will succinctly acquaint readers with the vision of the 
future on which the other chapters in this book are based. It is a 
vision of the future, or rather various possible futures, under the 
conditions of the socio-ecological transition and its consequences for 
employment overall, but also for key sectors and relevant groups. 
Specifically, the chapter describes the socio-ecological transition (SET) 
away from fossil fuels, which can be observed in two sets of megatrends. 
Megatrends in natural conditions include energy transition, rising 
challenges to resource security and increasing climate change impacts. 
Societal megatrends include demographic changes, shifting of economic 
and political centres of gravity, and growing use of information and 
communication technologies (ICT) and knowledge-sharing. The 
uncertainty and complexity associated with these megatrends are 
condensed into two alternative futures: a ’friendly’ and a ‘tough’ world. 
These two alternatives delineate European policy options. Although 
Europe cannot influence the speed and the intensity of the unfolding of the 
socio-ecological transition, it must be ready to address the challenges it 
brings. Three European response strategies are proposed: i) no policy 
change, ii) ecological modernisation and eco-efficiency and iii) 
                                                   
* Chapter 2 was compiled by Marcela Veselková and Miroslav Beblavý based on 
the work of Marina Fischer-Kowalski, Willi Haas, Dominik Wiedenhofer, Ulli 
Weisz, Irene Pallua, Nikolaus Possanner and Ekke Weis (from the University of 
Klagenfurt) and Arno Behrens, Giulia Serio and Monica Alessi (from CEPS) in 
work package 1 (Socio-ecological transition and employment implications) of the 
NEUJOBS project. 
T
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The impact of human activity on 
natural systems has been accelerated by 
the ongoing industrialisation of 
emerging economies. 
sustainability transformation. The effectiveness of these strategies will 
depend on the respective alternative future. 
The challenges associated with the socio-ecological transition away 
from fossil fuels can be expected to have far-reaching implications for 
production and consumption patterns, as well as for many other features of 
society. A change in an energy regime induces changes in society and other 
modifications in natural systems that occur either as an unintended 
consequence (such as resource exhaustion or pollution) or as intentional 
change induced by society (such as land use). These patterns of interaction 
between society and nature are known as ‘socio-metabolic’ regimes.1  
What drives socio-metabolic regime transitions? On such a broad and 
long-term scale, one cannot easily talk about actors and their deliberate 
efforts. What one can mainly analyse is structural change of interlinked 
social and natural systems, across a broad range of variables. The socio-
metabolic approach thus shares with complex systems theory the notion of 
‘emergence’: one state cannot be deliberately transformed into another, and 
neither can the process be fully controlled. One is confronted with self-
organising dynamics to which orderly governance or steering cannot be 
applied.2 The socio-metabolic approach therefore focuses on a relatively 
narrow set describing the society-nature interface for which quantitative 
measurements can be reliably obtained in very different contexts. The 
advantage of this restraint is that it is possible to empirically demonstrate 
the interconnectedness of socio-economic changes and changes in natural 
systems (between population growth, diets, land use and species 
extinction, for example). 
2.1 Introducing global scenarios 
Historical socio-ecological transitions, such as the fossil fuel-based 
industrialisation of Europe and elsewhere, led to a new type of society with 
unprecedented levels of natural resource extraction and energy and 
material consumption for approximately 15% of the world’s population. 
These were accompanied by an 
equally unprecedented growth in 
scientific and technical knowledge 
and democracy. These transitions 
led to a ten-fold increase in global 
material use and a seven-fold 
increase in domestic energy consumption (corresponding to an even larger 
12-fold increase in total primary energy supply) in the period from 1900 to 
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Between 1900 and 2009, 
industrialisation led to a ten-fold 
increase in global material use and a 
seven-fold increase in domestic energy 
consumption. 
2009.3 During the same time, world GDP increased by a factor of 26 and the 
global population quadrupled.4 
This transition is not only historical but is still ongoing. Economists 
use the term ‘emerging economy’ to refer to a country in the take-off or 
acceleration phase of the socio-ecological transition from an agrarian to an 
industrial regime, following pretty much the same pathway that mature 
industrial countries took in the 
centuries and decades before, based 
on the use of fossil fuels 
(increasingly, again, coal). Due to 
their much larger populations 
(comprising 60% of the world’s 
population), the ecological impact of 
their transitions – in terms of climate; biodiversity; soil, air and water 
pollution; depletion of fish stocks in the oceans; and nutrient washout into 
the oceans – would be huge, much larger than the impact of the historical 
transitions of the mature industrial countries. From the point of view of 
resource scarcity, however, it remains questionable whether this process 
will indeed take place or whether it will be abruptly halted in the middle of 
its acceleration.  
There is ample evidence provided by global change research that 
human activity caused, and continues to cause, major changes in the 
functioning of natural systems on every spatial scale – from local to global – 
and is transforming the earth’s system at an increasingly rapid pace.5 Such 
changes are now being accelerated by the ongoing process of 
industrialisation in the populous emerging economies. Thus, imagining 
2025, or even more so 2050, the expansive continuation of the industrial 
socio-metabolic regime for a majority of the world seems biophysically 
infeasible and threatens to further erode humanity’s natural base.  
It is very hard to predict precisely how fast these changes will happen. 
What is not subject to debate, however, is that some of them will happen, 
such as the exhaustion of cheap fossil fuels and a number of other natural 
resources, and – to say the least – increasing volatility of the climate system. 
Indeed, some of these developments can already be observed. Fischer-
Kowalski et al. refer to these developments as “global megatrends in 
natural conditions”, the biophysical part of the on-going socio-ecological 
transition.6 Still, these changes occur in response to, or as a consequence of, 
the continuing socio-ecological transition towards fossil fuel-based 
industrial societies and – sooner or later – will inevitably impose a new 
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socio-ecological transition on societies away from fossil fuels. The global 
megatrends in natural conditions include energy transitions (towards and 
away from fossil fuels), rising challenges to resource security and 
increasing climate change impacts. Furthermore, it is possible to observe 
elements of the social part of the socio-ecological transition that are related 
to social and technical achievements generated by the last transition. 
Fischer-Kowalski et al. call these ’global societal megatrends’, and they 
include the continuation of the global demographic transition, the ongoing 
shifts in the economic and political centres of gravity worldwide, and the 
growing use of ICT plus the related new forms of knowledge-sharing. 
These megatrends are fundamentally reshaping the global framework 
conditions for Europe. The speed of these megatrends and their magnitude 
are open to debate. Therefore, for each megatrend Fischer-Kowalski et al. 
distinguish between ‘friendly’ and ‘tough’ variants by 2025 and by 2050, 
and use these as global framework scenarios for the European policy option 
space.  
Figure 2.1 The socio-economic reproduction of Europe in a global context shaped 
by the ongoing socio-ecological transitions 
 
Source: Fischer-Kowalski et al. (2012, p. 77).  
Figure 2.1 depicts the European option space in this (dynamic) global 
framework. At the centre of the figure is the socio-economic reproduction 
of the European population at a certain level of welfare. The population is 
subject to demographic change (depending on global and internal 
conditions). Its reproduction, depending on the mode of production and 
consumption, requires the use of natural resources, the supply of which is 
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The energy transition will be 
accompanied by intensified global 
competition for scarce resources and, as 
a result, increasing and more volatile 
energy prices. 
subject to global (and internal) conditions. It also requires a certain amount 
and quality of human labour, again depending on global and internal 
conditions. At the top of the figure is the European policy process – 
political, economic and technical response strategies in a changing world 
shaped by the ongoing as well as the beginning of the next socio-ecological 
transitions. As mentioned above, for each megatrend Fischer-Kowalski et 
al. distinguish between ‘friendly’ and ‘tough’ variants: 
 A ‘friendly’ future entails moderate changes that pose fewer 
challenges for European policy-making. It entails incremental global 
changes in the lower ranges of change found in the literature. 
 The sketch of a ‘tough’ global future is based on still quite likely, but 
rather severe changes that would be highly challenging for European 
policy-making, shifting into the higher ranges of change found in the 
literature, including possible abrupt changes. 
2.2 Natural megatrends 
The megatrends in natural conditions include increasing climate volatility, 
an energy transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources and 
rising challenges to resource security.  
2.2.1 Energy transition 
While fossil fuels enabled and still enable the transition away from agrarian 
regimes, high demand in mature economies, as well as rising demand in 
emerging economies will sooner or later be faced with peak oil, peak gas 
and peak coal. Various studies of peak oil have identified the peak as 
occurring between 2008 and 2037. This will fundamentally change the 
context for the ongoing fossil-fuelled socio-ecological transition, as well as 
for the next transition towards renewable energy sources. 
In addition to future supply restrictions, climate change prompts 
global political responses, demanding mitigation policies that favour 
renewable energy sources and an overall reduction in fossil fuel 
consumption. Whether through 
climate mitigation policies or 
physical limits, a next energy 
transition is therefore inevitable and 
at least the take-off phase of such a 
new transition will be visible during 
the coming decades.  
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The transition away from fossil fuels will be accompanied by 
increasing and more volatile energy prices, as well as by higher energy 
investments to achieve the same amount of final energy supply, whether 
from renewables or from the remaining fossil fuel deposits (i.e. a declining 
energy return on investment, or EROI). While carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) technologies are seen as a glimmer of hope to mitigate these 
challenges, the feasibility of a large-scale rollout is under question and 
cannot safely be assumed in global scenarios. Finally, the bio-fuel demand 
of environmentally-oriented scenarios conflicts with food production, 
unless there is a major technological breakthrough. 
2.2.2 Rising challenges to resource security  
Enabled by increasing energy use, material consumption has increased 
tremendously in mature industrial countries and is currently stabilising at 
very high levels. As with energy, the overall global material demand will 
expand further, due to fast and rising growth in emerging economies. The 
overall rising global demand will encounter a deteriorating quality and a 
declining quantity of supply. 
For the EU, several raw materials are considered critical since they 
are of high economic importance and pose high supply risks. Some of these 
critical raw materials are not produced within the EU, such as rare earth 
elements (REEs) and phosphorus, for which much of the world is 
dependent on a few mining countries such as China and Morocco. 
Intensified global competition for resources will lead to further price 
increases and could contribute to price shocks. 
2.2.3 Stronger climate change impacts 
Climate change is a product of the former transition from biomass-based to 
fossil fuel-based energy systems in the now mature industrial economies. 
Past emissions are already determining severe changes due to a strong time 
lag in the climate system between cause (emissions) and effect (warming). 
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the next decade will significantly 
determine the extent of future climate change, the risk of triggering 
irreversible damage to global ecosystems and their consequences for 
humankind.  
If industrialised countries maintain their current levels of energy 
consumption and/or emerging countries increase their fossil fuel use to the 
level of mature countries (as they are currently projected to), this will 
greatly increase the risk of catastrophic climate change. It is reasonable to 
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assume that unabated climate change will cause large-scale changes in the 
earth’s system. In Europe, the Mediterranean countries will be hit the 
hardest with temperature increases, droughts, water scarcity, occasional 
flash floods and more forest fires leading to a loss of agricultural yields, 
with impacts on agriculture, tourism and health. Greece, Portugal and 
Spain, in particular, will be hot spots. A rise in sea levels is regarded as the 
greatest threat in the long term.  
Climate change, regarded as a multiplier of existing environmental 
and social threats, is increasingly perceived as an international security 
risk. For example, intensified global competition for resources and the 
resulting price shocks might lead to armed conflicts over resources. 
Therefore in the long run, the severity of impacts depends highly on both 
effective mitigation at the global level and adaptive capacities. 
2.3 Societal megatrends 
Societal megatrends include demographic transition, the ongoing shifts in 
the economic and political centres of gravity worldwide, and the growing 
use of ICT plus the related new forms of knowledge-sharing. 
2.3.1 Population dynamics 
In mature industrial economies, the previous demographic transition was 
closely linked – via the increased availability of food and shelter and 
societal capacities to absorb a growing labour force – to the historical SET. 
This demographic transition has now been largely completed and led to a 
stagnating (or even declining) and ageing population. In emerging 
economies, present population growth is going hand in hand with growth 
in the use of fossil fuels and other resources, following a similar pattern – 
though fortunately not as steep – to that previously observed in today’s 
mature industrial countries. The global population size and structure are 
crucial factors for environmental concerns, since environmental impacts are 
closely related to both population size and affluence. The observed 
slowdown of global population growth will probably lead to a stabilisation 
of world population within this century, but at a challengingly high level. 
Increasing short-term migration and relocation movements due to climate 
change impacts in Europe need to be considered. 
2.3.2 Shifting economic and political centres of gravity  
To date, the fifth of the world’s population that is concentrated in the 
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Europe’s educated population and ICT 
create an opportunity to actively shape 
the unfolding of the transition away 
from fossil fuels. 
industrialised countries has been able to dominate the rest of the world. 
However, the transition of emerging economies into a fossil fuel-based 
energy system has allowed for an economic development that increasingly 
makes the other four-fifths of the world’s population equal partners, if not 
the dominant players of the future. A shift of the political centres of gravity 
away from mature towards emerging economies will be a natural 
consequence of the faster growth of emerging economies. At the same time, 
global economic and political interconnectedness through trade, global 
production chains, international investments and media communications is 
steadily increasing. The next energy transition away from fossil fuels, 
issues of resource security, increasing climate change impacts and higher 
volatility of commodity prices will be important challenges for 
international collaboration. It remains an open question whether 
international relations will become more collaborative or more 
confrontational in the face of the challenges ahead. 
2.3.3 Growing use of ICT and knowledge-sharing  
This latest class of new technologies does not substitute – as most 
technologies before – for physical labour, but rather, it enhances and 
substitutes for intellectual labour and communications. It could provide 
crucial enabling tools for a next SET – enabling the handling of complex 
systems, speeding up the process of knowledge-sharing worldwide and 
across all areas, and creating a cheap communications space for the 
development of new world views and lifestyles. However, ICT tools are 
akin to a double-edged sword: analysing and managing complex systems 
are tasks performed by both democratic and dictatorial regimes. 
Transparency can help both enlightenment and surveillance, and social 
media may foster social innovation at the same time that it foments mass 
hysteria. 
2.4 European response strategies 
Considering the ongoing socio-ecological transitions and their global 
consequences, Europe has to be prepared for a more complex and 
challenging world than it has 
inhabited during the last few 
decades. Europe therefore must 
make its choices on how to adapt to 
higher energy, food and resource 
prices, more frequent extreme 
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weather events challenging existing infrastructures, and possibly more 
international tensions over resources and mobility. Moreover, price 
increases will hit low-income people the hardest and further increase 
distributional tensions within Europe. On the other hand, Europe’s 
population is better educated than ever before, ICT offers completely novel 
opportunities for democratic knowledge-sharing and for the smart 
regulation of complex systems, and Europe's immense wealth allows for 
investment in new infrastructure that, if implemented properly, will make 
Europeans less vulnerable to climate events, energy shortages and resource 
price booms.  
Politically, rather than passively settling for more unfavourable 
conditions, there is the chance to play a pro-active role in moulding the 
unfolding of the next socio-ecological transitions of mature industrial 
economies into a more sustainable future. Will Europe be able to create 
conditions under which climate change can be kept within acceptable 
limits? Can market economies become less dependent on rising energy and 
materials inputs, possibly less dependent on growth altogether, and 
actively seek their margins in (input) cost reductions? Will Europe find 
ways to handle the distributional tensions that inevitably accompany low 
growth and rising prices in a peaceful and socially fair way? These are 
challenges that call for broad political visions that gradually need to 
emerge and be defended by authentic and plausible policy action and 
communication. The current financial crisis – not unlike what we saw with 
the oil crises in the early 1970s that were also preceded by a broad 
movement promoting cultural change – could provide a turning point for 
such a development. The current European policy priority of financial 
stability could be a first step in this direction. 
Fischer-Kowalski et al. sketch three strategies for European policy-
makers to cope with the changing global context of ongoing socio-
ecological transitions. Two of these scenarios involve actively trying to 
shape the beginnings of the next socio-ecological transition away from 
fossil fuels.  
2.4.1 Strategy 1: No policy change 
First, no policy change assumes a business-as-usual approach without any 
additional policies to achieve sustainability. The overall aim is to defend 
the existing mode of production and consumption, as well as the vested 
business interests related to these consumption patterns, while trying to re-
establish previous, more favourable conditions at the international level. As 
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a result, existing sustainability policies are only partially implemented. 
There is a broad range of issues that are left unattended. For example, it is 
reasonable to assume that global megatrends will undermine the welfare of 
Europeans in the future. At the same time, there is a lack of shared political 
vision to prepare people for upcoming changes and to win support of 
voters. This further undermines national democratic systems and the 
common European vision, and may prompt a search for scapegoats (of 
foreigners, politicians, etc.). The halting of European political integration is 
a major impediment to any coherent common measures to address the 
global challenges outlined above. 
2.4.2 Strategy 2: Ecological modernisation and eco-efficiency 
In this second strategy, Europe attempts to actively deal with the 
challenges associated with the transition away from fossil fuels by 
achieving eco-efficient production systems through market-based 
instruments and the internalisation of externalities. Via increased eco-
efficiency in Europe, levels of energy and resource consumption are 
stabilised or even reduced, while efforts continue to secure growth in 
income (i.e. relative or even absolute decoupling of growth and 
energy/material consumption).  
This scenario assumes full use of the EU Emissions Trading System 
(ETS) to address climate change, support for investments in renewable 
energy sources, ecological tax reform reflecting energy and material 
intensity of products, removal of subsidies that promote wasteful use of 
energy and materials or using ICT for resource-optimised dealing with 
complex systems (smart grids, sustainable mobility satisfying present 
mobility needs, etc.) Although gains in the efficiency of energy 
consumption would result in an effective reduction in energy prices, the 
reduced prices would encourage an increase in the consumption of energy 
services.7 This so-called ‘rebound effect’ is thus one of the main risks 
associated with the ecological modernisation and eco-efficiency strategy. 
The reliance on supply-side market instruments might also contribute to 
the growing inequality of access to resources. 
2.4.3 Strategy 3: Sustainability transformation 
This strategy recognises that there is bound to be a next socio-ecological 
transition and pro-actively tries to shape its take-off, while at the same time 
taking action to deal with fundamental changes in global conditions. This 
includes the recognition that a significant reduction in fossil fuel use is 
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necessary and will have far-reaching social and economic consequences. 
Therefore, it requires a reconsideration of societal goals based on a 
thorough, informed public debate and entails changes in consumption 
(both patterns and levels) with a fundamental structural change in the 
economy. 
In the ‘sustainability transformation’ strategy, substantial structural 
change is envisioned and pursued. Goals are set to achieve a smart, lean 
and fair societal metabolism with the aim of optimising European welfare. 
To be more specific, smart refers to measures taken in the ecological 
modernisation scenario. Fair refers to striving for a more equal welfare 
distribution in Europe and worldwide, which implies new definitions of 
work and time use priorities that better address age and gender differences 
and allow for improved work-life balances or high taxes on speculation. 
Lean implies a reduction in societal metabolism and therefore decreased 
demand for transport, a decoupling of labour from energy productivity, the 
avoidance of rebound effects and sustainability. 
A number of measures should be taken to achieve these goals. For 
example, Diet change towards less meat/more vegetarian food would 
substantially reduce biomass metabolism and agricultural land use. Major 
investment in R&D could lead to a re-design of strategic products in a way 
that would save energy and resources in production and use. Similarly to 
the ecological modernisation scenario, ICT should be used to better 
understand and control complex systems. Additionally, ICT capacity may 
be used to shift consumption to less resource-intensive forms, e.g. virtual 
communications instead of travelling. A decisive ecological tax reform that 
is based on raw material equivalents (to include products' embedded 
energy for imports) could shift taxes from labour to resources, as implicit in 
a property tax and a financial transactions tax. Finally, the payoff from 
productivity gains should materialise in a reduction in working hours – not 
of income. 
2.5 How to evaluate the European response 
The success or failure of these response strategies will depend to a large 
extent on the global conditions, as described above. In terms of game 
theory, Fischer-Kowalski et al. created the general framework that allows 
for a straightforward evaluation and visualisation of the results for each 
scenario for a number of indicators of interest (environmental, social and 
economic) under different future global conditions (Table 2.1). 
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Table 2.1 Speculative game-theoretical payoffs of three European response 
strategies under two scenarios of global conditions 
 Global 
scenario 
Rate of change 
induced by 
response 
strategy 
‘Friendly’ 
world 
‘Tough’ 
world 
Response 
scenario 
Gradual 
change 
Rapid 
change 
No policy change Low - -- 
Ecological modernisation Medium ++ - 
Sustainability 
transformation 
High + ++ 
Source: Fischer-Kowalski et al. (2012, p. 95). 
Fischer-Kowalski et al. argue that business-as-usual strategies will 
not be able to cope with the changing global conditions. An insistence on 
the stabilisation of the status quo will impede the necessary social and 
economic adjustments and structural changes, and therefore most likely 
lead to negative pay-offs under both sets of global conditions scenarios. 
Under the ecological modernisation strategy, in contrast, outcomes 
will be the most satisfactory under the conditions of a ’friendly’ world. This 
strategy, however, will fail under the conditions of a ‘tough’ world, in 
which the rebound effects could shake the new status quo. This assessment 
is mainly based on the judgement that market-based strategies work best 
under relatively stable and smooth conditions because the expectations of 
economic actors can adjust properly and implement investment activities 
accordingly. Structural change can be induced with relatively minimal 
distortions or negative side effects. The open questions are the magnitude 
of the negative feedback from this strategy and the speed with which the 
adjustments can happen. 
The sustainability transformation strategy is expected to have a 
positive outcome under both scenarios of future conditions, but to be more 
valuable in a ‘tough’ world because it provides the vision and coherence 
required to overcome the hardships and challenges in a world shaped by 
ongoing and future SETs. This strategy is better suited to dealing with 
international volatility and supply shocks by focusing on inter-European 
activities and adaptation, thereby inducing changes towards a resilient and 
sustainable socio-metabolic regime with a focus on societal welfare rather 
than on increasing economic activity. This also includes numerous 
technical and social innovations, thereby strengthening the role of Europe 
as a leader in promoting and implementing sustainable development. 
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3. HOW MUCH WORK WILL THERE BE? 
WHERE IS IT GOING TO COME FROM?* 
emographic developments are expected to have a strong impact on 
European labour markets in the coming decade. As labour 
participation is a key determinant of the long-term economic 
growth and a source of government revenue, the ageing European 
population is a major policy problem. Employment in Europe will be 
strongly affected by aging, but also by other factors such as the upskilling 
of the population and the macroeconomic health status of the continent.   
In this chapter a series of predictions are presented on labour force 
participation and on employment, the latter with details by sector. 
Projections show that total number of hours worked is expected to, at best, 
remain constant on average in Europe, but with strong variations across 
countries. This will translate into higher wages and higher revenues for 
public pockets. Job creation will occur exclusively in the service sector, 
although its size will be strongly influenced by fiscal policies. The time 
horizon considered is 2030, which is sufficiently close for forecasts to be 
considered trustworthy but also far enough out for change to be observed.  
These forecasts are based on the scenarios described in chapter 2, 
where various possible visions of the future are described. Specifically, the 
                                                   
* Chapter 3 was written by a team of authors: Marcela Veselková based on research 
conducted by the team from the Institute for Labour Research (IZA), as well as 
Nicole van der Gaag (researcher at the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic 
Institute), Baptiste Boitier (senior researcher at SEURECO - Société EURopéenne 
d’ECOnomie), Nicolas Lancesseur (SEURECO and Université Paris 1) and Paul 
Zagamé (scientific director at SEURECO and Professor Emeritus at Université Paris 
1 Panthéon Sorbonne). It is based on findings from work packages 9 (Modelling 
economic and employment developments) and 10 (Modelling the evolution of the 
labour supply and labour demand) of the NEUJOBS project. The final version was 
compiled and edited by Marcela Veselková. 
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chapter describes the socio-ecological transition (SET) away from fossil 
fuels, which can be observed in two sets of megatrends. Megatrends in 
natural conditions include the energy transition, rising challenges to 
resource security and increasing climate change impacts. Societal 
megatrends include demographic changes, shifting of economic and 
political centres of gravity, and growing information and communication 
technologies (ICT) use and knowledge-sharing. The uncertainty and 
complexity associated with these megatrends are condensed into two 
alternative futures: a ‘friendly’ and a ‘tough’ world. 
3.1 Changes in population and labour force: Theoretical 
considerations and 2000-10 dynamics 
Since the start of this century, the average annual rate of population growth 
in the European Union has been below 0.5%, which is similar to other 
developed countries but modest in comparison to other world regions. 
Even with such a small rate of change, most European countries 
experienced population growth between 2000 and 2010, mostly thanks to 
migration. But in some – namely Germany and some eastern European 
countries – populations had already started to decline (Figure 3.1, left 
graph, yellow bars). With an average annual population decline of 0.8%, 
the drop was most severe in Bulgaria. Nonetheless, whether a more or less 
optimistic scenario is considered, the total population of the continent will 
be greater in 2020 than it is currently. The second most important fact about 
demographic development is that Europeans are, on average, getting 
older.1 Does aging matter for economic growth? Surprisingly enough, the 
answer is only to a certain extent.  
What really matters for economic growth is not the total population 
but the working-age population, which we define as the population aged 
20 to 64. Despite the ‘grey-looking’ future, a large majority of the EU 
countries in the last decade saw the size of their working-age population 
increase (Figure 3.1, left graph). In the years to come, however, most 
countries will face a declining working-age population, even under the 
more optimistic scenario (Figure 3.1, right graph). 
A larger working-age population is only foreseen for Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
However, with the exception of Luxembourg, the growth rate of the 
working-age population in these countries will still become smaller than 
the growth rate of the total population, and thus the pressure placed on the 
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working-age population to take care of the young and the old will increase 
in almost all countries. 
Table 3.1 Population (in thousands) and labour market participation factors 
contributing to labour supply 
 2010 2030 ‘Friendly’ 
scenario 
2030 ‘Tough’ 
scenario 
Country POP1 WAP1 Emp1 Hours2 POP3 WAP3 POP3 WAP3 
EU27 499,199.6 305,802.8 68.5 n.a. 536,289.5 301,620.9 488,329.3 278,919.0 
Austria 8,375.3 5,153.3 74.9 n.a. 9,104.5 5,152.3 8,276.9 4,790.4 
Belgium 10,839.9 6,496.9 67.6 1551 12,478.8 6,881.7 11,718.4 6,564.5 
Bulgaria 7,563.7 4,795.2 65.4 n.a. 7,221.0 4,198.1 5,832.4 3,404.9 
Cyprus 803.1 505.7 75.0 n.a. 994.9 576.8 886.9 511.9 
Czech 
Republic 
10,506.8 6,797.6 70.4 1811 11,185.3 6,554.1 10,109.2 6,038.9 
Denmark 5,534.7 3,279.6 75.8 1546 5,974.7 3,292.8 5,670.5 3,183.7 
Estonia 1,340.1 827.1 66.7 1879 1,419.5 808.2 1,133.2 635.2 
Finland 5,351.4 3,218.0 73.0 1677 5,759.2 3,040.8 5,491.6 2,963.6 
France 62,791.0 36,861.5 69.2 1480 69,458.1 36,791.4 66,195.2 35,565.4 
Germany 81,802.3 49,560.8 74.9 1407 80,831.6 44,230.1 72,318.2 40,398.7 
Greece 11,305.1 6,967.7 64.0 2016 11,797.1 6,799.8 10,851.2 6,399.1 
Hungary 10,014.3 6,270.2 60.4 1959 9,740.6 5,788.2 9,182.9 5,680.3 
Ireland 4,467.9 2,733.6 64.6 1542 5,269.9 2,969.0 4,654.1 2,545.8 
Italy 60,340.3 36,688.6 61.1 1772 67,635.2 38,465.1 60,648.3 35,230.4 
Latvia 2,248.4 1,405.3 65.0 n.a. 2,133.8 1,253.9 1,767.6 1,067.9 
Lithuania 3,329.0 2,054.3 64.4 n.a. 3,133.4 1,780.0 2,824.1 1,632.5 
Luxembourg 502.1 313.1 70.7 1636 654.8 387.1 609.4 366.6 
Malta 413.0 259.8 60.1 n.a. 432.0 242.9 373.9 211.3 
Netherlands 16,575.0 10,108.3 76.8 1381 18,065.8 9,866.4 17,002.6 9,442.9 
Poland 38,167.3 24,694.0 64.6 1940 38,290.3 22,412.8 34,817.1 20,928.0 
Portugal 10,637.7 6,553.2 70.5 1740 11,066.6 6,444.2 10,016.5 6,049.5 
Romania 21,462.2 13,740.0 63.3 n.a. 21,881.2 13,451.3 18,032.3 11,128.2 
Slovenia 2,047.0 1,315.7 70.3 1675 2,267.2 1,289.2 2,058.3 1,187.2 
Slovakia 5,424.9 3,560.3 64.6 1807 5,706.0 3,426.1 5,254.0 3,234.0 
Spain 45,989.0 29,131.0 62.5 1674 51,972.5 30,574.9 44,787.9 26,525.0 
Sweden 9,340.7 5,461.9 78.1 1635 10,976.2 5,945.3 10,330.4 5,680.4 
UK 62,027.3 37,050.2 73.6 1652 70,839.1 38,998.5 67,486.1 37,552.8 
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Most EU countries will face a 
declining working-age population 
under both scenarios. 
Notes: POP = Total population. WAP= Working age population (i.e. population aged 20-64). 
Emp = Employment rate of working age population. Hours = Average number of working 
hours per week on main job. n.a. = Not available. 
1 Data source: Eurostat; 2 Data source: OECD; 3 Data source: NEUJOBS.  
Figure 3.1 Annual average change in working-age population (aged 20-64), 2000-
20 and 2020-30 under ‘friendly’ and ‘tough’ scenarios 
    
Note: Countries sorted by change in total population in 2000-10. 
Data sources: Eurostat and NEUJOBS; calculations: Netherlands Interdisciplinary 
Demographic Institute (NIDI).  
Even under the ‘friendly’ scenario – with rather high fertility, life 
expectancy and immigration 
assumptions – in the short term most EU 
countries cannot escape their aging fate. 
Given the relatively short projection 
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A 1% decrease in the population will 
not automatically translate into a 
1% decrease in the labour force. 
period, this is not surprising. In a time horizon of only 20 years, 
developments in fertility will not contribute to changes in the population 
aged 20-64 at all, as the first children born during this period only enter the 
working-age population after the projection period ends. Furthermore, in 
most countries, mortality rates for those aged 20-64 are already rather low, 
so improvements in life expectancy at these ages can have only minor 
impacts. Finally, even though migration can bring about immediate 
changes in population growth, it is most unlikely to fully compensate for 
declines in the working-age population. 
The future is not altogether gloomy, however. Population aging will, 
in fact, be partially compensated for by behavioural changes linked to 
demographic developments and the characteristics of this new (but older) 
labour force. In other words, a 1% decrease in the population will not 
automatically translate into a 1% decrease in the labour force.  
What matters for the health of 
the economy is the total number of 
hours worked, not the head count of 
workers. For this reason, to 
understand the evolution of the 
future labour supply it is important to decompose the average annual 
change in total numbers of working hours into three components:  
 changes in the working-age population,  
 changes in employment rates and  
 changes in the average weekly number of hours worked per 
employee.  
Figure 3.2 shows how each item contributed to changes in the labour 
supply between 2000 and 2010. In all countries, one observes a decline in 
the average number of working hours per employee. In all countries, 
however – with the exception of Denmark, Estonia and Hungary – this 
decline in average working hours is more than offset by favourable 
demographic dynamics and increasing employment rates. In Germany, the 
working-age population in 2010 was lower than in 2000, but the resulting 
decline in labour supply due to demographic changes and falling working 
hours was less severe than the increase due to rising employment rates. 
Overall, therefore, labour supply in Germany grew slightly. Denmark, 
Estonia and Hungary, on the other hand, experienced an annual average 
decline in their labour supply of 0.5%, due to falls in both working hours 
and employment rates, with hardly any change in the working-age 
population.  
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Figure 3.2 Annual average change in labour supply due to changes in working-age 
population, employment rate and annual average hours per week per 
employee, 2000-10 
 
Note: Countries sorted by total change. 
Data sources: Eurostat and OECD; calculations: Netherlands Interdisciplinary 
Demographic Institute (NIDI). 
In the years to come, the picture will change. Even under a rather 
favourable population scenario, the working-age population will start to 
decline in most countries. Increasing labour supply will therefore need to 
come from changes in labour market participation and/or increasing 
numbers of hours worked per employee. As has been the case for the past 
decade, different countries will have to choose different strategies to 
achieve this result.  
3.2 Structural and behavioural aspects of labour supply: 
A look at the next two decades 
As explained in detail in the previous section, the total labour supply is 
affected not just by structural aspects, such as changes in the size and 
composition (e.g. age, gender, skill-level or household type) of the 
workforce. The behavioural dimension, i.e. the individual decision on 
whether or not to work and how much, matters as well.2 It is crucial to take 
this behavioural dimension into account in predicting potential challenges 
arising from the changing composition of working-age populations. 
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Individual decisions on whether to work 
or not influence labour participation, 
and hence the total labour supply. 
From a policy perspective, the distinction between the structural and 
behavioural aspects is crucial. Dolls et al. illustrate this distinction using the 
following example.3 If the relative share of socio-demographic groups 
which prefer to work part-time or which have a high preference for leisure 
increases more than the relative share of groups which prefer to work more 
hours, the change in total labour supply (measured in hours worked) will 
not be equivalent to the change in the size of the working-age population. 
This has important policy implications, because the change in head counts 
and the change in hours worked might be more effectively addressed by 
different policies. A reduction in 
the size of the labour force could 
be tackled with targeted migration 
policies, while fewer total hours 
worked as a result of high 
numbers of people working part-time could be tackled with improvements 
in childcare services. Dolls et al. therefore provide projections of both the 
size and the composition of the labour force for the ‘tough’ and ‘friendly’ 
scenarios developed by Huisman et al.4 
Figure 3.3 depicts the change in the size of the labour force in terms of 
the headcount. On average across all countries, the labour force shrinks by 
9.2% in the ‘tough’ scenario and by 1% in the ‘friendly’ scenario.  
Figure 3.3 Decline of labour force (headcount) 
 
Source: Dolls et al. (2013, p. 5). 
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The total amount of hours worked is 
expected to shrink by 8.9% under the 
‘tough’ scenario and to remain constant 
under the ‘friendly’ scenario. 
However, the projections imply divergent trends across countries. 
The demographic trends will be least favourable in Bulgaria, Germany, the 
Baltic states and Romania, which will experience the strongest decrease in 
labour supply. In these countries, the labour supply in terms of the 
headcount is projected to shrink by between 18% and 28% in the ‘tough’ 
scenario. In contrast, the labour force in Belgium, Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
Sweden and the UK is projected to grow under both scenarios.  
Figure 3.4 shows the projected changes in total hours worked, which 
under the ‘tough’ scenario is expected to shrink by 8.9%, on average. In 
contrast, the ‘friendly’ scenario implies no aggregate change to hours 
worked. However, there is strong variation in the total hours worked 
across countries. The ‘friendly’ scenario projects an increase, or at least 
stagnation, in hours worked in about half of the EU countries. Large 
increases are expected in Belgium, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Sweden. 
Furthermore, these increases tend 
to be greater than the increase in 
headcount. In contrast, significant 
reductions in total hours worked 
are projected for Bulgaria, 
Germany, the Baltic states and 
Romania.  
Figure 3.4 Change in total hours worked 
 
Source: Dolls et al. (2013, p. 11).  
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In order to fully capture the difference between the structural and 
behavioural dimensions of demographic change, it is important to examine 
the difference between the percentage change in hours and the percentage 
change in headcount, also known as the excess difference (ED). An ED of 
less than zero indicates that the structural tendencies are reinforced by 
individual behaviour patterns. This implies that, given projected 
demographic changes between now and 2030 (which are negative in most 
cases), the drop in total labour supply will be even stronger than the drop 
in headcount. This represents a future in which the share of older workers 
is growing and these older workers choose to work fewer hours. In 
contrast, an ED greater than a zero indicates a future in which the 
reduction in hours is less severe than the reduction in heads (due to fewer 
part-time workers, for example), thereby weakening the adverse effect on 
total labour supply. Figure 3.5 suggests that the demographic development 
is particularly worrying for continental Europe and the UK and Ireland, at 
least under the ‘tough’ scenario. 
Figure 3.5 Between now and 2030: Reduction in hours is less severe than the 
reduction in headcount 
 
Notes: Continental = AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; Nordic = DK, FI, SE; Southern = CY, 
EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; Eastern= BG, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SI, SK. 
Source: Dolls et al. (2013, p. 14). 
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A decrease in the labour force will push 
wages up and higher wages will induce 
higher labour participation. 
3.3 Labour demand and wage adjustment: Fewer but better 
paid workers?  
Disregarding the demand-side reaction to demographic changes may lead 
to an underestimation of employment rates. Figure 3.6 depicts the 
adjustment in the labour market that is likely to occur between now and 
2030. Point A represents the 
equilibrium in 2010. A decrease in 
the labour force due to 
demographic trends (as will be 
observed in most EU countries 
between 2010 and 2030) shifts the aggregate supply curve to the left. As a 
result, the equilibrium moves from point A to point B. However, point B 
will not be the new equilibrium because the labour demand will respond to 
a shift in labour supply. At the old wage level, there is now an excess 
labour demand and the wage must rise. Wage increases yield both a higher 
participation rate and a higher level of hours worked. The shift in the 
labour supply curve thus raises the equilibrium from point B to point C, 
which is characterised by an increase in employment and an increase in 
wages. 
Figure 3.6 Wage adjustments due to demographic change 
 
Source: Dolls et al. (2014, p. 6). 
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The wage adjustment to demographic change is composed of two 
distinct parts: 1) the change in average wages in response to demographic 
change between 2010 and 2030; and 2) the change in average wages caused 
by the labour market reaction to this demographic change (the shift from 
point A to point C in Figure 3.6). Figures 3.7 and 3.8 illustrate the relative 
magnitude of these effects. Under both the ‘tough’ and ‘friendly’ scenarios, 
the effect of demographics on average wages is positive. This reflects not 
only the well-known aging issue, but also the continuous upskilling of the 
population. Overall, future European workers will be not only older but 
also better skilled and more productive and, as a consequence, also better 
paid. 
Under the ‘friendly’ scenario, average wage changes due to 
demographics exceed +20% for some countries – such as Greece, Malta, 
Poland, Portugal and Romania – which are expected to experience a large 
upskilling of their populations between 2010 and 2030. In others, the 
overall wage changes are modest because the positive demographic effect 
is counteracted by a negative labour market effect, notably an increase in 
headcount or an increase in hours worked. The largest average wage 
decreases induced by the labour market are found in Cyprus, Luxembourg 
and Sweden, countries that are expected to experience the largest increase 
in headcount under the ‘friendly’ scenario. 
Under the ‘tough’ scenario, the effect of labour market adjustment on 
wages is positive.  The largest increase in average wages in response to the 
labour market are found in countries expected to experience the largest 
decrease in headcount, such as Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia and Latvia. 
Germany represents an extreme example: under the ‘tough’ scenario, the 
total labour force is projected to fall by 18.7%, the share of 50-64 year olds is 
projected to increase by 5.8% and the level of upskilling is expected to 
remain constant. As a result, the hours worked (before wage adjustment) 
are expected to fall by 22%. In response to this scarcity of labour, the wages 
of those left in the labour force are projected to increase by 50%, on 
average. The labour supply will therefore increase in response to the higher 
wages, particularly at the farthest margin. 
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Figure 3.7 Average wage changes due to demographic changes and the labour 
market response, ‘tough’ scenario 
 
Source: Dolls et al. (2014, p. 10). 
Figure 3.8 Average wage changes due to demographic changes and the labour 
market response, ‘friendly’ scenario 
 
Source: Dolls et al. (2014, p. 11). 
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Higher wages, and as a result higher 
tax and social revenues, may ease 
fiscal pressures associated with 
ageing populations. 
3.4 Fiscal effects of demographic change: Public finances 
likely to find relief despite ageing 
The demographic shock is expected to have an impact well beyond the 
labour demand and supply dynamics, and to also affect government 
revenues. One question comes directly to mind: with fewer people paying 
taxes, will the predicted wage increase compensate for the shrinkage in 
labour supply with regard to tax revenues and social security 
contributions? Projections for the ‘friendly’ and ‘tough’ scenarios suggest 
that this might be the case. Table 3.2 lists percentage changes in income tax 
revenues and revenues from social security contributions.  
Under the ‘friendly’ scenario, the percentage change in tax revenues 
in the EU-27 attributable to the wage increases reaches 30%. The positive 
development in income tax receipts is a result of two counteracting effects. 
First, the ‘friendly’ scenario assumes an increase in hours worked and 
employment rates. Average wages therefore decline in many of the EU-27. 
This drop leads to an additional small increase in employment rates, while 
overall hours worked remain constant. As a result, the tax base widens and 
tax revenues increase. Under the ‘tough’ scenario, the percentage change in 
tax revenues in the EU-27 attributable to the wage increases reaches 35.7%. 
This greater projected increase in income tax receipts is a result of a smaller 
projected labour force, and consequently higher wages. For example, the 
50% average wage increase in Germany is largely responsible for the 69% 
increase in tax revenue projected for the country. 
Social security contributions (SSCs) are projected to increase 
between 2010 and 2030 under both the ‘tough’ and ‘friendly’ scenarios. The 
wage changes implied by demographic change have two roles in increasing 
SSC projections. First, SSCs increase 
in response to wage increases. 
Second, the wage increase will be 
followed by increases in hours 
worked and employment rates, and 
subsequently an increase in SSC 
revenue. Overall, the increase in income tax contributions is higher than the 
increase in SSCs because after an assessment threshold, these contributions 
are fixed. SSCs increase by 10.2% under the ‘tough’ scenario and by 11.7% 
under the ‘friendly’ scenario. 
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Table 3.2 Percentage change in public revenue between 2010 and 2030 with 
projected wage changes 
  Taxes Social contributions 
  ‘Tough’ ‘Friendly’ ‘Tough’ ‘Friendly’ 
AT 52.1 43.5 5.4 -0.1 
BE 20 17.8 18 16.9 
BG -6.1 8 -9.4 2.8 
CY 19.4 31 3.4 5.2 
CZ 25.7 27.4 12.5 18.3 
DE 68.6 29.1 7.3 5.3 
DK 29.9 49.2 15 20.7 
EE 3.2 8.1 -3.8 5 
EL 40 41.2 4.6 5.1 
ES 41.6 31.1 17.1 22.1 
FI 17.8 20.7 11.8 13.2 
FR 44.8 57.2 12.9 16.7 
HU 6.2 8.1 4.9 9.4 
IE 61.3 25 40.6 18.4 
IT 39.6 35.8 11.5 10.2 
LT 8.1 12.6 4.9 10 
LU -8.3 -7.4 3 5.5 
LV 0.7 7.5 -1.7 5.7 
MT 36.6 23.6 1.9 12.3 
NL 46.1 40.4 6.3 7.2 
PL 12.9 24.5 4.6 14.4 
PT 45.9 28.3 25.2 20.8 
RO 10.9 7.2 4 7 
SE 13.3 20.8 8.2 5.1 
SI 25.4 13.5 12.4 12.2 
SK 19 22 7.5 13.3 
UK 16.5 17.2 11.6 10.1 
Unweighted avg. 25.6 23.8 8.9 10.8 
Population weighted avg. 35.7 30.0 10.2 11.7 
Source: Dolls et al. (2014, p. 11). 
The large increase in projected fiscal income may help to ease the 
fiscal burden associated with the growing pension bill and the public 
healthcare needed due to population aging. However, the presented 
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projections should be taken as an upper bound of future fiscal revenues 
because of strong modelling assumptions.5 Despite some caveats, it is 
possible to derive policy conclusions from the above analysis. Of particular 
importance is the difference between the social security contributions and 
personal income taxes: whereas the former is proportional to the volume of 
labour, the latter is not. A progressive income tax system, as is present in 
most EU countries, may therefore be a measure to stabilise the fiscal 
consequences of demographic transitions on public budgets. 
3.5 What jobs and for whom? 
Whereas the previous section focused on the projections of overall labour 
supply and labour demand, this section examines the possible overall 
future of European employment up to 2030 with regard to how many jobs 
and which type will be created and destroyed in the coming decade. 
Computations produced using the NEMESIS model,6 in combination with 
the assumptions of the ‘friendly’ and ‘tough’ scenarios, deliver two possible 
detailed pictures of the European economy up to 2030.7 The resulting 
projections of employment by skill level and by sector enable specific 
challenges related to changes in the labour market to be identified and 
policies to be better targeted.   
Table 3.3 Scenarios based on assumptions on the general context (situation in 2010 
and 2030 or variations from 2010 to 2030) 
    ‘Friendly’ ‘Tough’ 
So
ci
et
al
 
Demography (millions) +37M -11M 
Old age dependency ratio (%) 26% to 38% 26% to 39% 
Working age population 
(millions) 
-4.5M -29M 
   - High-skilled +36M +11M 
   - Low-skilled -40.5M -40M 
En
er
gy
 p
ri
ce
s Oil price ($US'10/bbl) $78 to $117 $78 to $195 
European gas price 
($US'10/Mbtu) 
$7.5 to $11.7 $7.5 to $12.6 
European coal price 
($US'10/t) 
$99.2 to $109.3 $99.2 to $115.9 
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European GDP grows at 1.8% in 
the ‘friendly’ scenario and at 1.2% 
in the ‘tough’ scenario. 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
World GDP growth (AAGR) 3.80% 2.5% 
European rate of interest (%)* 3.6 to 4.4 3.6 to 5.9 
€/$ exchange rate 1.3 to 1.3 1.3 to 1.4 
Public finance rule Stabilisation of 
public debt 
Stabilisation of 
public debt 
* Average nominal government bond yields, 10 years’ maturity. 
Source: Boitier et al. (2013). 
3.6 Labour supply projections: Strong divergence in the 
evolution of skill levels 
3.6.1 Two contrasting macroeconomic pathways leading to 
employment disparities 
European employment will be strongly 
affected by macroeconomic conditions. 
European economic growth takes two 
different pathways under the scenarios. 
Under the ‘friendly’ scenario, European 
economic growth is prompted by favourable international and financial 
conditions. In addition, the long-run potential growth of GDP is pushed up 
by significant growth in the quality of the labour supply. On the other 
hand, under the ‘tough’ scenario world demand does not help the 
European economy to recover from the crisis, as the shrinking labour 
supply reduces long-run potential GDP growth and makes rebalancing 
public finances more difficult. Thus, for the whole period, annual European 
real GDP growth is 1.8% on average under the ‘friendly’ scenario and 1.2% 
under the ‘tough’ scenario.  
The contrast between the scenarios is also visible in European total 
employment, which stood at over 221 million workers in 2010. The total 
creation under the ‘friendly’ scenario is about 23 million by 2030, whereas 
under the ‘tough’ scenario, the European economy destroys almost 9 
million jobs. Under the ‘friendly’ scenario, European employment growth 
goes back to pre-crisis trends, with an average annual creation of 1.5 
million units between 2015 and 2030 (close to the 1.8 million average 
annual creation between 1995 and 2005).8 The ‘friendly’ scenario is a post-
crisis scenario assuming a return to the pre-crisis European development 
pathway, even if these pathways are not exactly of the same kind. At the 
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opposite end, the ‘tough’ scenario entails a break with European pre-crisis 
economic development. The European Union recovers economic growth, 
but this growth is not high enough to increase employment. 
Table 3.4 Average annual GDP growth rate (%) 
 
Source: Boitier et al. (2013). 
At the national scale, the contrast between the scenarios is similar, 
with more employment for all countries in 2030 under the ‘friendly’ 
scenario than under the ‘tough’ scenario (Figure 3.9), but with strong 
differences across countries. In the four biggest economies of the European 
Union (excluding Germany), the evolution of total employment is relatively 
similar under each scenario. In the ‘friendly’ scenario, total employment 
grows by between 15% (in Italy) and 25% (in Spain), while under the 
‘tough’ scenario it remains relatively stable, growing by between -2.5% (in 
Spain) and +5.4% (in the United Kingdom). Between 2010 and 2030, these 
four European countries represent more than 70% of the total European 
2010-2015 2015-2020 2020-2025 2025-2030 2010-2015 2015-2020 2020-2025 2025-2030
Austria 1.5 2.0 2.1 2.2 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5
Belgium 0.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.9
Bulgaria 1.2 2.9 2.6 2.3 1.1 2.0 2.1 2.1
Cyprus -4.6 1.9 2.9 3.2 -4.8 0.9 1.4 1.5
Czech Republic 0.8 2.6 2.6 2.6 0.8 2.1 1.8 1.9
Denmark 1.1 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.0 1.8 1.4 1.6
Estonia 3.8 4.0 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.3 3.2
Finland 1.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 1.0 1.8 1.6 1.6
France 1.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 0.9 1.4 1.4 1.4
Germany 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.0 1.0 0.9
Greece -3.7 1.9 2.5 2.5 -3.7 1.3 1.4 1.4
Hungary 0.4 1.5 1.8 2.1 0.4 1.0 1.2 1.6
Ireland 2.0 2.5 2.4 2.5 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.7
Italy -0.2 1.9 1.9 1.9 -0.3 1.0 1.0 0.9
Latvia 4.9 4.4 3.6 3.5 4.7 3.9 3.2 3.2
Lithuania 4.6 4.0 3.8 3.6 4.3 3.5 3.3 3.3
Luxembourg 0.9 3.1 3.3 3.0 0.8 2.6 3.0 2.7
Malta 1.6 2.8 3.2 3.2 1.5 1.5 2.0 2.4
Poland 2.1 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.5
Portugal -1.6 1.9 2.2 2.1 -1.7 1.2 1.0 0.9
Romania 2.1 4.0 4.1 4.1 1.8 3.0 3.3 3.7
Slovakia 2.7 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.1 1.7 1.7
Slovenia -0.8 2.7 2.6 2.6 -1.0 2.0 1.9 1.8
Spain -0.7 2.3 2.7 2.5 -0.8 1.3 1.4 1.0
Sweden 2.1 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.0 2.7 2.2 2.2
The Netherlands 0.1 1.8 1.8 1.8 -0.2 0.8 0.8 0.7
The United-Kingdom 1.1 1.9 2.0 2.2 1.1 1.8 1.2 1.0
European Union (EU-27) 0.9 2.0 2.1 2.1 0.8 1.4 1.3 1.2
Friendly Tough
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employment increase, with more than 16 million jobs created. Under the 
‘tough’ scenario, these countries create 1.8 million jobs between 2010 and 
2030, which alleviates the fall in total European employment (8.7 million by 
2030 compared to 2010). In Germany, total employment is stable under the 
‘friendly’ scenario but falls strongly under the ‘tough’ scenario, with a loss 
of 5.3 million jobs by 2030 compared to 2010, i.e. constituting two-thirds of 
the total European employment loss under this scenario. 
Figure 3.9 EU-27* employment growth between 2010 and 2030 under the 
‘friendly’ and ‘tough’ scenarios (%) 
 
* Luxembourg and Bulgaria’s colours are not shown to enhance the clarity of the graph. 
Source: Boitier et al. (2013). 
3.6.2 Sectoral mutations: The explosion of private services 
An analysis of sectoral interactions allows a better understanding of the 
drivers of employment creation (or destruction) under both scenarios. 
Figure 3.10 depicts the change in sectoral European employment between 
the ‘friendly’ and ‘tough’ scenarios.  
We start the analysis with the non-market services sector, which is an 
atypical sector as its evolution is strongly dependent on government fiscal 
policies. Therefore, European employment in these sectors, which 
-17.5%
-15.0%
-12.5%
-10.0%
-7.5%
-5.0%
-2.5%
0.0%
2.5%
5.0%
7.5%
10.0%
-2.5% 0.0% 2.5% 5.0% 7.5% 10.0% 12.5% 15.0% 17.5% 20.0% 22.5% 25.0% 27.5%
To
ta
l e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t g
ro
w
th
 b
et
w
ee
n 
20
10
 a
nd
 2
03
0 
("
To
ug
h"
)
Total employment growth between 2010 and 2030 ("Friendly")
Bubble size: Total employement in 2010
HOW MUCH WORK WILL THERE BE? WHERE IS IT GOING TO COME FROM?  47 
 
represented almost 62 million persons in 2010, is the most sensitive to the 
variation in public expenditure between the ‘tough’ and the ‘friendly’ 
scenarios. In 2030, the number of people working in the sector is 15 million 
higher (i.e. one quarter of the 2010 level) under the ‘friendly’ scenario than 
under the ‘tough’ scenario. Indeed, public expenditure on social protection, 
education, economic affairs, education, defence or general public services is 
lowered significantly under the ‘tough’ scenario. In 2030, total public 
consumption is €3.2 trillion (constant € 2005) under the ‘friendly’ scenario 
and only €2.7 trillion under the ‘tough’ scenario.  
This strong difference between the scenarios regarding public 
expenditure and employment in the non-market services has consequences 
for the financing of the welfare state. Thus, social investments, which have 
provided positive returns in the past,9 will be weaker under the ‘tough’ 
scenario despite important needs, especially under the pressure of an aging 
population. As a consequence, the public finance constraint does not allow 
the development of these new services to the same extent, even if some are 
likely to be provided by the private sector. Instead, the smoother 
deleveraging under the ‘friendly’ scenario enables states to develop a wide 
range of new services in response to ageing populations.  
Figure 3.10 Change in European total employment under the ‘friendly’ and ‘tough’ 
scenarios (millions) 
 
Source: Boitier et al. (2013). 
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Two-thirds of employment creation 
comes from private services under 
the ‘friendly’ scenario. 
Under the ‘friendly’ scenario, employment growth is mainly driven 
by job creation in the private services sector, with an increase of 8 million 
between 2010 and 2020 and of 7 million between 2020 and 2030, i.e. a total 
increase of 15 million between 2010 and 2030. The construction sector also 
exhibits non-negligible job creation, 
with 3.9 million additional jobs by 
2030 compared to 2010, while in the 
European industry sector, employment 
falls by 4.1 million jobs (2.1 million in 
the first decade alone). Finally, agriculture loses about 3.9 million jobs 
between 2010 and 2030 (a 32% reduction).  
Under the ‘tough’ scenario, as previously explained, the fall in 
employment growth is large in the non-market services, with 3.1 million 
fewer jobs in 2030 compared to 2010. It is also very significant in the private 
services sector, in which employment in 2030 is 11.5 million lower under 
the ‘tough’ scenario than under the ‘friendly’ scenario, though it still rises 
by 3.5 million compared with 2010. For industry and construction, the 
differences between the scenarios are less accentuated – industry destroys 
5.7 million jobs and construction creates only 3 million jobs. Finally, 
agriculture is the sector least impacted by the slowdown in economic 
growth, with a loss of 4.8 million jobs (i.e. only 900,000 fewer jobs than 
under the ‘friendly’ scenario).  
The evolution of the sectoral employment structure depends on 
several factors. The main factor related to the socio-ecological transition is 
the increase in fossil fuel energy prices. The goods and services that are 
energy-intensive become less attractive as energy price rises. As an 
example, the share of transport in household consumption budgets 
decreases from 13% to 10% between 2010 and 2030 under the ‘friendly’ 
scenario. By the same token, the level of employment in the transport 
equipment sector is reduced by 15% over the period. However, this price 
increase will stimulate demand in the renovation sub-sector, which is 
labour intensive, and will then boost employment in the construction 
sector.  
The most influential factor in the rise of employment in services is the 
improvement in the standard of living. When a household get richer, 
expenses for culture, recreation, communication, and so on are released, 
inducing a higher demand for the corresponding services and more 
employment potential in these sectors. In all European countries, the 
service sectors are the major contributors to employment creation. The 
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Is the ‘tough’ scenario a 
‘sleeping policeman’ on the 
road of employment mutations? 
global evolution of the sectoral structure fits within a historical context of 
transfer between industries and services. 
Creative destruction (or ‘Schumpeter’s gale’), mostly in the form of 
employment destruction in industry and employment creation in services, 
takes place under the ‘friendly’ scenario 
but does not happen under the ‘tough’ one. 
As a result, under the ‘tough’ scenario the 
usual leading sector in the employment 
growth – the private services sector – does 
not develop as it does under the ‘friendly’ scenario. Worse still, after 2020 
only the destruction process takes place in the private services sector, 
which loses almost 1.5 million jobs between 2020 and 2030 under the 
‘tough’ scenario. Other sectors also face difficulties, but to a lesser extent 
than services. Thus, the ‘tough’ scenario can be viewed as a wasted 
opportunity for potential job-creating sectors, as the continuation of slow 
economic growth prevents the restart of private demand.  
3.7 The rise of high-skilled workers… 
The distribution of skills across sectors is obviously uneven; more workers 
with PhDs are needed for medical research than in the waste collection 
sector. An interesting way to understand this split is to consider the 
sectoral dichotomy between tradable and non-tradable sectors, where a 
tradable sector is defined as a sector with a ratio between import and 
production of below 15%. Broadly speaking, agriculture, energy industry, 
manufacturing sectors and sea and air transports are tradable sectors, 
whereas construction, private services and non-market services are non-
tradable sectors.10 The skill level is defined by the educational level 
attainment, with high-skilled corresponding to ISCED 5 and 6 graduates 
and low-skilled corresponding to ISCED 0 to 4 (it therefore includes the 
category of medium-skilled, which is usually defined as levels 3 and 4 of 
ISCED). 
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Table 3.5 European employment by skill level in the tradable and non-tradable 
sectors, difference in thousands 
   ‘Friendly’ scenario ‘Tough’ scenario 
  1997-
2007 
2010-
2020 
2020-
2030 
2010-
2020 
2020-
2030 
Tradable 
High-
skilled 
3,054.1 3,791.3 3,092.2 2,533.8 1,042.3 
Low-
skilled 
-6,609.1 -5,042.6 -5,068.0 -4,876.2 -5,111.2 
Non-
Tradable 
High-
skilled 
16,446.8 11,686.2 16,291.2 5,404.6 2,714.1 
Low-
skilled 
10,220.2 -3,434.1 1,585.6 -4,290.4 -6,191.6 
Sources: Boitier et al. (2013) calculations based on Timmer (2012) and the NEMESIS 
model. 
According to the results of our model, there is a lasting destruction of 
low-skilled employment in the tradable sectors under both scenarios. The 
pace of the destruction is similar to that of the previous decade. This result 
corroborates the fact that, in the tradable sectors, the lower the labour 
productivity, the higher the activity and so employment is vulnerable to 
international competition. In the non-tradable sector, low-skilled 
employment is more protected but the projections are pessimistic 
compared to past trends. Indeed, during the last decades, the creation of 
low-skilled employment was mainly due to public services. With the public 
finance constraints, this leeway cannot be used to the same extent. In the 
tradable sectors, highly-skilled workers are more resilient to international 
competition than the low-skilled, since there is an expansion of 
employment. Finally, highly-skilled employment in the non-tradable 
sectors is growing fast and is the major contributor to employment creation 
under both scenarios. From 2020, creation goes back to its previous trend. 
Technological progress plays a major role in the evolution of the 
employment structure. The development of ICT enables the opening of a 
growing range of services to international competition. These technologies 
make the atomisation of the global supply chain easier, as multinational 
firms can subdivide the tasks of the production process more efficiently 
and choose the most competitive workforce from among different 
countries. Beyond this evolution, the most powerful impact of the 
technological progress is the replacement of jobs by machines or 
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Under the ‘friendly’ scenario, the 
over-qualified group will expand, 
and the under-qualified diminish. 
computers. This concerns a worker being replaced by a machine in a 
factory or a worker being replaced by a computer programme in an office. 
The more routine the task, the more the chance that the job will be replaced, 
a process already observed in the 2000s.11 Workers endowed with a low 
stock of skills and specialised in manual non-routine tasks as well as 
workers endowed with a high stock of skills and specialised in 
conceptualisation and intellectual tasks, are relatively favoured by the 
impulse of technologies, implying the skill polarisation of labour market. 
The construction and the lodging and catering sectors can provide some 
good insights into this phenomenon. Indeed, on the one hand, the workers 
of these sectors have a very low endowment of skills, on the other their 
tasks entail very little routine and in fact they are almost the only sectors to 
create both low-skilled and high-skilled jobs in a context of an overall fall of 
the low-skilled employment.  
3.8 ...without forgetting unemployment!  
Total unemployment depends on the macroeconomic path, since the 
relatively high growth rate under the ‘friendly’ scenario allows the global 
unemployment rate to return to its pre-crisis level by 2030, whereas the 
weak growth under the ‘tough’ scenario implies a rising unemployment 
rate until 2030, reaching 12.1%. For all the reasons underlined previously, 
low-skilled employment is highly vulnerable to the evolution of the 
European economic structure. Under the ‘tough’ scenario, the 
unemployment rate of these workers does indeed grow strongly. 
Nevertheless, under the ‘friendly’ scenario, the significant decrease in the 
low-skilled labour supply, coupled with robust economic growth, reduces 
the stress on the market and thus reduces the unemployment rate.  
What may come as a surprise and seem to be a paradox is the rise in 
the high-skilled unemployment rate. Indeed, this rate grows even under 
the ‘friendly’ scenario. To explain this paradox, one should remember that 
in the model, the skill level is defined by the level of education attained. 
Thus, the rise of the unemployment rate under the ‘friendly’ scenario stems 
from a demand from firms for real high-skilled tasks that is not high 
enough to absorb the significant growth of the high-skilled labour force (in 
addition to wage rigidities delaying 
the return to the equilibrium of the 
labour market). Therefore, the increase 
in the high-skilled unemployment rate 
should be considered as an indicator of 
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a skills mismatch between the education of workers and the tasks needed 
by firms. A recent OECD study could support this result.12 Its results 
suggest that in the OECD countries, one in four workers could be over-
qualified and one in three under-qualified. The results for the ‘friendly’ 
scenario suggest that over-qualification would expand while under-
qualification would decrease. Accordingly, fostering R&D and innovation 
by firms would provide an outlet for this labour supply by increasing the 
potential tasks for high-skilled workers.13  
Table 3.6 European unemployment rate by skill level (%) 
  ‘Friendly’ 
scenario 
‘Tough’ 
scenario 
 2010 2030 2030 
Total 9.7% 7.6% 12.1% 
High-skilled 5.1% 6.6% 10.2% 
Low-skilled 11.4% 8.2% 13.2% 
Source: Boitier et al. (2013). 
In the long run, the best solution to offset the decrease in the 
workforce so as to support economic growth is to stimulate labour 
productivity by improving human capital  
The decline in the European workforce puts economic growth at risk. 
To avoid this pitfall in the short run, the employment rate must be raised, 
bearing in mind that the greatest potential lies in women and older 
workers.14 The mobility of European workers between European countries, 
as well as immigration of extra-EU workers, should also be fostered to 
facilitate the absorption of the shock. In the long run, the only solution to 
offset the decrease in the workforce so as to support economic growth is to 
stimulate labour productivity by improving human capital.  
A rise in labour productivity would not only be an appropriate 
response to the economic growth challenge, but also to the employment 
issue. Indeed, there are two main threats to the evolution of employment. 
Although technical progress and international competition can provide 
new opportunities to develop high-skilled employment, they also weaken 
the situation of low-skilled workers in the labour market. As confirmed in 
the scenarios, large-scale destruction of low-skilled jobs will occur up to 
2030. Once again, implementing an efficient system of skills upgrading 
aimed at improving labour productivity seems to be the best employment 
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policy. Under the ‘friendly’ scenario, the strong growth in the high-skilled 
labour supply enables the compensation of the destruction of low-skilled 
jobs. This proves that the potential of firms’ demand for high-skilled labour 
is sufficient to reduce global unemployment and to give rise to lasting 
economic growth. In contrast, the weak increase in the high-skilled 
workforce under the ‘tough’ scenario constrains economic growth, which 
implies a rise in total unemployment. 
Despite the favourable global evolution of high-skilled employment, 
the ‘friendly’ scenario shows that some bottleneck effects and skills 
mismatches could appear in the labour market. The increase in firms’ 
demand for high-skilled tasks is not high enough to absorb the overall 
inflow of educated workers. This results in rising over-qualification and 
possibly rising high-skilled unemployment. The improvement of skill 
levels on the supply side should be coupled with stimulation on the 
demand side to avoid these mismatches. Indeed, some policies enhancing 
innovation and research would help to increase the outlet for high-skilled 
labour supply in addition to improving the competitiveness of European 
industries. Beyond the structural policies for resource efficiency and 
climate change (carbon tax, rising of environmental standards, etc.), 
education and training systems must be more oriented towards these 
environmental concerns in order to benefit from the new markets that will 
automatically emerge under the pressure of depleted fossil energy. 
Finally, with the single exception of Luxembourg, the growth rate of 
working-age populations is projected to be lower than the growth rate of 
total populations. The higher proportion of older people in the total 
population poses a challenge for public finances, but the fiscal burden 
associated with the growing pension bill and healthcare may be eased by 
labour market adjustments. A reduction in the working-age population 
does not automatically translate into a smaller labour supply – a shrinking 
labour supply creates pressure for wage increases, which in turn induces 
labour participation. In addition to migration policies, it is therefore 
possible to increase the number of hours worked through policies that ease 
the transition from part-time to full-time employment, of which 
improvements in childcare facilities are an example. 
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Notes 
1 Huisman et al. (2013). As Croatia was not yet part of the European Union at the 
time the NEUJOBS scenarios were compiled, Croatia is not included in the 
scenarios. 
2 See Dolls et al. (2013, 2014). 
3 Dolls et al. (2013). 
4 See Dolls et al. (2013, 2014) and Huisman et al. (2012). 
5 For a discussion, see Dolls et al. (2014). 
6 NEMESIS (New Econometric Model for Environmental and Sustainable 
development and Implementation Strategies) is a macro-sectoral econometric 
model built to aid decision-making in the fields of energy, the environment and 
economic policy. It was built for two main purposes: the production of short-term 
and medium-term projections and the analysis of economic policy issues, 
especially in the fields of the environment and R&D. Co-financed by the European 
Commission, NEMESIS was developed by a European consortium composed of 
the Federal Planning Bureau of Belgium, SEURECO (Société Européenne 
d’Economie, Paris, France) and the Institute of Computer and Communication 
Systems (NTUA - University of Athens). It currently covers the whole of Europe 
and Norway. The rest of the world is divided into ten different geographical areas 
and is assumed to be exogenous. 
7 Zagamé et al. (2010). 
8 Timmer (2012). 
9 Hemerijck (2013) and Hemerjick et al. (2013). 
10 Based on 2005 data. 
11 Autor et al. (2006) and Maselli (2012). 
12 See OECD (2011). 
13 See the literature on the complementarities between R&D and human capital 
(e.g. Redding, 1996). 
14 European Commission (2013). 
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4. EXPLORING THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
HUMAN LABOUR IN RELATION TO 
SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL TRANSITIONS* 
uman society – willingly or not, slowly or quickly – is in a 
transition away from the use of fossil fuels. This transition is 
expected to have as many and equally far-reaching implications 
for human labour as the previous transition to a fossil-fuel based industrial 
society had. To understand this phenomenon better, we develop a simple 
scheme that can be applied throughout 
history to characterise human labour 
according to its quantitative, qualitative 
and institutional features. Using this 
scheme, we attempt to explore 
historical linkages between energy 
regimes and the changing nature of 
human labour. We focus on the 
interrelationship between socio-metabolic regimes and the amount of 
human lifetime spent on labour, the respective critical qualitative capacities 
of human labour power and the institutional forms in which labour is 
employed. Our hope is to be able to draw some useful conclusions derived 
from socio-ecological analyses.  
Against this backdrop we speculate about the future: What could 
labour look like after the ongoing socio-ecological transition is completed, 
or has reached a next stage? Most analyses of ‘green jobs’ deal with a fairly 
close future, and mainly with the future of gainful employment.1 We open 
                                                   
* Chapter 4 was written by Marina Fischer-Kowalski and Willi Haas, Director and 
Researcher, respectively, at the Institute of Social Ecology at the University of 
Klagenfurt.  
H
Human labour and energy regimes 
are closely interwoven. 
Consequently, the new energy 
transition away from fossil fuels 
will play an important role in 
shaping the future of labour. 
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up the time horizon (which also means keeping it somewhat unspecified) 
and ask ourselves: As the fossil-fuel-based socio-ecological transition 
apparently induced such major changes to work and life, what changes can 
we expect from a major societal transition away from fossil fuels? 
4.1 The socio-ecological character of human labour  
4.1.1 Quantitative characterisation  
Our starting point is the question of how to distinguish ‘labour’ from other 
human activities throughout human history. A socio-ecological perspective 
on this helps to circumvent some of the longstanding debates around this 
issue and suggests looking upon human labour as an element of human 
time use in a social (distributional) context. As humans live out their lives 
in social groups, they cooperate in various forms of ‘division of labour’. It 
therefore makes sense to regard as ‘labour’ all those activities that are 
subject to such a division and thus constitute social interdependencies, and 
to only exclude as ‘non-labour’ those elements of time use that cannot be 
socially transferred to anyone else.   
While traditional time-use research deals with time use on a 
descriptive and individual level only, a socio-ecological analysis places 
time use and activity categories in a functional context of system 
reproduction.2 Based on functional linkages, time spent on labour can be 
distinguished from time spent on non-labour, as follows:3  
1. The reproduction of the self. Activities such as sleeping, eating, 
resting, learning, having fun, etc. These classes of activities cannot be 
subject to a social division of labour, and thus cannot be considered 
‘labour’.   
2. The reproduction of household and family. These activities also deal 
with personal reproduction, but in an inter-subjective mode (child-
bearing and rearing, food preparation, daily chores, etc.). This clearly 
should be considered ‘labour’. 
3. The reproduction of the community. Participation in ‘public affairs’ 
on various scales beyond the family, such as collective decision-
making, voting, participation in religious and public ceremonies, 
military service or shared infrastructure work. This clearly has 
labour-like features.  
4. The reproduction of the economy at large. On a systemic level, this 
is time used for the production of goods and services for anonymous 
consumers. Individually, it is the time used for income generation in 
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Across history, the greatest time 
spent on labour per inhabitant and 
per day was under agrarian 
conditions. The industrialisation of 
agriculture relieved labour time 
through the use of fossil-fuel 
technologies.  
a market (and therefore is close to conventional economic definitions 
of labour).  
The share of a population‘s time that is devoted to each function 
varies widely across socio-ecological regimes. It is also related to 
demographic structures, since they determine the share of people who are 
fit for work as well as the dependency ratio. How activities are distributed 
among subgroups of the population by gender, age and status is highly 
variable. The higher the status of a group, the more time for self-
reproduction (Type 1) it will typically be entitled to.  
For the individual, the question is how much labour time they need 
to survive and to reproduce – this defines a minimum of Type 2 and 4 
activities. Under favourable environmental and social conditions, this may 
be very little.4 Under unfavourable environmental or social conditions, this 
may be more than the individual can afford over a longer stretch of time, so 
they will not reproduce and will not be able to survive. For the social 
community, demand for labour can best be seen as an economic 
relationship: the relationship between the benefit to the community (i.e. the 
marginal return to additional labour) and the cost of this additional labour. 
In family and community relations, an additional potential labourer (an 
additional child, for example, or a second wife) may be sustained, although 
the benefit of the labour they can deliver is lower than the costs. In strictly 
economic relations, additional labour will not be employed if benefits do 
not exceed costs. What determines both variables – the benefits to be 
gained by additional labour and the cost of it, beyond social relations – 
strongly depends of course on a society’s energy regime (see Figure 4.1).  
As long as labour only serves 
for the collection and hunting of food 
and its preparation for consumption, 
it does not require much time. 
Moreover, an increase in labour time 
under such conditions may well be 
self-defeating: an increase in hunting 
and gathering in the same area will 
tend to deplete the sources of food 
and force the community to migrate. As is also documented in research 
from cultural anthropology, the hunting-gathering regime requires the 
least amount of human labour from its members.5 With the transition to the 
agrarian regime, the amount of labour increases, and it increases even more 
with the intensification of traditional agriculture (Figure 4.1).6 The 
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transition to the industrial regime may at first boost labour time even 
further.7 Later, however, it provides relief. This storyline is reflected in the 
data compiled in Figure 4.1, using working hours per day per inhabitant as 
an indicator. Work in the economy is lowest under hunting-gathering (0.8 
hours/day), rises with traditional agricultural intensification (to a value of 
about 3.3 hours in Germany in 1870) and then drops to a little above two 
hours under contemporary industrial conditions (about 2.1 hours for 
France, the Netherlands and Germany, and 2.4 hours for the UK). 
The economic labour time being greatest under agrarian conditions is 
due to the increasing amount of colonising activities required to feed ever-
more people on the same land.8 With the industrialisation of agriculture, 
this is greatly relieved by fossil-fuel-based technologies.  
Figure 4.1 Approximate daily working hours by socio-metabolic regime for an 
average inhabitant 
 
Note: Based on the following cases: Trinket (hunter-gatherers), Campo Bello 
(swidden/slash & burn agriculture) and Nalang (permanent farming, traditional). 
Sources: Fischer-Kowalski et al. (2011); France 1998-99, Netherlands 2000, UK 2000-
01: European Commission (2003), Eurostat database 2013; Germany 2001-02: 
Statistisches Bundesamt (2006), Eurostat database (2013). 
Notwithstanding doubts about data quality and comparability, the 
amount of daily time spent on household and family chores seems, in 
contrast, to be less variable across socio-metabolic regimes (about two 
hours for non-industrialised communities and between two and three 
hours for industrialised societies).  
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4.1.2 Qualitative characterisation 
For a qualitative characterisation of human labour, we are looking at 
abstract dimensions that bear a certain relationship to energy and vary 
across socio-metabolic regimes. One should be able to argue that these 
capacities are rooted in human nature, in the sense that they are part of the 
natural equipment of every human being and they should render 
themselves for social enhancement (or suppression) and training (or lack 
thereof). From the wide range of possible distinctions, we have selected the 
following three basic capacities for our analysis: physical power (as a 
capacity of the body), rationality/knowledge (as intellectual capacity) and 
empathy (as emotional intelligence or social capacity).  
Physical power. Physical power is the capacity to alter physical 
objects through the use of force. This capacity relates to the notion of 
‘exergy’, which is the ability to perform work in a physical sense,9 and the 
concept of energy efficiency: one can look at the human body as a machine 
that requires a certain amount of energy input (i.e. food) to perform a 
certain amount of work (exergy output). Physically speaking, the human 
body is not a very efficient machine as it needs a high amount of energy 
input just for living, i.e. for its basic metabolism, and can transform only a 
small amount of energy input into useful work and only for a limited 
fraction of its lifetime. While the basic metabolic rate (BMR) depends on 
age and body mass (e.g. 6.2 MJ/day for a 50 kg woman and 9.6 MJ/day for 
an 80 kg man, corresponding to outputs of about 70-110 watts), heavy farm 
work or sports such as all-day cross-country skiing may double the daily 
energy demand. With typical kinetic efficiencies of around 20%, even eight 
hours of heavy physical work represents an output of only 2 MJ – 
equivalent to burning 1 kg of coal in an engine with 10% efficiency.10 
Another limitation is the relatively small ‘installed power’ of the human 
body – even elite athletes cannot sustain a power output beyond 500 watts 
for longer than an hour; their peak power delivery is 1,000 watts for several 
seconds.11 Human effort, even at its best, is therefore a most unimpressive 
source of mechanical energy.12  
Rationality/knowledge. This represents the intellectual capacity to 
correctly anticipate the effect that one’s own actions have and to plan them 
deliberately. This capacity relates to information processing and to learning 
from experience as well as from communication with others. While the 
adult human brain accounts for about one-sixth of the basic metabolic rate, 
brain work is, energetically speaking, light work – even intensive 
intellectual activity only marginally raises the brain’s metabolic demand.13 
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But more so than with physical power, the individual perspective is too 
narrow: rationality and knowledge should be looked upon as social 
properties, as being built up and maintained collectively, with individuals 
only having a certain share in this collective propensity. And of course, 
building-up and maintaining a stock of knowledge and information 
processing generates a certain energy (and labour) demand at the social 
system level.  
Empathy: Empathy is the capacity to emotionally anticipate and 
mirror the feelings of other living beings. Modern brain research has 
demonstrated that it is an innate capacity of primates to sense the feelings 
of others and ‘understand’ (mirror) the intentions that guide the activities 
of others.14 However, this natural capacity should be expected to be 
strongly influenced by cultural features at the social system level. It should 
be looked upon not as an intellectual but as an emotional capacity, crucial for 
human labour that involves and functionally relies upon communications 
and caring for the needs of people or other living beings. Empathy as an 
emotional capacity rooted in certain neuronal equipment must not be 
equated with a value orientation of altruism; the ability to mirror the 
feelings of others may just as well be used to manipulate or harm them.  
These qualitative features of human labour power have three types of 
interlinkages with socio-metabolic regimes: they can be functionally 
(economically, technologically) more or less relevant for the performance of 
work; they may be socially (culturally) more or less valued and enhanced 
or suppressed (investment in education); and, finally, they may be 
technologically more or less supported and enhanced, or they may be 
substituted to a greater or lesser extent by technology. These different 
pathways will play a prominent role in the subsequent historical analysis.  
4.1.3 Characterisation by institutional form 
In some highly stratified societies, it may be considered altogether 
unworthy for the ‘free man’ to be working for his subsistence. This is well 
represented, for example, by Aristotle, Hesiod or Xenophon for ancient 
Greece and by Cicero for ancient Rome, who highly valued a life in leisure 
and service to the polis as a free and self-determined citizen, and for whom 
working under somebody else’s command was incompatible with personal 
dignity. However, the conceptualisation of work is highly dependent on 
societal formations and varies over human history. 
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The following broad classifications for the various institutional forms 
that labour may take can be found in the historical and anthropological 
literature: 
 Family work within personally interdependent household systems 
and mutuality of obligations – examples are subsistence agriculture, 
hunter-gatherers and household work in most socio-metabolic 
regimes. 
 Slavery, where a master owns the labourer and has to take care of 
his/her reproduction or, if cheaper, buy a new one. 
 Other kinds of collective, often compulsory services like the 
military, prison camps or religious orders, and sometimes voluntary 
work where individuals invest surplus time for the sake of a 
community, such as hospice services. 
 Serfs within manorial systems – the family receives land from the 
lord of the manor and owes a share of its produce as taxes and/or 
compulsory labour in return. 
 Self-employment in own firm/enterprise, often household-based but 
selling produce/services on markets. 
 Wage labour – the individual is free to sell a certain quantity of time 
on a labour market. This form of labour has undergone an enormous 
differentiation process with regards to professional and hierarchical 
specialisations.  
While the social science discourses about the institutional forms of 
labour tend to focus on self-determination, hierarchy and exploitation from 
the point of view of their moral and political legitimacy, a socio-ecological 
reflection should focus on economic and ecological functionality. 
Functionality as understood here refers to the effectiveness with which the 
natural resource base can be utilised for people’s benefit at the lowest 
environmental cost. The institutional form of labour is at least as relevant 
for this functionality as the technologies used. 
4.2 Human labour in different socio-metabolic regimes 
While hunter-gatherers do work by the standards of the time-use 
distinctions, this work is still very close to what other social animals need 
to do to sustain themselves. With the transition to agriculture, labour 
becomes a much more pronounced feature of human existence specifically 
– both qualitatively and quantitatively. During industrialisation, the labour 
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time required to be spent on food production is reduced significantly, 
allowing for the development of a highly differentiated labour market with 
further increased divisions of labour within and between countries. 
4.2.1 Work in the agrarian regime 
Quantitative features 
A critical quantitative question is how many people can be sustained by a 
certain piece of land, and how many additional people not working the 
land (landlords, urban citizens, soldiers, etc.) can it subsidise. There is a 
tendency to develop techniques that allow more people to live off a piece of 
land, intensifying land use at the expense of investing in additional 
labour.15 The increased labour burden creates an incentive to have more 
children to share the workload. This triggers population growth, lowering 
labour productivity even more. If population pressure on the land is 
reduced, for example by labour opportunities in urban centres, agricultural 
labour productivity may rise again and allow for increasing surplus 
production that then allows feeding a larger urban population.16  
Nevertheless, working hours in mature agrarian systems tend to be 
very high.17 In the agrarian regime, the overwhelming majority of the 
population (including children and the elderly) are occupied with food 
production for most of their available lifetime. This reflects the relatively 
low energy return on energy investment (EROI) of agriculture and the 
focus on humans and animals as the main source of mechanical power. 
Depending on land productivity, the EROI of agriculture lies somewhere 
between 2 and 10 units of energy return to each unit of energy invested (in 
a draft animal agricultural system, for example, maize has an EROI of 
4.1:1).18 The proportion of the population that can be sustained from the 
surplus of agricultural labour, even in advanced agrarian systems, is in the 
range of 5-15%. This (low) proportion is confirmed by typical rates of 
taxation and shares of urban populations across the pre-industrial history 
of countries (see Figure 4.2).  
Figure 4.2 presents regional estimates for the time around the year 
1500, as this is a period in which we can expect urban settlements to sustain 
themselves exclusively on contributions from traditional agriculture. The 
figure shows that the share of the population in settlements of 2,500 or 
more inhabitants varied between 2% and 10% across world regions. This 
means that it took, on average across the world, 25 peasants to feed one 
urban citizen; even in Renaissance Western Europe, 11 farmers had to 
contribute.  
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Figure 4.2 Share of urban population in settlements with 2,500 or more 
inhabitants by world region in 1500 
 
Source: Klein et al. (2010).  
Qualitative features 
Qualitatively, the agrarian regime relies mainly on the physical power (and 
physical endurance) of human labour. This applies to the rural population 
(constituting the very large majority) and also, for example, to slave labour 
in mines and infrastructure building (if we think of the Roman Empire). 
There is little societal effort to improve the skills and knowledge base of 
those 90-95% of the population engaged in agricultural labour. As long as 
they feed themselves and deliver their tithes and taxes, they are left to 
themselves to organise their work. With the fellachs (farmers) in ancient 
Egypt, the lower castes in India or feudal serfs in Europe, as well as with 
African slaves in the southern states of America, no effort is made to spread 
literacy or practical knowledge concerning work in agriculture.  
Education, in the sense of societal investment in the skills and the 
knowledge capacity of physical labour, is largely absent. This investment is 
restricted to a small minority of privileged, usually male urban elites 
liberated from the need to work for their subsistence, and is largely 
disconnected from what may be considered ‘productive work’.19 Religious 
castes and organisations contribute to the education of ideological elites 
(universities founded in Europe from the late 11th century) and to the 
religious indoctrination of children (Sunday schools, Qu’ran schools, etc.), 
but do not convey functionally useful knowledge to those whose labour 
sustains society. Whatever great civilisational gains are achieved, they are 
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rarely connected to the mass of human labour. The social tensions created 
by this highly unequal distribution of knowledge (albeit without any 
relationship to practical application) are reflected in the widespread 
religious conflict in 14th to 16th century Europe over the Bible and the right 
of everyone to read it by themselves, and in the efforts from the elites to 
maintain knowledge monopolies as reflected in the burning of Giordano 
Bruno in 1600. 
Technological enhancement and substitution of human physical 
power were mainly sought via animal power: buffaloes, oxen and (later) 
horses, and in other regions elephants and camels, are used for traction of 
ploughs, water pumps and carriages, or for carrying heavy loads in the 
case of donkeys. This technological solution draws on the human labour 
capacity for empathy, since educating and guiding working animals 
requires a certain understanding and concern for their needs and feelings. 
Animals may be useful or even indispensable due to having a higher power 
density than humans, but they do not substitute quantitatively for human 
physical labour (as this is still required in order to work with and feed 
those animals).20 In general, agrarian systems are marked by a substantial 
degree of public cruelty, a cultural emphasis on heroism and the use of 
force. Thus it should not be expected that the evolution of empathy receives 
much social enhancement. 
Institutional forms of labour 
Labour in agriculture (>90%). In peripheral or unproductive regions (such 
as mountainous areas, marshes or sparsely populated arid regions), 
agricultural or pastoral labour usually takes the form of household-based 
family labour, largely subsistence-oriented, according to family power 
structures. In more productive regions, labour is organised into some form 
of manorial system with bonded serfs or slaves who owe a defined 
proportion of the fruits of their labour in the form of produce, labour or 
money to the landlord.  
Labour outside agriculture (< 10%). This can take the form of slave 
or compulsory labour, e.g. in mining or construction, or as household-
based self-employment, for example in crafts and trades or transportation. 
The “atomisation of production was the rule…”.21 Another common and 
important form of ‘labour’ is military service, which may be considered 
labour in the sense of providing food, animals, slaves and treasure by 
looting, and by protecting one’s own population from looting. However, 
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Physical power is the key feature of human 
labour during the agrarian regime. The ruling 
classes are not interested in the majority of the 
population engaged in agricultural production 
or in improving their skills and knowledge as 
long as they feed themselves and deliver their 
tithes and taxes. 
military service cannot be considered labour in the sense of producing 
resources; it does so only by redistribution between enemies and friends.   
4.2.2 Work in the coal-based industrial regime 
Quantitative features 
Quantitatively, the unfolding of the coal-based industrial regime multiplies 
the demand for labour. Although industrial labour is mainly the exertion of 
physical power, and much additional physical power is brought into the 
economy from coal-driven steam engines, the demand for human labour 
soars so much that even the rapid population growth (‘first demographic 
transition’) can be absorbed. For the industrial workforce, it is only 
humanitarian legal efforts that gradually achieve a reduction of daily 
working hours and a ban on child labour. Industrial labour is cheap, and 
the profits to be gained from it far surpass the surplus to be gained from 
land ownership.  
In this phase, there is clearly a positive relationship between energy input 
into the economy and the number of labour hours: more energy does not 
substitute for, but facilitates, 
the use of additional human 
labour. In Germany and 
Italy, as in most 
industrialising European 
countries, the total number of 
labour hours in the economy 
rises with energy use up to 
the First World War. Then 
there is a reduction of working hours while energy use stagnates; this 
pattern holds throughout the period of coal dominating the energy regime. 
In contrast, after World War II, when the use of oil became dominant, 
energy use in both countries increases significantly while labour hours 
decrease; this speaks to a substitution of labour by technical energy. After 
the 1970s, there is no clearly discernible relationship between energy use 
and labour hours (see Figure 4.3).  
Historians studying time use have even documented that in the early 
phase of industrialisation in the UK (i.e. during the 18th century), the 
weekly working hours of urban labourers rose above those of the previous 
agrarian conditions.22  
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Figure 4.3 Primary energy consumption (PEC) and working time (hours) for Italy 
(left) and Germany (right), 1870 to 1998 
  
 
Source: Maddison (2001, 2008); Cleveland (2011); SEC database (2011).  
Qualitative features 
At its onset, the coal-based industrial regime mainly adds physical power 
through steam engines driving water pumps (in mines) and weaving looms 
in manufacturing. This additional physical power does not so much replace 
human labour as increase its demand, because production processes can 
take place more cheaply and on a larger scale. For agriculture, there is only 
an indirect impact: allowing (and in part, forcing) rural populations to 
migrate to urban centres and earn their living on wage labour in 
manufacturing.23 Later, railways facilitate transporting coal and food over 
large distances into these urban centres, thus allowing them to grow and at 
the same time stimulating surplus rural production. In manufacturing (so-
called ‘proto-industry’) and, later, industrial labour, the impact of steam 
engines is not to improve the skill component in human labour, but rather 
to minimise it.24 The key capacity of human labour in agriculture, as well as 
in urban wage labour, remains physical power and endurance. However, 
small skill segments evolve further – in urban craftsmanship and 
engineering, in trade and finance, in the military and among civil servants.  
During this regime most countries start to introduce publicly 
financed compulsory schooling for children (including, or even in 
particular, for the lower classes in urban centres). Often still under the 
supervision of the clergy, children are expected to learn reading, writing 
and simple forms of algebra, in addition to receiving religious instruction. 
This is largely to do with the functionalities of the modern nation state and 
the requirements of its military, and very little to do with “qualifying 
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labour”.25 It does create a need for teachers, however, as maybe the first 
labourers to be mainly qualified by formal education. 
With empathy, one can observe an increasing cultural differentiation 
by gender. While men, in their work and beyond, are supposed to be tough 
and to contain their emotions, females are supposed to be sympathetic and 
emotional. Empathy, one might say, becomes a female virtue, but a virtue 
nonetheless.26 
Institutional forms of labour 
The most spectacular change during this regime is the rise of free wage 
labour. Free wage labour, a minority form at first, increases to become the 
most dominant institutional form. Gradually, often through revolutions, 
serfdom and slavery are abolished. In contrast to the landed aristocracy of 
the agrarian regime, industrialists see themselves as hard-working, 
responsible for the labour process, and drivers of technical innovation. 
Capitalists do not see themselves as a leisure class, but feel obliged to 
demonstrate frugality and a strong work ethic.27 During this phase, the 
separation of a sphere of production and gainful employment from the 
sphere of reproduction as a cosy and secluded home wisely governed by a 
housewife (who is not seen to be ‘working’, but to be exercising love and 
care) becomes an urban middle-class model that gradually spreads to other 
social strata.28 
4.2.3 Work during the rise of the oil-based industrial regime 
Quantitative features 
Primary energy consumption in the economy rises, but overall labour 
hours decline; energy input per labour hour is no longer stagnant, but rises 
rapidly. This novel ‘substitution’ effect of mechanical energy for human 
labour can be clearly seen in Figure 4.3 for Italy and Germany after the 
World War II. With the implementation of the ‘oil regime’ after the World 
War II, human labour hours in the economy become completely dissociated 
from energy input. While labour hours show a slight decline, energy use 
soars and so does the energy intensity per labour hour. This same pattern 
can be seen for all European countries. An important part in the decline of 
labour hours is played by the decline of employment in agriculture; there, 
the working hours per employee had been particularly high relative to all 
other economic sectors.  
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Since the 1970s, information and 
communication technology has 
substituted for the knowledge work 
component of human labour. At the 
same time, the physical work component 
has been further reduced in Europe by 
the externalisation of industrial 
production to the world’s periphery. 
Somewhat similar changes occur in households: electrical equipment 
(washing machines, vacuum cleaners, food mixers, etc.) substitutes for 
physical effort on the part of housekeepers and raises the intellectual 
requirements to handle these machines. As has been demonstrated in a 
number of studies, however, the overall impact is not to reduce household 
work, as purchasing and servicing this equipment in larger homes with 
higher standards of order and 
cleanliness are time-consuming 
activities. In combination with the 
gradual disappearance of servants, 
the household burden on middle-
class women tends to increase.  
This is the ‘golden age’ of 
building up the welfare state and 
boosting private consumption, of 
steady increases in wage levels 
and of reductions of working time. It is also a ‘golden age’ when the 
consequences of expanding the education system become statistically 
visible in the rapid increase of ‘white collar’ over ‘blue collar’ labour and 
the near disappearance of agricultural labour.  
Qualitative aspects of human labour 
Liquid fossil fuels and electricity allow for the substitution of the physical 
power dimension of human labour by decentralised energy services. Key 
technologies are the internal combustion engine, used for cars, and multi-
purpose electro-motors linked to electricity grids. Liquid fossil fuels used 
for tractors and in chemical conversion for mineral fertilisers and pesticides 
also substitute for a large part of physical human and animal labour in 
agriculture. In effect, physical strength and prowess lose much of their 
economic, and thus cultural, value. 
Instead, the knowledge dimension of human labour becomes much 
more important. There is an unprecedented growth in public education and 
knowledge production. This is the ‘golden age’ for expanding the public 
education system, propagating equal opportunities, and building up a 
skilled workforce with capacities in information and knowledge 
management rather than physical power and endurance. Knowledge 
production, information processing and communications become major 
economic activities. For the first time in history, knowledge production and 
learning become no longer class privileges and ideological bastions, but 
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evolve to become secular and rational, and functionally related to roles in 
the labour market.  
As far as empathy is concerned, a gender-based picture 
predominates: toughness and rationality for men, empathy and 
emotionality for women. Women as loving housewives, taking care of their 
husbands and children, become the majority model of middle class life. 
Institutional forms of labour 
In this phase, wage labour becomes by far the most dominant form of 
labour. Self-employment, both in agriculture and in other sectors, declines 
while employed labour rises. The overall rates of participation in gainful 
employment remain largely constant, but within wage labour there is a 
shift from ‘blue collar’ to ‘white collar’ labour. From the end of World War 
II to the early 1970s, unemployment rates remain very low.  
4.2.4 Work in the transition phase from the early 1970s 
onwards 
Qualitative features of labour 
One might draw the following analogy: just as technological development 
and increasing fossil fuel use meant internal combustion and electric 
motors substituting for much of human physical work, now information 
and communications technology (ICT) is substituting for knowledge work. 
Substituting for knowledge work is inherently less energy intensive than 
substituting for physical work, even if it is not optimised in this direction. 
Nevertheless, knowledge production and knowledge handling remain key 
features of human work.  
Coinciding with the first world oil crisis in 1973, a structural change 
in the relationship between energy and labour becomes apparent: the trend 
of steeply increasing primary energy input in high-income countries is over 
and gives way, after some sharp fluctuations, to a more stationary energy 
consumption, both overall and per working hour (see Figure 4.3). There is 
no longer any discernible correlation between energy use and working 
time. This period is also characterised by a loosening of the tight ties 
between exergy and economic output, most likely as a result of the shift in 
technology towards information and communications technologies.29  
The reduction of physical work in Europe was of course also greatly 
enhanced by the externalisation of industrial production to the world’s 
periphery, where emerging economies with very low labour costs were 
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With the availability of decentralised 
energy services enabled by liquid 
fossil fuels and electricity, physical 
human and also animal labour is 
substituted in agriculture, and also 
in other economic sectors. 
prepared to produce the steadily increasing amount of industrial products 
that Europe and other rich regions of the world wished to consume. Studies 
of carbon emissions embodied in trade have shown, for example, that the 
apparent reduction in the domestic growth of fossil-fuel-based energy was 
– at least to a certain degree – compensated for by rising fossil-fuel 
combustion elsewhere.30 
Intellectual educational standards in the labour force keep rising, as 
does school and university enrolment, and qualified white collar work 
increases while industrial blue collar work continues to decline. There are 
indications that – connected to the rising importance of marketing, services 
and communications processes – the capacity for empathy is gradually 
losing its exclusive female label and becoming a more important 
qualification for work in general.  
Quantitative features and institutional form 
In Europe, average annual working hours per inhabitant decline only very 
slightly in the early 1970s, much less than previously (Figure 4.4, left 
panel), but working time per employee continues to decline (Figure 4.4, 
right panel). This is a symptom of increasing part-time work (particularly 
by females), unemployment and rising flexibility in the use of labour 
power. While Japan shows a similar trend of declining working time to that 
of Europe, the US is increasing its working time per inhabitant, with 
stagnating numbers per employee.  
More generally, one might say that there are signs of erosion of the 
traditional, well-established patterns of employment and signs of rising 
insecurity, while no new clear pattern has established itself. The family 
pattern that had been introduced in the course of the industrial 
transformation and had seen its climax in the late 1960s – namely, early 
marriage for the large majority and long phases of female economic 
dependency upon male incomes – gradually fades away. Women seek (and 
need) employment for their 
sustenance irrespective of family ties, 
they bear fewer children and the 
household division of labour slowly 
becomes less gender-based. 
Unemployment remains at a higher 
level than in the period before, and 
the main measures considered to 
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counter this are boosting economic growth and keeping immigration at 
bay.  
Figure 4.4 Annual working hours per employee (left) and per inhabitant (right) in 
the US, Japan and EU-15 (1960-2005) 
  
Sources: left: OECD (2001); Maddison (2001); Maddison (2008) (online data base); 
right: OECD Stat Extracts 
(http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=ANHRS; Maddison (2008); own 
calculations). 
4.3 Speculation on the future of labour 
Human labour in Europe as we know it today is highly interwoven with 
the fossil-fuel based energy regime. In different energy regimes of the past, 
human labour took different shapes in terms of the features we have 
identified for our socio-ecological analysis. Now we venture into the future 
of labour with the simple but fundamental claim that the next socio-
ecological transition away from fossil fuels will, in the long run, have as 
huge an impact on the organisation of human labour as the socio-ecological 
transition towards fossil fuels has had. To this end, we first briefly sketch 
the key features of the structural change we anticipate from a new socio-
metabolic transition. We do this by speculating on possible changes in 
certain economic activities, from which we can deduce consequences for 
labour. Second, on the basis of the sectoral understanding and on the 
insights gathered from past transitions, we develop our – admittedly 
highly speculative – storyline for the future of labour. 
4.3.1 Anticipated changes in economic activities 
The starting point for our speculation is the assumption that both rising 
expenses for energy generation and declining energy return on investment 
(EROI) will make energy more costly and less abundant. This is already 
being observed for fossil fuels, where ‘conventional’ resources are 
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A scarcity of commodities is likely 
to shift the focus of cost reduction 
from labour to resources. 
becoming depleted and new, ‘unconventional’ resources require much 
higher energy investments (for example, tar sands).31 While this 
phenomenon has not yet fully impacted upon energy prices, sooner or later 
we assume energy consumption will become quite expensive, and even 
more so in rural areas.  
Along with these changes in the energy regime, there are further 
changes in framework conditions that may have long-lasting structural 
impacts upon work. After many decades of decline, we are now (since 
about the year 2000) seeing a sharp rise of prices of all raw materials 
(commodities). While some believe this to be a transitional phenomenon 
due to lagging investments, we see many indications of approaching 
scarcity and of rising efforts for the extraction of material and energy.32 If 
this were to dominate the future of resource use, it could have two 
substantial impacts. First, the share of jobs in supplying society with 
material and energy would rise due to both lower EROI and declining ore 
grades. Second, if commodity prices (including energy) remain high or rise 
even further, this could substantially alter business strategies. One could 
expect a shift in the dominant mode of cost reduction from labour to 
resources. In this case, the increase of labour productivity would not be the 
key measure, but rather the saving of resources, possibly at the expense of 
more labour.33 From a macroeconomic perspective, this would mean a shift 
in the relative prices of material goods and human labour, and 
consequently a decline in demand for material goods and increasing 
demand for human labour.  
A decline in low-price commodities, including energy, could trigger 
significant changes in economic activities with subsequent consequences 
for labour. In effect, if the purchasing power of workers were to be 
reduced, distributional conflicts over wages and prices for basic goods 
could become more frequent if no countermeasures are taken.34 Such social 
unrest could speed up transition 
processes. However, here we choose a 
pragmatic approach and assume 
incremental changes with little 
turbulence in sketching the future of 
certain economic activities where, against our analysis of the past, changes 
seem to be most obvious (Table 4.1).  
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Table 4.1 Anticipated changes in economic activities and their consequences for 
human labour  
Assumed changes in Europe arising 
from the socio-metabolic transition  
Consequences for 
labour  
Changes in  
Q
ua
nt
ity
 
Ph
ys
ic
al
 
In
te
lle
ct
ua
l 
Em
pa
th
y 
Energy sector         
 Share of electricity in final energy 
use significantly increases 
 Power generation largely from wind, 
solar and hydro power 
 Reduced imports of fossil fuels 
 Demand-side management increases  
 More labour force required to supply 
society  
 On average, higher skills needed 
 Increased maintenance work for 
power generation 
 Increased demand upon consumers to 
manage their energy consumption in 
terms of quantity and timing  
Agriculture, forestry and fishing         
 Increasing quality of food due to 
increasing demand for ‘healthy’ food 
 More organic farming, more 
vegetable farming 
 Less production of red meat 
 Higher attention to animal protection 
and standards of husbandry 
 Price increases in wood and forestry 
products  
 Crisis of wild fish production 
requires new investments and 
controls, aquaculture increases   
 Increasing labour demand in organic 
and vegetable farming with high 
quality standards 
 Stable labour demand for livestock 
rearing (fewer numbers, but higher 
standards) 
 Spread of ‘precision farming’ in 
response to price increases and 
environmental standards 
 More labour investment in securing 
ecosystem services (forestry, fishing) 
Construction         
 Stabilisation of infrastructure at 
present levels of per capita stocks 
(transport, energy, building, etc.) 
 Gradual conversion and rebuilding 
of existing structures into an energy 
efficient, low maintenance, and slim 
infrastructure (insulation of 
buildings, compact structures 
 Less overall construction activities 
reduce labour demand  
 This might be compensated by a 
change from extending infrastructure 
to converting, rebuilding and 
renovating, since this is more labour 
intensive  
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concentrated in urban areas, 
reduction of road network and 
improved rail network, etc.) 
 This shift leads to higher demand for 
manual skills (handicraft) and less 
machine-intensive labour 
Transport         
Passenger 
 Further agglomeration in urban 
areas and reduction of rural 
population due to the number of 
productive people required for 
agriculture, forestry, mining and 
tourism 
 Transport between urban areas is 
organised with public transport, 
mainly by rail 
 In urban transport, cars are reduced 
to a minimum and replaced by 
walking, cycling and public 
transport 
 Reduction of and shift to low 
maintenance transport infrastructure 
(e.g. railways, cycling, walking) 
Freight 
 Reduced volume of cargo because of 
radically reduced fossil fuel demand 
 Less transport of construction 
materials for non-growing slim 
infrastructure 
 With agglomeration process, 
material demand shifts further to 
bigger settlements 
 Employment shifts from transport 
manufacturing to transport services; 
the net employment effect is positive, 
given the same mileage 
 In urban areas pro-cycling policies 
and promotion of public transit 
stimulates labour demand – overall 
this increases physical exercise by 
citizens  
 A reduction in mileage for both 
passengers and freight might reduce 
labour demand in the transport sector 
 Improvement of logistics requires 
sophisticated ICT solutions and 
skilled labour 
  
Body-related services 
(food services, healthcare, wellness, fitness) 
        
 ‘Eating out’ remains common; 
increased demand for ‘healthy’ food, 
differentiation of food styles 
 Increased health literacy increases 
demand for ‘soft’ services (e.g. 
wellness and fitness programmes) 
 Ageing increases demand for health 
services, including caretaking 
 Observed trends continue 
 There is a wide range of body-related 
services that require special skills 
 The overall demand for care both 
within families and professionally 
increases and requires empathy 
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Supply of raw materials         
 Increased material management to 
improve material circularity  
 Consequent design for longer service 
life and easier recycling at end-of-life 
 Recycling where this saves energy  
 More logistics skills and work 
 More handling of goods and waste 
 More challenging design tasks 
 
4.3.2 Implications for the future of labour 
The existing ‘green jobs’ reports, such as UNEP (2008) or the European 
Strategy Agenda 2020, do not elaborate on the quality of ‘green’ labour in 
terms of physical work, intellectual capacity or empathy required. 
Consequently, we have to venture a guess ourselves. Figure 4.5 summarises 
how the envisaged changes in economic activities might affect labour (it 
should be noted that the numerical values in this figure are only 
illustrative). The reference frame of 100% refers to the total number of 
human working hours. No statistics are available that would allow the 
quantitative historical comparison of the quality and institutional form of 
labour that we attempt in Figure 4.5. 
Figure 4.5 Variation of quality of work and its institutional form in Europe, by 
past socio-metabolic regimes and speculation about changes during the 
new transition  
  
Notes: Work includes market-oriented employment and non-market subsistence 
work, including household and non-market community work. 
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A decline in continuously available, cheap 
energy could lead to reduced substitution 
of human labour by mechanical energy, 
and thus an increase in the proportion of 
physical work in our everyday life. 
According to our assumptions (see Table 4.1), the energy sector, 
agriculture, the construction sector, as well as body-related services and 
supply of raw materials will 
experience a quantitative 
increase in labour demand.35 
Since these are clearly sectors 
with a demand for physical 
labour, we assume that after a 
long period of decline, the 
proportion of physical work might rise again (Figure 4.5, left panel).  
The increasing share of work in caretaking, as assumed above, would 
play a particularly significant role in increasing physical work. Similarly, 
when jobs that can save resources – such as in renovation, repair, remaking 
and reusing – gain momentum, this also might contribute to increasing 
physical work.  
Another line of reasoning sees the increasing frequency of extreme 
climate events as a source of additional physical labour, whether in the 
form of gainful employment, as non-market civil services (‘other’), or as 
family labour in coping with such events. This is reflected in the left panel 
of Figure 4.5 as a possible increase in non-market forms of labour (family 
and ‘other’) at the expense of gainful employment. 
Finally, Figure 4.5 is based on the assumption that the substitution of 
(particularly medium qualified) intellectual or knowledge work by ICT and 
– facilitated by the use of this ICT – its eventual global outsourcing to 
lower-income countries will continue. The only services that are very 
difficult to substitute by ICT and almost impossible to outsource to other 
countries are those involving face-to-face contact with the target 
population, e.g. various forms of caretaking. In the context of an aging and 
increasingly culturally heterogeneous and demanding population, we 
assume that there will be an increase in the type of work based on empathy 
(at the expense of medium qualified intellectual work) in the institutional 
forms of collective services, family work and gainful employment.     
To avoid the dangers of climate change (i.e. a rise in average 
temperatures above 2˚C), most simulations assume a global decline in 
primary energy use in the order of 1% annually.36 If such an assumption 
were to be realised globally, the required decline in primary energy use in 
Europe would be much steeper.  
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How could Europe respond to the changing global landscape, and 
what would this mean for the medium- and long-term transformation of 
human labour? Two broad pathways can be distinguished. 
One pathway would seek to carry on business as usual for as long as 
possible and take little action in shifting away from fossil fuels 
(Energiewende) towards a new energy regime. Economic growth and global 
competitiveness would be prioritised by lowering wages and social 
standards. This pathway may well still result in growth rates that remain 
too low to substantially decrease unemployment.37 Large portions of the 
labour force may become marginalised, and new forms of labour (such as 
self-employment, deliberate part-time work or voluntary civil engagement) 
may be constrained due to inadequate social security arrangements. People 
(if they are able to) may cling to traditional jobs even if they do not find 
them satisfactory, and also continue to follow the traditional order: 
education, work and then retirement. Aggravating impacts of climate 
change could make the maintenance of public infrastructure substantially 
more expensive, and security costs could rise to cope with rising inequality 
and social conflict.  
Another pathway would be a more pro-active and innovative 
response to the socio-ecological transition. There could be massive 
investment in renewable energy infrastructures on the one hand, and 
efforts to shift the tax burden from labour to resources (or carbon) on the 
other. There would be institutional adjustments to a future of low economic 
growth, but also the expectation of rising wage in emerging economies that 
would change the terms of trade and open up opportunities for re-
industrialisation within Europe. Social policy would be directed at 
allowing a diversification of labour forms across the classical distinction of 
employment/self-employed, but also across the life cycle and the phases of 
education/job/parenthood/pension by providing flexible economic 
support for phases of little or no work. 
Overall, it seems inevitable that the socio-ecological transition will 
impact labour, both quantitatively and qualitatively. What seems at stake is 
not so much the demand for labour and the availability of gainful 
employment, but the economic balance between the remuneration of 
labour, the cost of raw materials and the expectation of profits.  
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1 For example, see Eurofound (2012), Cedefop (2009) and OECD (2010). There are 
some exceptions to this, such as the 2000 project by the Hans Böckler Stiftung, 
“Arbeit und Ökologie”, which looked at a broad range of conceptions of ‘labour’, 
including household work and paid civil work. 
2 For a discussion of the traditional time use research, see Gershuny (2000). 
Giampietro and Mayumi have a long research tradition of placing human time use 
within a framework of system reproduction, and see it as a key link between 
demography, energy use and economic output (e.g. Giampietro et al., 2012). This 
chapter follows a similar perspective.  
3 See Ringhofer (2010). 
4 See Sahlins (1972); Ringhofer (2010). 
5 See Sahlins (1972); Gowdy (1998). 
6 See also Boserup (1981); Ringhofer (2010). 
7 Voth (2000). 
8 Boserup (1965). 
9 See Ayres and Warr (2005). 
10 Smil (2008, p. 138). 
11 Ibid., p. 137. 
12 Ibid., p. 138. 
13 Ibid., p. 128. 
14 Rizzolatti et al. (2006, pp. 54-61). 
15 Boserup (1981, pp. 1-255). 
16 This is at the core of the Nobel Laureate William Arthur Lewis’s influential 
‘dual-sector model’ (Lewis, 1955). 
17 Clark and Haswell (1967); Fischer-Kowalski (2011); Fischer-Kowalski et al. 
(2011). 
18 See Pimentel et al. (1999). 
19 Sohn-Rethel (1970). 
20 Smil (2008, p. 174). 
21 Christ (1984, p. 2). 
22 Ibid., p. 2. 
23 See Wrigley (1988); Wrigley (2010) for the UK. 
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24 See Marx and Engels (1848, pp. 25-57). 
25 Gellner (1988). 
26 Elias (1939); Badinter (1980). 
27 Weber (1920). 
28 Bolognese-Leuchtenmüller and Mitterauer (1993). 
29 Ayres and Warr (2005, pp. 181-209). 
30 Hertwich and Peters (2009). 
31 Murphy and Hall (2010). 
32 Mudd (2010). 
33 See, for example, Dobbs et al. (2012). 
34 See also Randers (2012). 
35 This is in line with recent studies – (Mattera et al. (2009) for the US; Leitner et al. 
(2012) for Austria – that identify forestry and agriculture, the construction 
industry, waste management, and trade and transport as the main sectors of new 
‘green jobs’. 
36 See, for example, WBGU (2011); GEA (2013). 
37 Randers (2013). 
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5. JOB QUALITY IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION: TRAVELLING BACK IN TIME?* 
The academic discourse is out of touch from what is going 
on.… We spend our lives having theories about whether 
the contract of employment is green, yellow or pink, 
instead of asking if everybody has employment. 
 (A labour law expert from the UK) 
 
he European Union’s Lisbon Strategy, launched in 2000, aimed to 
create “more and better jobs”. The global crisis has clearly 
undermined the achievement of quantitative employment targets, 
but this chapter seeks to answer whether jobs have become “better” over 
the past 10 to 15 years. The Job Quality Index constructed by the European 
Trade Union Institute shows that there was a marked deterioration in 
subjective job security between 2005 and 2010. At the same time, it shows 
an improvement with regard to working time and work-life balance. It may 
be that while rising unemployment and the declining bargaining power of 
labour reduced the quality of existing jobs, overall job quality rose in 
certain respects because low-quality jobs were more likely to disappear 
than high-quality ones.1  
A further challenge to understanding the relationship between 
quantity and quality of employment arises from the ways in which Europe 
                                                   
* János Kovács is the author of chapter 5, which builds on the work of 
Christoph Hilbert, Marcela Veselková and Tünde Virág as well as their co-authors, 
Ada Garriga, Mireia Las Heras, Esther Jimenez and Zsuzsa Vidra. The research 
conducted in the work package 2 (Good jobs in a good economy) is summarised in 
two studies (Kovács et al. 2012, 2014), in which the reader will find detailed notes 
and references. János is a permanent fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in 
Vienna. 
T
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copes with climate change. However, the precise impact of the greening of 
European industry is difficult to predict. So far, greening seems to have 
redistributed jobs between sectors without altering the general level of 
employment. The effect of greening on job quality is moderate. The greatest 
improvement is observed in skills development, while the impact of 
greening on career and employment security, health and well-being, and 
reconciliation of working and non-working life is less clear.2  
Assessing the development of job quality depends on the indicators 
used.3 Quite frequently, the concept of ‘good jobs’ is examined along the 
dimension of intrinsic versus extrinsic features.4 Intrinsic features include 
how interesting or meaningful the work is or whether the worker 
experiences social isolation. Extrinsic features pertain to objective, easily 
measurable components of quality such as the work compensation 
package, the regulation of working time or the contractual status of the 
employee. Another important distinction may be whether ‘materialist’ or 
‘post-materialist’ attributes prevail in a certain job (and/or in the 
perception of that job by the employee). Accordingly, one is advised to 
contrast acquisitive and security/survival-oriented, instrumental-rational, 
etc. (materialist) values with autonomy/self-expression-oriented, gender- 
and environment-conscious, etc. (post-materialist) values.5 The two 
distinctions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
Since the middle of the past century, researchers have tended to 
presume optimistically that in the long run good jobs would gradually 
crowd out the bad ones. Simultaneously, the proportion of its materialist 
and post-materialist elements would change in favour of the latter.6 
‘Detraditionalisation’ was one of the labels characterising this process.7 
Today, however, one may expect to witness a declining importance of 
attributes such as creativity, self-fulfilment, recognition, autonomy, 
participation and equal opportunity, but a rising significance of stable full-
time employment, decent pay, and good physical working conditions in the 
eyes of the employees when assessing the quality of jobs. This chapter will 
therefore focus on ’retraditionalisation’, asking whether or not time travel 
back to the 20th century began some time ago. Does the demand for 
quantity override job quality considerations (“A good job is an existing 
job.”)? Is there a broad preference for the stability of employment (“A good 
job is a job that will continue to exist tomorrow.”)? Do post-materialist 
values really not matter much in defining the concept of a good job (“A 
good job is a stable, well-paid job that offers agreeable physical working 
conditions.”)? 
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This chapter grew out of a considerable dissatisfaction8 with the 
typical research agenda in this field, which i) is preoccupied with the quid 
pro quo between job security and the flexibility of work contracts and/or 
physical working conditions (especially the regulation of working time); ii) 
regards the post-materialist elements of job quality as cushions that 
moderate the shocks of decreasing security or increasing flexibility of 
employment rather than as self-explanatory aims of ‘humanising’ the 
workplace; and iii) does not make any distinction between the ‘egoistic’ 
and ‘altruistic’ constituents of post-materialist aspirations. 
5.1 Putting some flesh on the bones of survey-based studies 
Current studies of job quality are dominated by large surveys. They begin 
by identifying a set of composite quality features (mixing materialist and 
post-materialist ones), and continue by formulating a questionnaire in 
which these features are presented to the respondents for 
evaluation/selection/ranking in the framework of impersonal (or personal, 
but rather shallow) surveys. In many cases, the interviewees have to choose 
from among answers like “safety at the workplace is 
unimportant/important/very important for me”.9 Frequently, these 
surveys are carried out by leading international organisations with a 
primary interest in large-scale comparisons and generalisable results.10 
They tend to observe objective and subjective variables of job quality 
simultaneously, as well as measure (and aggregate) even the subjective 
variables to construct in an extreme case, a single job quality indicator for a 
whole country. 
As regards the subjective variables, the respondents are normally 
asked about their satisfaction levels rather than about their aspirations or 
preferences. The researcher then tries to derive the latter from the former.11 
In this way, one may produce snapshots of how ‘decent’ the respondents 
feel their existing work to be, but one cannot really learn what kind of 
ideals they cherish with regard to good jobs. Moreover, in most surveys the 
interviewees are not requested to explain the components of these 
snapshots. Typically, the researcher wears 
the hat of the ‘normal employee’, seeing the 
existing (viable) selection of the quality 
features from his/her perspective and 
pretending to know the breadth of the 
choices and the potential reasons for certain preferences. The researcher 
will generally not make great efforts to reveal the motives governing the 
In-depth case studies should 
serve as a complement to large 
surveys of job quality. 
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decisions taken by the respondents and to confront these with their real 
practices. Even if the preferences are somehow revealed, their discursive 
environment and the underlying cultural motives remain in the dark. The 
respondents are inundated with a whole lot of questions (requiring short 
answers) even when data collection is not impersonal. Finally, the 
researcher has almost no opportunity to test the strength or consistency of 
the preferences because the respondents are not observed in the context of 
a given case of employment. 
To address the shortcomings of such surveys, a more personal 
approach to the study of good jobs is suggested. It requires asking 
employees to explain their quality preferences and comparing these 
explanations with their actual practices. Also, researchers should exercise 
self-restraint in terms of both measurement and making normative 
statements. First, they have to tell whether job quality is higher or lower… 
and then they have to suggest a proper mix of quality features. Such an 
approach should not be seen as a rival to but an ally of the survey methods 
described above – an ally whose results are perhaps less representative and 
exact, but with whose help one can put some flesh on the bones of survey-
based studies.  
In order to explore the background of the employees’ narratives with 
some accuracy, a case study approach was chosen. Case studies in four 
countries (Hungary, Slovakia, Spain and the United Kingdom) were 
conducted at comparable sites. One of the two case studies conducted in 
each country focused on a large international company in the telecom 
industry. For the others, we studied two huge engineering firms, a large 
pharmaceutical enterprise and a medium-sized company in the food 
industry. (The original aim to reach full comparability was hampered by 
the resistance of Hungarian and Slovak engineering firms.) 
During 2012 and 2013, the researchers conducted a minimum of between 10 
and 15 semi-structured in-depth interviews in each company to accomplish 
the case studies. The overwhelming majority of the respondents came from 
the shop floor, including low-level management. What they offered us 
were certainly views ‘from below’ of good jobs, even if many of them 
worked in top industries. In the first half of the company interviews the 
respondents were asked about their own concept of an ideal job, and in the 
second they were requested to choose between materialist and post-
materialist features of job quality (for the questionnaire, see Kovács et al., 
2014). Relevant local documents were checked and as much participant 
observation was undertaken as was permitted by the companies. Of course, 
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even more than 100 interviews do not allow for the construction of any 
reasonable typology of quality preferences according to age, gender, 
profession, occupation, status, etc. – not to mention nationality. 
5.2 ‘Retraditionalisation’ and rising flexibility 
In the first decade of the new millennium, one could not help but discover 
a large gap between the dominant rhetoric and the real world, that is, 
between the mounting popularity of the term ‘good jobs’ (which has 
become a catchphrase like flexicurity, employability, matching skills and 
jobs, etc.) in politics and academia and the vast number of people who 
would be satisfied with bad jobs, even with almost any kind of job. 
Unfortunately, the popularity of the good job rhetoric does not originate in 
a coherent set of arguments. If one just compares the leading definitions of 
job quality – ranging from the so-called ‘Laeken indicators’, through the 
ILO or the ETUC concepts of decent work, all the way down to 
Eurofound’s ‘quality features’ – astonishing results occur. Fair wages and 
enough jobs, not to mention health and safety, are missing in many of 
them. One researcher or politician emphasises gender equality, the other 
work-life balance, and yet another career development. One praises 
security while the other stresses both flexibility and security, and so on. I 
would almost go so far as to say that the selections of quality attributes are 
coherent only in one single respect: one rarely finds the ideal of ‘green jobs’ 
in any of the taxonomies. However, other post-materialist features (such as 
participation, social responsibility, inclusion, self-fulfilment, recognition, 
creativity, autonomy and engagement) appear in the elite discourse on 
good jobs on the EU level rather frequently. 
The following selection includes a few results of the most recent 
quantitative inquiries on job quality in the countries under scrutiny:   
 Hungary, Slovakia and the UK belong to those countries in which 
flexibility clearly overrides security in terms of a ‘composite indicator 
of flexicurity’ based on four pillars: contractual arrangements, 
lifelong learning, active labour market policies and social security 
systems. In Spain, however, security prevails. The UK is characterised 
by a higher level of both flexibility and security than in the other 
three countries.12 
 In considering six types of jobs (active, saturated, team-based, 
passive, insecure and high-strain jobs, arranged in descending order 
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of quality), the UK has the highest share of good jobs among the four 
countries, followed by Slovakia, Spain and Hungary.13 
 The ‘overall job quality index’ (based on the average of rankings 
made in the field of wages, non-standard forms of employment, 
working time and work-life balance, working conditions and job 
security, skills and career development and collective interest 
representation) demonstrates that the score of Spain, Slovakia and 
Hungary relates to that of the UK like 4 to 7.14 
 Focusing on four sets of indicators – 1) earnings, 2) working time 
quality, 3) intrinsic job quality and 4) prospects of employment – the 
number representing ‘average job quality’ in terms of 1) is 1,591 in the 
UK, 1,414 in Spain, 844 in Slovakia and 626 in Hungary. For 2) the 
numbers are 61.3, 57.8, 52.4 and 56.8; for 3) they are 69.4, 68.9, 67.5, 
67.1; and for (4) they are 70.9, 60.0, 64.0, 61.8, respectively.15 
 In a taxonomy including “high-quality standard employment 
relationship (SER)—like”, “instrumental SER-like”, “precarious 
extensive”, “portfolio” and “precarious unsustainable” jobs (in 
descending order of quality), the UK has the smallest share of ‘best 
jobs’ among the four countries (the Slovak share is almost twice as 
large). The UK also has between two and three times as many ‘worst 
jobs’ as Spain and Hungary, and about five times as many as 
Slovakia.16  
The results of such (inherently incomparable) surveys warn us to be 
cautious when someone tells us without any reservation that job quality in 
country A is three times higher than in country B, flexibility killed security 
or that the era of post-materialism is over for good. Yet, in preparing the 
literature reviews, our research group encountered such generalisations in 
great numbers. The doubts concerning the clarity of the concept of job 
quality did not ebb, as demonstrated by the following working hypotheses 
with which the armchair research was left.17 
Two discursive camps. When considering good jobs, the main actors of 
the labour market organise their employment discourses by and large 
along the flexibility/security axis, suggesting different mixes of the two 
concepts but falling roughly into two camps (discursive alliances). These 
camps are rather stable and include similar sets of actors in the four 
countries examined. Irrespective of the fact that both camps’ blends of 
concepts frequently carry the label of ‘flexicurity’, they follow the old logic: 
typically, the employment narratives put forward by employers, the liberal 
and conservative parties and labour economists oppose those suggested by 
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trade unions, the social-democratic parties, labour sociologists and most 
NGOs.  
Shaky concepts. With the exception of the UK, concepts such as 
stability and security, flexibility and precariousness, internal and external 
flexibility, employment and job security, income security and job security, 
job preferences and job satisfaction, and job quality and work quality are 
frequently used as synonyms without further qualification. In many cases, 
secure jobs are regarded as good jobs while flexible jobs are seen as bad 
jobs, and vice versa; both discursive alliances often suffer from tunnel 
vision. As a consequence, important dilemmas are sometimes disregarded 
(such as whether the job security for the insiders of the labour market does 
not hurt that of the outsiders, or whether bad jobs also deserve to be 
maintained).  
Flexibility on the rise. The flexibility and security discourses are 
intertwined, but on average lean towards the former. Flexibility can be 
interpreted as inclusion and, as such, as a contribution to a new version of 
security that replaces the outmoded narrative of stability with that of 
employability. Thus the adherents to the flexibility narrative open a door 
towards a novel version of security that can be attained through new, 
variable skills, including by those whose employment is currently insecure. 
In the optimal case, flexible work schedules may improve work-life balance 
and reduce ethnic-, gender- or age-related discrimination.  
The security camp could, in 
principle, show a greater interest in 
attributes of good jobs which go beyond 
those related to wages, contractual rights 
and physical working conditions, but the leap in this direction does not 
seem to be made in three of the four countries. They could use attributes 
such as self-fulfilment, autonomy or participation as Trojan horses of the 
security narrative. But even in the fourth country, the UK, where a coherent 
narrative has crystallised around the concept of ‘good work’ (stressing 
skills, health and even green values), concern about the quantity of (secure) 
jobs offsets quality considerations for the major stakeholders of the security 
camp.  
Retraditionalisation. As regards the various components of job quality, 
those of a post-materialist nature are the clear losers. Hence, a 
retraditionalisation seems to be a valid assumption, especially in Spain and 
to a lesser degree in the UK, while in the two Eastern European countries 
the same phenomenon could be described as being stuck in a traditional 
Is flexibility on the rise, are post-
materialist values in decline? 
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interpretation of job quality focusing on full-time work with permanent 
contracts and appropriate wages. When employees in any of the four 
countries choose from among the materialist elements of good jobs, one 
sees a strong preference for stability of employment, that is, for 
compromising on wages and physical working conditions, not to mention 
fair treatment, career development or work-life balance. 
‘North-south’ divide. Instead of the widely-assumed ‘east-west’ divide 
in reflecting upon job quality (in which, say, the west is flexibility-prone 
and post-materialist, while the east is security-prone and materialist), a 
‘north-south’ cleavage emerges, in which Hungary and Slovakia as new 
entrants join Spain on the southern side of the EU. This division is 
demonstrated in the three countries through less sophisticated employment 
discourses, a stronger antagonism between the two discursive camps, a 
quantitative rather than qualitative approach taken by the main actors of 
the labour market to jobs, and the relatively low value attributed by them 
to the post-materialist components of job quality.  
5.3 Case studies: Industries, companies and job qualities 
As mentioned above, the eight case studies of employee preferences for the 
various components of good jobs represent telecommunications (E, H, SK, 
UK), engineering (E, UK), food (SK) and pharmaceutical (H) industries. 
Evidently, the industry matters. Just like the concrete company cases do, 
which are strongly affected by the actual changes in the labour markets of 
the four countries. What do the macro data tell us?18  
 All things considered, by the end of our research period, the plight 
of employment was most favourable in the UK, and employment trends 
showed the greatest improvement in Slovakia. Of the two ‘bad performers’, 
employment trends were more critical in Spain than in Hungary in most 
respects.  
Besides the overall employment situation in the four countries, it is 
the most recent developments in workplace innovation that may have 
influenced the quality preferences of employees to a large extent during the 
past 10 to 15 years. The spread of relatively new techniques of work 
organisation, such as teleworking, flexi-time, task rotation and multi-
skilling, prompt the researcher to ask whether these counter-balanced some 
of the adverse trends in the labour markets during the past decade or so; 
trends that were probably further aggravated by the global crisis. They 
seem to be instrumental sui generis in reinforcing the post-materialist 
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attitudes of the employees, although the ‘virtualisation’ and 
‘fragmentation’ of work may promote the egoistic rather than collectivistic 
elements of these attitudes.19 
How do all these changes (or lack of changes) manifest themselves in 
actual employee discourses on ‘decent work’? 
 
Box 5.1 What do the macro data tell us? 
 During the past decade and a half, economic growth as a whole was very 
fast in Slovakia, fast in Hungary and moderate in Spain, while the UK 
underwent a slight economic decline. Hungary, Spain and the UK 
suffered from the global financial crisis to an almost equal measure, 
resulting in near stagnation over more recent years. 
 The rate of employment did not change significantly in the four 
countries. It was higher in the middle of the past decade but decreased 
afterwards (in Spain until today). The rate was highest in the UK 
throughout the period studied. The decline in male employment was 
essentially counter-balanced by a rise in female employment, especially 
in Spain. The rate of employment fell sharply among the youth (by the 
least in the UK), stagnated among the middle-aged, and grew 
considerably among the older-age cohorts (particularly in Slovakia). 
 The share of part-time employment rose, especially in the case of men 
(who are still two to three times less likely than women to be employed 
in part-time jobs. The rise was the slowest in the UK, but there the share 
of part-time work was already high. 
 Temporary employment grew a little in Hungary and Slovakia, and fell 
in Spain and the UK. 
 The rate of unemployment rose everywhere, except Slovakia, and 
particularly sharply in Spain (especially among men and the young). 
Long-term unemployment changed in a similar fashion. 
 The unemployment trap did not grow in the UK; it decreased 
considerably in Slovakia, and increased in Hungary more than in Spain. 
 Finally, net incomes between 2005 and 2012 more than doubled in 
Slovakia, rose significantly in Hungary and moderately in Spain, and 
stagnated in the UK. The crisis hit Hungary and the UK the hardest. By 
and large, as far as incomes are concerned, neither female nor young 
employees fared worse than their male and older colleagues.  
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5.4 Job quality choices in the same industry 
In the telecoms companies under scrutiny – that is, in large transnational 
firms in a flourishing industry 
employing many young, well-
trained professionals (with a 
majority of males in the sample) – 
the main security attributes of job 
quality, such as a decent salary that 
is paid regularly, a formal contract 
promising longer-term employment, good physical working conditions and 
the like, were usually taken for granted. Perhaps more importantly, the 
interviewees were without exception employed at the time we met them, 
mostly enjoying the ‘luxury’ of legal certitude and an acceptable living 
standard. As regards flexibility, in these companies imminent dismissal is 
not normally a credible threat, and flexibility of working time can be 
associated with values such as autonomy, creativity and work-life balance 
rather than with the stress of precarious work. The post-materialist quality 
features come to the fore, and team spirit, communication, pride, 
recognition, prestige, upward mobility and so on may overshadow some of 
the classical material rewards. Employees appreciate the fact that their 
work is creative and challenging (according to one Hungarian respondent, 
“it is unpredictable, I like that there are no two identical days”20), represents a 
cutting-edge technology, and constantly develops their skills.  
In the Hungarian telecoms firm, recognition was considered by the 
employees interviewed as the third most important trait of good jobs, 
following job security and decent pay. Besides career development 
resulting from (and also generating) recognition, they also valued team 
work, being treated as an equal, and receiving information on higher-level 
decisions even if they cannot actively take part in them. As a Hungarian 
manager remarked, “one usually thinks it is pay but we found that the real touch 
point is communication”. However, maybe he was not quite right. 
Irrespective of whether or not the management informed employees 
correctly about a crucial change in the company’s work organisation 
introduced at the time of the case study, the employees were resisting the 
new scheme by saying that it disrupted team spirit by excessively 
individualising work activities and curbed their feeling of autonomy 
through a system of permanent supervision (“they are watching us from 
above”). At the same time, the employees were not complaining much about 
Post-materialist values, such as team 
spirit, communication, pride, 
recognition, prestige and upward 
mobility, are more important in large 
transnational firms. 
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the reduction of the wage-performance ratio resulting from the 
organisational shift. In the opinion of the authors of the case study: 
The growing tendency of flexibilisation is perceived as a major 
threat to all the good qualities that they currently appreciate in the 
job. (...) At the end of the day, (...), the super-flexible working 
conditions achieved by the necessary company reorganisations 
may lead to the retraditionalisation of employees’ values: they will 
regard security as the most important work value.  
In other words, if flexibilisation of work organisation hurts the 
former post-materialist combination of autonomy and collective 
performance, then the employees may again attribute more significance to 
the materialist features of security, such as an agreeable wage and stable 
employment. 
In the Slovak telecoms firm, career development, professional 
education (‘progress’, in their parlance) and work-life balance were given 
high scores by the employees. Moreover, they emphasised their own 
responsibility in exploiting these opportunities. At the same time, they 
tended to relativise the importance of material rewards against other 
features of work:  
Wage is important in the beginning (...) but if there is no 
recognition, no education, no career growth, (...) if the job is boring 
and you don’t see the challenge, you lose motivation, you lose 
productivity.(…) High salary can convince you to sign that 
contract but you will probably try to quit after three months if you 
wake up in the morning and don’t want to go to work although 
the salary is high (...).21 
While amongst the post-materialist components of good jobs the 
primarily egoistic (consumerist, individualist, hedonistic, etc.) components 
like flexibility of working hours or work-life balance were often 
emphasised, the altruistic (collectivist) ones such as non-discrimination, 
participation or environmentalism were hardly mentioned in the 
interviews (again, maybe because of their self-explanatory character in a 
Western-based enterprise of a prestigious industry, just as in the Hungarian 
company). In this respect, I found the following interview excerpt 
extremely telling: 
I do, I do [care about the working environment] because I want to 
feel important. Freud says that mankind craves two things, right? 
The first thing is sexual satisfaction and the second is the feeling of 
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importance. And I agree with Freud, by the way. So as every 
person on earth, I want to feel important. This might not be my 
building, I might not own it but it is good-looking and it makes me 
feel important that I work at a cool place. 
Studying a telecoms company in Spain revealed similar results in 
terms of the ranking of more and less traditional elements of job quality. 
Here, permanent and tailor-made contracts were appreciated more than a 
good salary, while the latter was also preceded by work-life balance and 
flexible regulation of working time. In this case, flexibility meant personal 
autonomy in changing traditional cultural patterns such as spending 12 
hours at work (with long lunch and coffee breaks) and paying the 
employees ‘by presence’, which prompts them to stay at work until the 
managers leave. As the authors of the Spanish case study noted, their 
respondents would like to avoid having ‘much overtime’ or ‘Marathon days’ 
and consider the right to take part in organising their own working time as 
‘non-negotiable’.22 
Professional development shared second place with autonomous 
time management in the employees’ preference lists. One of the 
respondents put it this way: “Money is important but if you have on the table 
flexibility [of working time] and career development then money is not important.” 
Mobility within the firm as well as between regions and countries was also 
considered a key feature of good jobs, as was having meaningful work. 
Happiness is a principal requirement, as demonstrated by our interview 
partners: “I do not understand why I have to be tied to a chair.” “The job should 
be ambitious, entrepreneurial allowing you to contribute with new ideas.” “I 
would like to enjoy doing my job and go home in peace with myself.” Hence, 
certain post-materialist features of decent work managed to occupy many 
of the upper positions in the Spanish employees’ ranking. Amongst the 
other typical post-materialist values, equal opportunity came out as a top 
priority whereas other ethical, political, ecological, etc. components of job 
quality did not really matter. 
Did experiences in the British telecoms firm differ significantly? By 
and large the answer is “no”, but according to the case study, decent pay 
was not primarily compared to in-job post-materialist features (such as 
recognition, creativity and participation) but rather to work-life balance in 
general, and the time one can spend with one’s family in particular. “(…) 
You work to live but you don't live to work.” “I think you should enjoy your free 
time as much as you should enjoy work.” “Work is important to pay the bills but 
the most important thing is what’s happening in your family.” “It's more 
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important to have more time for oneself than for work.”23 Also, health and safety 
were valued by employees almost as much as pay, and environmental 
awareness was stressed in the interviews more often in the UK than in 
Hungary, Slovakia and Spain.  
The respondents in the British telecoms firm also felt privileged as far 
as material rewards were concerned (or did not expect any improvement 
under the current economic conditions). Thus, they were also inclined to 
speak about their claims with regard to a good working atmosphere, 
recognition, independence and creativity: “I mean we’d all want more money 
but I don’t think (…) I would go back in the factory just for money, no.” “When 
you’re sort of governed by the clock, you feel like you’re a robot.” “A bad job is 
gonna be one way not valued, possibly grossly underpaid or mistreated. (…) A 
good job is exactly the opposite, so valued, you're paid well and you enjoy.”  
It also transpires from the UK study, as well as from the other three, 
that if any of the three main pillars of security (pay, contract and physical 
working conditions) was to be shattered in this industry, then post-
materialist aspirations would probably not assume such a prominent 
position in the preference lists of the respondents. 
All in all, the fact that our telecom case studies do not reveal much 
difference in the quality preferences across the four countries, and that 
these preferences are slightly biased towards post-materialist values, does 
not mean that the ‘retraditionalisation’ hypothesis should be dismissed for 
good. In the companies we examined, the material needs of employees, 
including job and income security, are apparently relatively satisfied, or the 
employees cannot hope to achieve a substantial increase in the level of 
satisfaction. They are therefore ready to accept second-best solutions in the 
field of security. But to which amongst the non-traditional values do they 
subscribe? The respondents tend to embrace those post-materialist 
components of job quality which are of an egoistic character, such as a 
pleasant working environment, autonomy, work-life balance, skills and 
education. Altruistic values, such as participation, social responsibility, 
equal opportunity or greenness, remain at the bottom of their preference 
lists. Is a kind of ‘selfish post-materialism’ on the rise? 
5.5 Job quality choices between industries 
Employees in other – less prosperous – industries normally do not develop 
such a high intensity of post-materialist attitudes in defining the concept of 
good jobs as that experienced in the telecom firms. Of course, prosperity is 
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only one among the possible explanations. Some of the companies 
discussed below are not less prosperous, but represent much older 
technologies and industrial culture, not 
to mention the fact that they have left 
behind the most vigorous/constructive 
phase of their development trajectory, in 
which labour shedding is less likely. 
Similarly, they do not attract as many young professionals who bring post-
materialist values to the workplace. Undoubtedly, some of these companies 
can give their employees a sense of security, but frequently the technology 
they apply does not promise them much flexibility, creativity or autonomy.  
Consider the two engineering companies. The one in the UK is equal, 
if not superior, to the telecom firms discussed above in terms of cutting-
edge technology, size and reputation. Decent pay, long-term employment 
and favourable working conditions were expected by the employees as 
almost axiomatic features of job quality in this large multinational company 
that, in their view, “would always exist”. By security they meant reliability 
and predictability of the firm’s behaviour as well as safety stemming from 
the excellent brand name, and did not regard material rewards as an 
absolute criterion of quality. According to one respondent, “[w]age is 
important. But it's again a balance between working environment and wage. I 
wouldn't for instance work a crazy amount of hours”.24 His colleague put this 
thought in a similar way: “I want to get paid. But it's not my number one 
driver. I am more driven by having a really good experience, a great challenge, and 
being employable.” 
Instead of talking about security, interviewees stressed how 
challenging, creative and socially responsible their ideal job would be, and 
to what extent it was expected to contribute to their own professional 
development. Continuous learning as a means of future employability was 
an important element here. Although the respondents did not face any 
aggressive attempts at flexibilisation of working time, they believed that, 
for example, longer working hours would be a fair price for attaining these 
values. Health and safety were important aspects of a good job, but given 
ample state regulation as well as a reliable company record in this field, the 
employees did not emphasise them in the interviews. The same applies to 
equal opportunity. However, while in all the above fields the company’s 
official narrative largely matched the discourse of the individual 
employees, the employees ranked environmental awareness much lower 
than their company did. What seems symptomatic again is that, with the 
remarkable exception of social responsibility, altruism is not a strong driver 
Materialist values are dominant 
in more traditional or less 
prosperous industries. 
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in the domain of post-materialist considerations. However, in the other 
three countries our case studies have hardly identified employees who 
would have had ideological motives as strong as those demonstrated by 
the following three interviewees in a British engineering company: 
For any money in the world I wouldn't work for, I have ten 
companies in my head, I wouldn't work for those with a very 
strong ‘first-world’ attitude and bad working conditions or impact 
in the third world.  
Somewhere between alcohol and tobacco, there is a line that 
I would prefer not to cross. I worked for a bank, enjoyed working 
for a bank (…) but I wouldn't go back (…) I think it’s just the world 
view that I don't subscribe to (…).  
I wouldn't work for a company that does animal testing or 
spills oil everywhere, anything like that (…). 
The Spanish engineering firm shows a more traditional pattern; here 
materialist values are more popular among the employees. Although 
decent pay is not considered the top priority (coming third in the list), but 
some kind of pay originating in stable employment definitely is. The latter 
was presented, together with professional development, as the most 
important element of job quality in the interviews. As one interviewee said, 
“I prefer to earn less and be comfortable but this does not mean that salary is not 
important in a job”.25 In contrast to responses at the Spanish telecom 
company, here the recent employment crisis in the country has clearly 
exerted a major influence upon the employees’ attitudes. In the opinion of 
one interview partner of ours: 
(...) earlier having a permanent contract meant something, now I 
know many cases that [the employees’ position] seemed stable, 
and they got fired. My wife works in a bank and this kind of job 
seemed much more secure and stable but now not anymore, and 
the same happened to many good jobs in big and stable 
companies.  
The majority of respondents thought that the stability of a job is 
contingent on their employability which may result from continuous 
education. They presumed that “autonomy is also linked to professional 
development”, “(…) when you get promoted it goes with (...) dignity and 
prestige”. In second place on the list of quality features one finds the 
adequate organisation of working time, leading to a better work-life 
balance and a shortening of the traditionally long Spanish workdays. 
“Flexibility should be linked to your personal use of time“, one of the employees 
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noted. Another respondent contended, “I could renounce [part of my] salary 
for a good team (…) I could give up my salary but not my time”.  
As for other post-materialist features of good jobs, variability of the 
work and mobility were frequently mentioned. Moreover, time (the 
authors of the case study ask whether this is not the new currency of the 
21st century) was appreciated not only for self-fulfilment, but also for 
voluntary work outside the company. Green attitudes, however, were not 
popular among the respondents. One of them said with resignation, “it is 
very difficult to value sustainability if you have no job”. 
The employees of the pharmaceutical company we studied in 
Hungary also preferred a stable contract (but also the possibly inflexible 
working time of eight hours and five days) to decent pay among the 
standard elements of employment security. In other words, they also 
tended to accept a ‘job for pay’ trade-off, as demonstrated by the following 
interview excerpt:  
It kills your daily life when you constantly have to worry whether 
there’s going to be work tomorrow, whether or not the company 
will close in six months. This place has a stable reputation. I’m not 
saying they’re paying the employees sky-high but the positions are 
secure.26 
Primarily due to technological reasons (three-shift operation, severe 
work discipline) and company traditions (lifelong employment, family 
networks in the workforce, special welfare services), neither external nor 
internal flexibility were regarded by the employees as a major threat. In 
accepting that they are ‘locked in’ to a high-discipline work process, the 
respondents valued not only creativity and variability of work, but also 
trust, solidarity, intergenerational cooperation, social sensitivity, industrial 
peace, and so on (that is, a pleasant working atmosphere) in addition to the 
pride they felt working in a competitive, well-organised, clean industry of 
high esteem. Surprisingly for a chemical firm, health and safety did not 
feature highly on the priority list of job quality attributes. Furthermore, 
compared to the British and Spanish companies, the employees in the 
Hungarian pharmaceutical firm did not rank professional education and 
work-life balance among the top priorities when thinking about decent 
work. As the case study author notes, “being penned up and having a time 
schedule partly or wholly in contrast to normal family schedules lend human 
relationships at work a far higher importance”. 
Are the above-mentioned constituents of working atmosphere - i.e. 
non-physical working conditions – post-materialist and if they are, do they 
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belong to the egoistic or the altruistic segment of job quality traits? They are 
mostly of only an indirectly materialist nature, even if some of them 
remind the observer of the cultural world of a traditional (paternalist) 
company. (“It’s like we had two homes”, said one interviewee.) Also, altruism 
unmistakably occurs amongst these traits but it is also slightly old-
fashioned, relating to ‘love and peace’ within the firm rather than 
participation, equal opportunity, environmentalism or obtaining time for 
voluntary activity outside of work. 
Finally, let us have a look at a much smaller company operating in 
the food industry in Slovakia. As it is located in a region of severe 
unemployment and most of the employees are not highly qualified, it was 
not surprising to hear our respondents wish for more security for 
themselves. Although they were not satisfied with their wages, they put the 
ideal of having a permanent contract at the very top of their preference list, 
while attributing almost as much importance to acceptable pay. The author 
of the case study asserts the following: “Links were drawn between low wage 
and underrated or under-appreciated work. Wage was thus constructed as both a 
source of income and a source of dignity.”27 Yet, resignation seems stronger: 
things are “not that bad and you cannot be too picky nowadays”. This sentiment, 
repeated by many respondents, reflects the fact that today many employees 
are content to have second-best jobs rather than striving for ideal ones.  
In any event, good physical working conditions were mentioned 
among the vital components of decent work much more often than in the 
seven other case studies – an understandable phenomenon if one takes into 
account the high intensity of work and ratio of overtime in this firm, not to 
mention heat and noise. “The relationships here are disturbed. Maybe it’s 
because of too much work, people are nervous“, said one of the respondents. 
Another noted: “You have to hurry up, you have to work fast. You hurry to the 
work, you hurry from the work, you hurry in the work. The break is short, you just 
have something to eat and then you get back to work and work fast until you’re 
finished.”  
Just as in the Hungarian pharmaceutical firm, professional education 
and career development were not brought up by the employees in the 
Slovak food company. They longed for meaningful work, team spirit and 
recognition – “civility in the workplace”, as one noted – and would appreciate 
a family-like working atmosphere. However, they cited none of the 
altruistic features of post-materialism, such as participation, fair treatment 
and social responsibility. Despite the fact that theirs is a bio-sensitive 
company producing healthy food, and that the owner is proud of his 
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commitment to green values, the highest level of adherence to 
environmentalism by the employees was reflected in this opinion: “Before I 
started working here I wasn’t concerned about [greenness]. But when you work in 
this company, you gain a different perspective.”  
5.6 Hypotheses vs. conclusions: Which post-materialism? 
How do our preliminary assumptions relate to the results of fieldwork? Is 
the evidence collected in the case studies convincing enough to accept the 
working hypotheses of our research group, above all the assumption of 
‘retraditionalisation’? Are the respondents’ attitudes reverting to those of 
the 1960s, when post-materialist values were less important in defining a 
good job. Have the interviewees really travelled back half a century in 
time? 
A note of caution must be made here. To understand the degree of 
‘detraditionalisation’ during the last century, and to establish how seriously 
employees began to ‘retraditionalise’ their quality preferences during the 
past decade or so, one would have had to study their attitudes 10, 20 or 50 
years ago. In want of a better solution, we took the conclusions of the 
‘detraditionalisation’ literature for granted, which suggested that the 
present importance of materialist elements should have been preceded by a 
process of ‘retraditionalisation’ eroding the results of decades of 
‘detraditionalisation’. This section therefore captures only the outcome of 
that process, without making specific claims about when the process 
started and whether it will continue.  
Similarly, our research design does not offer an answer to the 
question of why post-materialist values have lost some of their importance 
(although the recent economic crisis and a growing risk aversion in its 
wake seem to be principal reasons for this).28 Also, as mentioned above, the 
small sample size of the investigation does not allow for estimates 
regarding the participation rates of various social groups in 
‘retraditionalisation’ by age, gender, profession and the like. The 
interviewees, however, seem to confirm the truism that younger, higher-
skilled employees in transnational companies of progressive industries are 
perhaps the most reluctant to return to traditional attitudes towards job 
quality. 
The empirical findings nuanced much of what our research group 
believed they knew about materialist versus post-materialist values (or, 
more broadly put, cultures) in the context of the flexibility and security 
JOB QUALITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: TRAVELLING BACK IN TIME?  103 
 
discourses. First, it became clear that insisting on a sharp distinction 
between the two kinds of culture in the context of job quality is rather 
difficult because of a grey zone in which they overlap. Materialist values 
(such as a stable contract or appropriate pay) may be regarded by 
employees not only as a source of material safety, but also as part of 
recognition, prestige and engagement, thus embodying post-materialist 
values. Or indeed post-materialist values such as a pleasant working 
atmosphere or self-fulfilment may largely depend on the quality of 
physical working conditions, without doubt a materialist value.  
Second, both cultures consist 
of competing elements and are, as a 
consequence, not well defined. The 
trade-off between job (contract) and 
pay is probably the best-known 
example in the field of materialism, 
while in the field of post-materialism it is the rivalry between egoistic and 
altruistic aspirations (for example, humanising the workplace in a polluting 
industry) that may prevent the observer from making unambiguous 
statements on cultural undercurrents of employment discourses. The same 
applies to the concepts of security and flexibility, which are also loosely 
defined and may overlap. As mentioned before, flexibility may result in 
security (such as when flexible working time leads to more jobs or longer-
term employment contracts) and vice versa (when stable employment 
increases employability through professional development in a classic 
flexicurity regime). 
Third, one wonders how two or more partially defined dichotomies 
can be combined in a reasonable manner. The binary model of materialism 
versus post-materialism cannot be identified with that of security versus 
flexibility (or that of east versus west or south versus north). Wishing more 
security for oneself, for instance, is not necessarily a materialist claim and 
characteristic of employees in the eastern or southern countries. To put it in 
simple geometrical terms, let us imagine two perpendicular axes dividing 
the space into four quarters. One axis embodies the security versus 
flexibility dimension, the other stretches between the extremes of 
materialism and post-materialism. (For the sake of simplicity, let us forget 
about the fact that the extremes may overlap.) Now, if one looks for job 
quality features, they will be found not only in the security/materialism 
and flexibility/post-materialism quarters, but also in the other two.    
Materialism is defined by the trade-off 
between job contract and pay, post-
materialism by the trade-off between 
egoistic and altruistic aspirations. 
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For example, aspiring to security may go beyond materialist values 
(for example, if health and safety includes mental/spiritual well-being), 
whereas flexibility is not tantamount to post-materialism (cf. flexible 
employment contracts increasing job security through inclusion). Does the 
formalisation of informal employment contracts enhance security? Most 
likely it does. But maybe the employee has to pay its price by means of 
accepting a more flexible pattern of work organisation. At the same time, 
his or her job’s prestige may grow as well, and the employee will cease to 
feel a lack of affiliation. He or she may also gain in terms of fair treatment 
and participation through the process of formalisation. Consequently, both 
materialist and post-materialist traits of the job improve. 
 Similarly, flexibilisation may result in ‘retraditionalisation’ in terms 
of narrowing the contractual rights of employees, or curtailing their 
freedom to decide on their own work-life balance, thereby also reducing 
their autonomy. Symbolic geography is also a slippery slope: as 
demonstrated above, ‘eastern’ employees can subscribe to post-materialist 
values (such as demanding more recognition and dignity), while 
‘westerners’ may prove to be heavily materialist (regarding professional 
education as a means of raising wages and remaining employable rather 
than of increasing self-fulfilment), and so on and so forth. 
These distinctions usually remain hidden in the thick of the 
security/flexibility discourse, in particular, if examined through 
impersonal surveys in which the researcher does not want to go beyond a 
simplistic Maslowian approach. However, the most important finding of 
this study is that retraditionalisation manifests itself not so much in giving 
preference to materialist values as opposed to post-materialist ones, but 
rather in an inclination towards egoistic values, whether materialist or 
post-materialist in nature. The low position of any altruistic approach to job 
quality in the preference lists of the overwhelming majority of the 
respondents in almost all companies (and Hexenküchen of labour 
legislation) in the four countries was nearly as representative a result as if it 
were presented by a large-sample survey. The ignorance and neglect of 
green values was probably the most obvious phenomenon, followed by a 
general lack of interest in social responsibility, participation and equal 
opportunity.  
It seemed an even more striking fact that in the case of those 
components of good jobs which could have been interpreted as either 
altruistic or egoistic, the latter option prevailed. The best example is 
participation (social dialogue), which was not regarded by the interviewees 
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as a (collectivist) end in itself but as a means of attaining predominantly 
egoistic goals like the prevention of layoffs or wage cuts. Quite frequently, 
employees took a passive approach to participation: the wish to be 
informed replaced that of having a share in decision-making. Flexible 
working time presents a more complicated issue. When it was popular at 
all, the employees defended it as an opportunity to achieve an adequate 
work-life balance. Nevertheless, altruism rarely exceeded the boundaries of 
the family; in those cases when it did, the free time gained through 
flexibilisation was meant to increase personal autonomy, in particular the 
freedom to engage in leisure activities.   
5.7 Quantity and egoism win 
The complexity of the underlying concepts notwithstanding, it seems 
possible to derive the following conclusions from the case studies: 
1. Quantity wins. On the level of elite discussions, the flexibility 
narrative clearly dominates its rival in the countries under scrutiny. 
However, as far as employee preferences ‘on the ground’ are 
concerned, job security (in the sense of stable employment) overrides 
not only most of the post-materialist values, but also such traditional 
materialist quality features as decent pay, appropriate physical 
working conditions (including health and safety at the workplace) 
and fixed working time. This phenomenon is characteristic even of 
those cutting-edge firms in which the employees are also keen on 
many of the post-materialist values related to job quality. Sheer 
quantity defeats quality, whether the latter is materialist or post-
materialist in nature. Therefore, paradoxically, retraditionalisation 
may endanger even some of the traditional components of decent 
work. 
2. Second-best wins. In any event, when employees talk about the concept 
of an ideal job, they normally describe a “second-best” occupation 
that they can realistically obtain. Having lowered their aspiration 
levels, they mean “acceptable/agreeable” when saying “good”. This 
overall attitude applies to the materialist and the post-materialist 
components of decent work almost equally. However, when it came 
to actual choices, our 
respondents pointed out a 
variety of trade-offs between 
the two but tended to sacrifice 
the post-materialist values more readily. 
Policy-makers focus on job quantity, 
employees on egoistic aspirations. 
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3. Egoism wins. Retraditionalisation seems to be a helpful assumption, 
but the post-materialist features of good jobs do not disappear 
entirely. They tend to assume a rather low position in the preference 
lists of the employees; one could perhaps say they are in a dormant 
state but may be reawakened, in particular in the progressive 
industries, at any time provided that meanwhile the overall quantity 
of (good) jobs grows to a sufficient extent. At this point, it is not easy 
to judge which among the post-materialist features may have a better 
chance of reaching a higher position in the future, the more egoistic 
or the more altruistic ones. Currently, egoism seems to be the obvious 
winner. 
4. The ‘south’ wins. The concept of the presumed ‘north-south’ cultural 
divide in employment discourses also needs to be attenuated. This is 
not because, in contrast to the expectations, there are striking 
similarities between the formerly eastern countries or between the 
formerly western ones. The case studies demonstrate the strength of 
global/transnational impacts, including those of the EU. These cut 
across national borders, homogenise the concept of job quality to a 
considerable extent, and turn the large, cutting-edge firms into 
islands on which the employees order their preferences for good jobs 
rather independently from the dominant narratives of the countries’ 
elites. A Slovak telecom company may be regarded as at least as 
‘northern’ as a Spanish one. The UK is an obvious exception in all 
fields examined, being the most ‘northern’ amongst the four countries 
as far as the obstacles to retraditionalisation are concerned. 
(Evidently, this would not have been the case if our sample had 
included ‘northern’ countries, e.g. Germany and France or Sweden).  
5. Country-specific cultures lose. Cultural dissimilarities with 
national/ethnic roots did not surface in the course of fieldwork in 
great numbers. A likely reason for this is that the recent global crisis 
standardised many of the former cultural specifics, and one would 
have had to use more sophisticated research instruments to detect 
their remnants. Yet, it is possible to observe some essential cultural 
motives (for example, regarding health in the UK, dignity in Hungary 
and Slovakia or time in Spain as high-priority constituents of decent 
work; the importance attributed to physical working conditions in 
Hungary and Slovakia; or professional education as a top priority in 
Spain and the UK) though they did not provide a solid basis for 
generalisation. 
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These ‘four wins, one loss’ conclusions will perhaps become a 
suitable point of departure for survey-makers in job quality studies in the 
future. Otherwise, researchers may continue to i) endlessly mix and remix 
the (often rather ambiguous) quality features in order to identify the best- 
and worst-performing countries; ii) overlook a decline in expectations 
concerning decent work, and a growing share of materialist and/or ‘selfish’ 
post-materialist aspirations; and iii) separate the ‘east’ and the ‘south’ too 
sharply. Even worse, they will ignore those fundamental value choices 
which transpire even from such quasi-anthropological studies such as this 
one. 
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6. WORKPLACE INNOVATION IN EUROPE* 
s the nature of work really changing, as is frequently asserted in both 
popular and academic literature? Before trying to sketch an answer to 
this question, it is important to clarify what constitutes innovation in 
the workplace. We believe that the best way to do this is to frame the 
concept around the overall phenomenon of innovation, which is normally 
thought of in terms of product innovation (in other words, the creation of 
new products). Innovation, however, can also concern processes and 
among these, the organisation of work.  
More specifically, workplace innovation (WPI) can be understood as being 
a possible outcome of the intersection between human resource (HR) 
management, technology and skills. The three elements co-exist and are 
interdependent: where technology adoption is driven by HR strategic 
policies, managers are likely to create enough momentum to change the 
work process and consequently to invest in training and upgrading of skills 
to support the innovation. Conversely, a lack of skills coupled with static 
HR management will most likely present a barrier to technology adoption, 
and hence to workplace innovation.  
What does this mean in practice? In everyday working life, 
workplace innovation is translated into a number of specific actions, such 
as flexi-time, teleworking, alternative 
payment schemes, employee 
empowerment and autonomy, task 
rotation and multi-skilling, teamwork 
and team autonomy. 
New modalities of working have 
started to appear in recent years and 
                                                   
* Miroslav Beblavý and Ilaria Maselli are the authors of chapter 6, which is based 
on the research report on workplace innovation conducted by CEPS and supported 
by Microsoft. The original report features among co-authors also Elisa Martellucci.  
I
Workplace innovation in practice: 
flexi-time, teleworking, alternative 
payment schemes, employee 
empowerment and autonomy, task 
rotation and multi-skilling, 
teamwork and team autonomy. 
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neologisms like ’crowd-sourcing’ and ‘co-working spaces’ have entered our 
vocabulary. These new forms of work organisation involve tasks that are 
chopped up and outsourced to independent workers in different parts of 
the globe and the aggregation of workers themselves across new types of 
working spaces. An important driver of such change is technology: 
working across different states without the possibility of sharing 
documents or communicating instantaneously would not only be 
unproductive, but also a hassle.  
As so often happens with change, these new modes of working 
generate doubts and fear. Is it really more productive to organise work in a 
less hierarchical and more flexible way? What are the consequences for 
workers? Is it happening too fast? Should policy-makers regulate it, and if 
so, in what way? 
6.1 No single metric measures workplace innovation 
How widespread are workplace innovation practices in reality? Data from 
the European Working Condition Survey collected by Eurofound offer 
plenty of insights, but it is important to bear in mind that it is impossible to 
summarise workplace innovation with one single number for Europe. In 
fact, two elements of differentiation exist. On the one hand, penetration 
varies enormously according to the practice – telework compared with task 
rotation, for instance. On the other hand, we show that each of these 
practices is present in the various European countries, but in a very uneven 
fashion. Nonetheless, for nearly all the forms of workplace innovation 
considered, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and Finland score higher 
than the other countries. This is consistent not only with the traditional 
literature on welfare-state classifications, but also with studies that argue 
for the existence of a Scandinavian model of work organisation.1  
For purposes of comparison, it is useful to look at the US experience 
as a benchmark, where the debate on workplace innovation has re-ignited 
following the decision by Yahoo’s CEO Marissa Mayer to ban teleworking 
early in 2013. According to data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
one-third of all American workers have access to flexible working hours, a 
proportion that does not change visibly between men and women but 
increases rapidly with the level of education.2 Telecommuting, however, is 
less widespread: a recent study shows that such practice applies to less 
than 20% of US workers, a percentage that remained quite constant during 
the 2000s after a period of growth during the 1990s.3  
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6.2 An uneven spread, both geographically and by country 
The key elements of workplace innovation for which we have statistical 
information are: flexi-time, teleworking, alternative payment schemes, flat 
hierarchies, employee empowerment and autonomy, task rotation and 
multi-skilling, teamwork and team autonomy. Table 6.1 shows the 
percentage of workers involved in each of these practices in the European 
Union. It is clear that different practices have different average levels of 
penetration: almost 70% of workers, for instance, enjoy autonomy but only 
12% have access to teleworking. The least diffused are the so-called 
‘quantitative aspects’: flexi-time (37.8%), teleworking (11.7%) and 
alternative payment schemes (12.5%). More common are the qualitative 
aspects, which apply to at least four workers out of every ten.  
Table 6.1 Percentage of workers involved in innovative practices in their workplace 
in Europe, 2010   
Flexi- 
time 
Tele 
working 
Alternative 
payment 
schemes 
Flat 
hierarchies 
Employee 
empowerment 
37.8 11.7 12.5 56.8 43.9 
Employee 
autonomy 
Team work Team 
autonomy 
Task rotation  
67.4 56.4 52.0 43.6  
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from the 5th European Working 
Conditions Survey (Eurofound, 2010). 
But are these averages representative of the continent as a whole? 
Looking at detailed data by country, we discover that the answer is clearly 
“no”. The Nordic countries are in the lead: Denmark, Sweden, Finland and 
the Netherlands rank highest in the diffusion of new ways of working, 
which are much more widespread in these countries than in the 
Mediterranean countries like Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy. In between 
are the Baltics: Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania in particular occupy the 
middle rank, creating a model of ‘post-communist almost-Nordics’. The 
most interesting case is Slovenia; it ranks fifth, right after the Nordics, and 
has the same level of diffusion across all elements.  
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Figure 6.1 Diffusion of innovative practices in the workplace, by country, average 
across nine items 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from the 5th European Working Conditions 
Survey (Eurofound, 2010). 
6.3 Flexi-time, teleworking and alternative payment schemes 
in Europe 
Interviews conducted with workers across Europe as part of the European 
Working Conditions Survey 2010 indicated that in the majority (60%) of 
cases, working time is set by the company with no possibility of change. 
The exceptions to this finding were 
Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands 
where this percentage falls significantly 
to the point that in only one-third of the 
cases does the employer set the working 
time in a rigid fashion. The laggards in terms of working-time flexibility are 
the east Europeans, the Spaniards and the Portuguese.  
If on average 60% of workers cannot choose their working time, this 
means that the remaining 40% enjoy at least some flexibility. Such 
flexibility can take different forms: a small minority (7%) can choose 
between several fixed working schedules; 16% have a margin for 
adaptation, which, for example, can take the shape of flexi-time whereby 
the worker has flexibility in terms of starting and ending hours, but with 
core hours when the worker’s presence is compulsory. Only 16% of 
workers can fully determine their working hours, and a majority of these 
are self-employed.  
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Flexi-time, teleworking and 
alternative payment schemes still 
concern a minority of workers. 
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Figure 6.2 Working time set by the company with no possibility for changes 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from the 5th European Working Conditions 
Survey (Eurofound, 2010). 
What type of working-time flexibility are we referring to here? The 
responses to two questions in the survey (Do you work the same number of 
hours every day/every week?) reveal that flexibility “by the day” is more 
widespread than flexibility “by the week”. In other words, European 
workers often have a predetermined number of working hours per week 
that are adjustable by the day, with highly skilled clerical workers and self-
employed people having more flexible working hours than others.  
The second element of the definition of workplace innovation we 
selected is teleworking. Figure 6.3 shows the share of workers whose main 
place of work is their employers’ or their own business premises, and home 
as a second option. On average, 12 Europeans out of every 100 engage in 
telecommuting. The difference between countries is again very stark: only 
in the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark does this share exceed 30%. It is 
not by chance that these are also the countries where workers have more 
freedom to choose their work schedules; overall, Dutch, Swedish and 
Danish workers have the greatest liberty to set their own working time and 
their place of work. At the opposite extreme are Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary 
and Cyprus, where fewer than five in ten workers can work from home as 
an alternative to their business premises. Aggregate data for Europe (as a 
whole) by sector illustrate that greater numbers of workers in four 
particular sectors are allowed to work from home: real estate, professional 
and scientific activities, education, and information and communications. 
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Figure 6.3 Percentage of office workers that “also” work from home 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from the 5th European Working Conditions 
Survey (Eurofound, 2010). 
The third element of quantitative flexibility considered is 
performance-linked remuneration. Figure 6.4 plots the share of workers 
who mentioned, as part of their remuneration, company shares and/or 
payments based on overall company performance (i.e. a profit-sharing 
scheme). While both sub-elements increase in importance over time, 
payments related to performance remain by far the most important.  
Figure 6.4 Diffusion of performance-linked remuneration 
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Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from the 5th European Working Conditions 
Survey (Eurofound, 2010). 
Both measures create a stronger link between the fate of the 
organisation and the worker. However, they differ in intent: profit-sharing 
schemes create an incentive for the worker to put in more effort, whereas 
employee-share ownership reflects trust and inclusiveness. Performance-
linked remuneration is more widespread in France, where almost one-third 
of workers receive part of their salary linked to the performance of the 
company. The other countries above the European average of 14% are a 
mix of Nordic and east European countries.  
6.4 Increased worker autonomy and responsibility 
The seven dimensions that characterise an innovative workplace – flexi-
time, teleworking, alternative payment schemes, employee empowerment 
and autonomy, task rotation and multi-skilling, teamwork and team 
autonomy – can be grouped into quantitative and qualitative dimensions. 
The latter aspects of high-performance workplace systems are based on 
allowing employees to exercise higher independence and giving more 
responsibility to single workers and teams. As a consequence, high-
performance workplaces abandon the rigid pyramidal structure typical of 
Taylorist organisations and adopt a flatter structure with the intention of 
encouraging innovation from the bottom-up, thereby achieving greater 
productivity because workers feel more invested in their jobs.  
European Working Conditions 
Survey data indicate that more than 
60% of workers enjoy some degree of 
autonomy because they are able to 
choose or change their method of work. 
The capacity to influence company 
decisions is rather more limited: even though one-half of European 
companies have put in place a mechanism designed to give a ‘voice’ to 
workers, only 40% of workers report having some involvement in the 
organisation of the work process.  
The three variables in the Survey that refer to workers’ autonomy are 
positively correlated, which means that it would be very difficult to 
empower workers by allowing one element and not the others. For 
example, it would be unnecessarily inefficient if a worker who is able to 
change his or her work method discovers a more efficient process but is not 
More than 60% of workers enjoy 
some degree of autonomy, defined 
as being able to choose or change 
their method of work. 
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able to communicate it or share it with colleagues and superiors.  
Another element of qualitative flexibility at the workplace is task 
rotation. It has its raison d’être in workers acquiring multiple skills that 
make them more flexible in the distribution of tasks. This practice involves 
at least one-third of all European workers. The EU average, by country, is 
44%, with Sweden and Denmark among the countries exceeding 70%. Of 
the workers involved in rotating tasks, approximately 80% declared that 
different skills are needed to cope with all aspects of their work.  
Teamwork and team autonomy are the last elements of qualitative 
flexibility. Teamwork concerns more than 50% of workers, only half whom 
also enjoy autonomy in terms of the internal division of tasks. This latter 
dimension of teamwork is more differentiated across countries: once again, 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland rank in the top positions, given that more 
than two-thirds of team workers in these countries also enjoy great 
autonomy in the division of tasks.  
6.5 Workplace innovation as a package 
Correlation analysis indicates that flexi-time and teleworking are positively 
correlated with all qualitative elements. In the case of alternative payment 
schemes, the signs of the coefficients are the same but the relationship is 
strong only with flat hierarchies and team autonomy. Not only is there no 
trade-off between telecommuting and employee empowerment, for 
instance, but in some cases there is a strong interdependence. This indicates 
that workplace innovation comes as a package.  
The importance of a holistic approach to workplace innovation also 
emerges from the radar charts in Figure 6.5: not only do the Nordics exhibit 
wider diffusion across each item compared to the southern countries, but 
they also achieve a better balance between the different dimensions (with 
the exception of alternative payment schemes and teleworking, which in 
general display very limited diffusion). Altogether, they enable workers to 
decide when to work, to influence decisions relevant for the organisation, 
to work in teams and to exchange tasks. In the southern countries, 
however, there are efforts to let workers organise themselves in teams and 
take more responsibility, but elements of rigidity persist – the diffusion of 
flexi-time and task rotation remain limited and hierarchies are not smooth 
across the different criteria considered.  
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Figure 6.5 Innovative practices: Nordic vs. the southern countries 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from the 5th European Working Conditions 
Survey (Eurofound, 2010). 
6.6 The slow diffusion of innovation in the workplace 
We have already shown that workplace innovation still concerns only a 
minority of workers in most countries. Has there been any change on this 
front? A comparison with the same data for 2010 (only old-European 
countries available here) reveals that the diffusion of participatory practices 
made little progress much between 2000 and 2010.  
It is interesting to note that the only major change across the decade 
was in the share of workers who receive part of their compensation linked 
to performance: the percentage of workers who answered positively to this 
question rose from 5.2% in 2000 to 13.7% ten years later. Surprisingly, 
diffusion of the remaining workplace innovation elements remained 
consistently static. On top of this, for all items except teamwork, there is 
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divergence rather than convergence across the old-European countries 
(standard deviation coefficients mostly go up between 2000 and 2010). 
Table 6.2 Workplace innovation in western Europe, 2000 vs. 2010 
(% of total respondents) 
  Tele-
working 
Alternative 
payment 
schemes 
Employee 
autonomy 
Team 
work 
Task 
rotation 
2000 Average 11.7 5.2 69.1 58.1 44.1 
2010 Average 15.7 13.7 69.3 57.7 46.0 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from the 5th European Working Conditions 
Survey (Eurofound, 2010). 
This finding is clearly a surprise. Between 2000 and 2010, the 
technology allowing workers to organise differently surely improved: it 
became both more widespread and cheaper. This leads to a puzzle: if 
technology became increasingly accessible and the gains from workplace 
innovation outpaced the losses in terms of productivity and job satisfaction, 
why do we not observe more of it? And why has it made so little headway 
in the past decade?   
6.7 Workplace innovation and the economy 
In a knowledge economy, one can expect that a major share of the output is 
not produced by traditional factors of production. As economies approach 
the technological frontier, they cannot simply rely on the accumulation of 
capital and labour to grow more, but rather need to innovate more and 
more.  
Innovation is often understood as the creation of new goods and 
services, but that is only one element. Innovation in fact also concerns 
processes, including how work is organised: how hierarchical the structure 
of a firm is, how free workers are to decide the content and the timing of 
their activities, whether they need to present in the office during working 
hours and if their pay is linked to the fate of their company.  
Measuring innovation and its 
contribution to productivity improvements, 
and therefore ultimately to growth, has been 
a major preoccupation of many social 
scientists for many years. The only point of 
All inputs to production 
aside from capital and labour 
matter more and more in a 
knowledge economy.  
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agreement among them is that all those inputs excluding capital and labour 
compose total factor productivity, and some attempts have been made in 
recent years to decompose this residual and quantify how, for instance, 
changes in the organisation of work or the skills of workers contribute to 
explaining economic growth. According to this literature, summarised 
under the heading ‘intangible capital’, organisational capital constituted 
one-quarter of the overall intangible investment in Europe in 2005, which 
in itself accounts for approximately 7% of GDP.4 These estimates obviously 
need to be taken with caution, but they do confirm that the ways in which 
work and production are organised do indeed matter, potentially in a 
positive way for the overall economy.  
6.8 Employees’ and employers’ perspectives 
But this is not the end of the story. Moving from macroeconomic estimates 
to the literature on working conditions, we discover that the view that 
workplace innovation can be beneficial to both the employer and the 
employee is rather dominant.    
Some researchers have used data on Canadian establishments to test 
whether particular organisational structures are correlated with the 
likelihood of adopting process and product innovations. Their study 
confirms that establishments with decentralised decision-making, 
information-sharing programmes, or incentive pay plans are significantly 
more likely to innovate than other establishments.5  
One strand of the literature argues 
that workplace re-organisation plays a 
significant role in rising productivity. A 
US study on manufacturers during the 
period 1993-96 concludes that “employers 
have been actively engaged in workplace 
re-organisation and that these changes in workplace practices, along with 
increasing diffusion of computers, may well have played a significant role 
in the recent rise in manufacturing productivity”.6 More precisely, the 
authors find that workplace practices and re-engineering efforts accounted 
for approximately 30% of output growth in manufacturing over the period 
1993-96. They also observe that workplace innovation is positively 
associated with labour productivity, especially when it has occurred in 
unionised establishments, possibly because workers are more willing to 
participate in employee involvement programmes if they feel the union 
will protect their employment security.7 
Workplace innovation is mostly 
beneficial for the economy as a 
whole, as well as for employees 
and employers.  
122  LET’S GET TO WORK! THE FUTURE OF LABOUR IN EUROPE 
 
Another study finds that firms with interdependent worker 
productivity, or more simply firms where teamwork is the rule, are more 
successful at keeping turnover and absent rates lower.8 Along the same 
lines, it has also been documented that private sector establishments that 
explicitly link pay with individual performance experience significantly 
lower absence rates.  
Overall, most research finds that an innovative workplace increases 
employees’ influence at work and increases perceived self-realisation. Of 
those who have a high overall level of access to an innovative workplace, 
60% regard themselves as highly satisfied and only 13% display a low level 
of job satisfaction. Greater control over work and the allocation of tasks 
within a relatively flat hierarchical system allows individuals (in an optimal 
case) to choose tasks according to their preferences and talents. Not only do 
the so-called ‘organisational innovations’ enhance the utility of employees 
in their work, but being able to voice preferences and influence work 
distribution highly correlate with job satisfaction. Qualitative changes in 
work organisation can foster creativity and let ideas emerge from the 
bottom. Groups with more complex tasks (i.e. task variety), autonomy, 
team-specific goals and feedback demonstrate higher values for the team 
climate for innovation than do groups with more restrictive task structures.  
On the negative side, it is important to mention that higher job 
satisfaction practices – such as additional learning possibilities, task 
complexity and high levels of autonomy – lead to an increased level of 
stress, work pressure, increased workloads, job insecurity and poorer 
work-life balance. In this regard, the paradoxical aspect of these new forms 
of work organisation has been observed. It was trade unions that, based on 
the critique of ‘Taylorism’, requested more autonomy and control over 
their tasks, which was welcomed by managers. In the end, this also brought 
new challenges and threats for employees: risk of burn-out and the need to 
rethink workers’ rights and job security.  
If workplace innovation allows the possibility of a higher income, 
more interesting work, higher job discretion and better employment 
security for less-skilled employees, these benefits come at a price. 
Workplace innovations are implemented to improve performance, but this 
improved performance may be achieved at the expense of employees, and 
some experts even refer to this as “management by stress”. Recent research 
revealed that, at least in the US, telecommuting is more instrumental in 
increasing working hours and blurring the boundary between work and 
private life than in improving work-life balance.  
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Among the elements of quantitative flexibility at the workplace, 
alternative payment schemes are perhaps the most controversial. Origo and 
Pagani found that the increase in job satisfaction often associated with 
innovative workplace systems comes more from the qualitative aspects, 
such as team working, than the quantitative and monetary ones: 
Workers attach great importance also to non-monetary aspects of 
the job, which are more likely to be improved by many forms of 
functional flexibility rather than numerical and working time 
flexibility. Given the same wage level, workers may then be more 
satisfied (and hence more productive) if they perceive some 
enhancement in the intrinsic aspects of their job (such as control 
over their tasks and the possibility to use their creativity).9 
Performance payments have also been roundly criticised by those 
who argue that the practice is not consistent with the definition of an 
employee, since dependent workers are not supposed to share risks with 
the entrepreneur. Very recent research at the intersection of neuroscience 
and economics has found that if it is true that workers with variable-
payment schemes are more productive, this is due not only to the incentive 
mechanism but also to a degree of self-selection: “When facing the 
alternative between variable and fixed payments, more productive workers 
systematically prefer the variable pay.”10 This implies that employers can 
use screening techniques to attract less risk-averse but more productive 
employees. How many workers receive alternative forms of compensation 
linked to their performance as part of their salary as individuals or team 
members? 
The Karasek demand-control model provides a consolidated theory 
to explain employee well-being in the work context. According to the 
model, it is important to maintain a balance between demands in a job (i.e. 
workload) and the level of autonomy over that job. A job with a high 
workload and low autonomy (a ‘high-strain’ job) is considered stressful, 
whereas a high demanding job with a lot of autonomy (an ‘active’ job) 
results in learning opportunities. The difference between the two 
conditions is that whereas an active job leads to new learning challenges 
and a sense of mastery and self-efficacy, the former creates a high-stress 
job.11 
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6.9 It is not all about technology: Barriers to innovation 
The accessibility and diffusion of technology that facilitates the adoption of 
innovative practices at the workplace indicate that other reasons than tools 
and software must explain the little change observed in the past decade. If 
email and VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol, such as Skype and Google 
Talk), are widely used among workers, how can one explain that only a 
minority are telecommuters? We find that a set of microeconomic 
considerations applies in this case: risk aversion, lack of trust between 
social partners and costs related to the transition towards a new work 
environment. More specifically, we identify four key issues which together 
can create a formidable barrier to change.  
The first is uncertainty about the success of the project. Even though 
the case studies in the literature as well as the broader statistical data show 
positive outcomes when workplace 
innovation is successfully implemented, 
they do not and cannot capture the 
number of failed attempts where it was 
not implemented in the end. Therefore 
the literature may be affected by a 
severe selection bias.  
This leads to the second factor, which we could call the ‘first-mover 
cost’. In economic jargon, the term ‘first-mover advantage’ is used to 
denote the competitive benefit derived from being the first to enter a given 
field. However, with workplace innovation the effect appears to be the 
opposite, given all the costs and risks associated with being the first in a 
country or a field to implement a given aspect of workplace innovation. 
This is true with regard to regulatory and legal uncertainty, but also with 
respect to new, informal norms and technological change.  
Moreover, even when the organisation in question is not a pioneer, 
there are significant costs of transition, ranging from investment in new 
equipment, through disruption of work and productivity, to training costs.  
There is also an ex-ante uncertainty over the distribution of costs and 
benefits, which can be amplified by a lack of trust between managers and 
workers or among workers, leading to risk aversion and resistance by the 
parties involved. The reason why trust is so important in designing and 
implementing workplace innovation is two-fold. First, it touches upon the 
very core of the employer-employee/trade union relationship. Second, 
evidence shows that such a change constitutes a highly incomplete 
Technology is an important 
enabler of workplace innovation, 
yet it remains a necessary but 
insufficient condition for change.  
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contract, i.e. it is impossible to precisely specify its terms and conditions in 
advance and there is a significant learning and adaptation process 
involved. With incomplete contracts, the presence of trust and/or of formal 
and informal institutions is crucial to whether parties decide to collaborate 
or not, even if there are mutual benefits to be obtained. 
There are also some genuine risks in workplace innovation, 
particularly with regard to the blurred boundaries between work and 
private life and the potential for intensification of work instead of increased 
productivity. Again, this can be amplified if there is a lack of trust between 
employers and employees or their representatives.  
With regard to the role of technology in changes related to work 
organisation, we conclude that technology is an important enabler of 
workplace innovation by lower the cost of work organisation, especially for 
small- and medium-sized enterprises, and creating the opportunity for 
workers to collaborate across different cities and countries. Yet, it remains a 
necessary but insufficient condition for changes in work organisation.  
6.10 The public sector as leader of workplace innovation 
Somewhat unexpectedly, the European Working Conditions Survey data 
analysed revealed that very little change took place over the past decade in 
terms of diffusion of innovative practices at the workplace, despite the 
availability and diffusion of technology that allows work to be organised in 
a much more flexible way. We explain this puzzle by relying on 
microeconomic considerations such as risk aversion, lack of trust between 
social partners and costs related to the transition towards a new work 
environment. We conclude therefore that technology is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for the diffusion of innovative practices at the 
workplace.  
In order to overcome barriers to innovation 
and in light of the fact that the balance between 
the advantages and disadvantages of innovative 
practices for employers and employees is in 
favour of the former, we contend that policy intervention is needed. In 
principle, this could be done in a wide variety of ways. However, in times 
of hard budget constraints on public finances and keeping in mind the goal 
of increasing competitiveness, we believe that the best way for policy to 
provoke change on the ground is by setting a good example.  
 
Policy-makers should 
lead by example.  
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The public sector plays an important role (although to a varying 
extent) as an employer in all EU member states. Public-sector institutions 
are generally perceived as facing more difficulty in shifting to new forms of 
work organisation compared to private-sector organisations.12 Therefore, 
successful change in such an environment could send an important 
message to the wider corporate world that such change is possible. 
Additionally, public-sector organisations might find it easier to resolve the 
issues of regulatory uncertainty with other authorities than might private 
companies. This strategy would not only show that organising work 
differently is both potentially feasible and beneficial, but it would also 
allow the productivity of the public sector to be increased. 
Box 6.1 The small revolution at the Belgian Federal Public Services 
An example of a small revolution is provided by the office of the Belgian 
Federal Public Services (FPS), where several initiatives have been taken aimed 
at motivating employees, improving the working environment and inducing 
more cooperative and collaborative attitudes. Two main innovations were 
introduced: teleworking and the possibility to measure work on the basis of 
performance instead of working hours. These two initiatives have been 
accompanied by the creation of a new working space. The Belgian example 
also shows that since the benefits of such a change can be tangible both in 
financial terms, thanks to the money saved on rent, and in terms of 
productivity: an internal survey revealed that autonomously organised 
workers became more and more efficient in dealing with cases.  
The Belgian case is interesting not only for its results, but also for its 
process. Before adopting the new office policy, the system was tested on a 
group of 40 employees. The results were positive, demonstrating to the FPS 
staff the feasibility of the dynamic office system. For all the employees based 
in Brussels (around 1,000), FPS now has a total of 668 desks, 154 spots for 
conversation and 25 meeting rooms. The initial investment was €10 million, 
but in the long term the dynamic office approach saved 30% in office space 
and €6 million is saved each year. To make the dynamic offices and 
teleworking a reality, in 2009 new equipment (personal laptops, USB keys, 
LCD screens) was given to the employees and internet connections installed 
in their homes, the ICT infrastructure was renovated and new 
communications tools introduced, such as the soft phone (a device to call 
from your computer) and office communicator (chat). 
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As a second step and with a more substantial effort, policy should 
address two important issues: on the one hand, overcoming the risk 
aversion and lack of information; and, on the other, dealing with regulatory 
barriers and uncertainty.  
There is a role for direct government action to disseminate 
knowledge and assist organisations in using workplace innovation. The 
motivation for such action is a combination of risk aversion and 
information costs in the organisations involved. Risk aversion is associated 
with incomplete knowledge about and uncertain distribution of benefits 
from workplace innovation. Therefore, policy-makers can lower the risk 
aversion of individual companies/institutions by providing funds and 
knowledge and also by creating networks of companies/individuals 
involved in workplace innovation. 
A clear example of good practice in this respect is the Finnish TEKES 
programme. The role designed for TEKES, a public agency, is to provide 
funds and knowledge to particular companies, but also to: i) push people 
involved in the same area towards the creation of networks, ii) mobilise 
resources for the creation of expertise through universities and consultants 
and awareness among the public and iii) include innovation in the 
workplace as part of the country’s general innovation strategy. Even 
though it is not possible to simply export this model, the experience of 
TEKES can certainly be inspirational for similar institutions across 
European countries. Of course, creating an integrated, large-scale 
programme or a dedicated agency is not the only way to go forward, 
especially in times of tough budget constraints. Specific elements of this 
approach – for example, creating a dedicated fund for the training of 
managers and/or trade unionists, supporting research on the topic or 
financing the dissemination of information – can be undertaken on their 
own.   
Overcoming regulatory barriers and uncertainty are essential steps 
that require the direct involvement of policy-makers. Many organisations 
contemplating workplace innovation believe that inflexible labour laws or 
collective agreements create significant obstacles to change, but a detailed 
analysis shows that these perceived obstacles are more frequently 
identified in general than specifically. The real problem seems often to be 
general uncertainty rather than negative certainty.  
A key role for the authorities, therefore, is to help identify barriers in 
legal/regulatory uncertainty and to try to provide clear, binding answers. 
This concerns issues ranging from general labour legislation, through 
128  LET’S GET TO WORK! THE FUTURE OF LABOUR IN EUROPE 
 
health and safety at work, to data protection and fiscal/social security 
issues. A proactive approach by the authorities could involve appointing 
liaison representatives for workplace innovation at key regulatory agencies 
– e.g. the labour inspectorate, the social security agency and the tax 
administration – empowered with a clear mandate. 
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7. FUTURE OF SKILLS IN EUROPE: 
CONVERGENCE OR POLARISATION?* 
he importance of human capital for Europe’s future and the 
emphasis placed by the European social model on both dynamism 
and inclusion have become clichés. This chapter examines whether 
the current trends in the areas of education and skills are pushing the 
European Union towards convergence or polarisation. 
Polarisation or convergence can be analysed with regard to countries, 
but also within countries and educational systems. What can we expect as 
higher education is extended to the masses? Is it just lack of information 
that leads students to choose social sciences rather than mathematics? Is 
later tracking of students truly the answer to educational inequality and 
how likely is it to be politically successful? Is job polarisation by skills 
happening in Europe and why? How can low-skilled individuals improve 
their skills – going back to school or learning on the job? And what does it 
mean to be low-skilled after all? 
7.1 What happens with the extension of upper secondary 
and higher education to the general population? 
As universal primary and secondary education has been a reality for a 
considerable time in developed countries, efforts have been directed 
towards higher education. These efforts have been reinforced by the 
growing body of work suggesting that the impact of investment in 
                                                   
* Written by Miroslav Beblavý and Marcela Veselková, chapter 7 draws on research 
conducted within work package 4 (Education and skills) of the NEUJOBS project 
by a team of researchers at Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels and the 
Slovak Governance Institute in Bratislava. The team also included Lucia Mýtna 
Kureková, Ilaria Maselli and Anna-Elisabeth Thum, as well as other individuals 
with minor research roles. 
T
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education and training on national economic growth is positive and 
significant, although difficult to quantify. In light of the recognition that 
higher education is crucial for economic development and job creation, the 
European Union agreed the target that at least 40% of those aged 30 to 34 
should have a higher education qualification or the equivalent by 2020. 
According to the European Commission,1 11 EU countries have already 
exceeded this target. In contrast, the lowest completion rates can be found 
in the southern and central European countries, despite the fact that they 
have very high secondary education completion rates. Various projections 
of the extension to tertiary education suggest that higher education systems 
will probably continue to expand, but that the continued growth of 
‘massification’ is beset by many uncertainties. 
Instead of examining the expansion of tertiary education directly, we 
examined broad trends in the expansion of upper secondary education, 
which has to precede the expansion of tertiary education. The time span 
encompasses the post-World War II period, which witnessed a rapid 
expansion of upper secondary education in Europe. With regard to the 
speed of the expansion, two hypothetical benchmarks were set: i) 
massification of upper secondary education, characterised by a transition 
from 20% to 50% gross enrolment rates; and ii) universalisation of 
education, characterised by a transition from 50% to 80% gross enrolment 
rates.2 
When looking at Sweden, United Kingdom and Slovakia, it took 
between 10 to 26 years for these countries to massify their upper secondary 
education and an additional 16 to 41 years to universalise it. Although the 
data should be interpreted with caution due to differences in the 
organisation of national school systems, it is clear that countries expanded 
their upper secondary sectors at various speeds. The expansion was slower 
in the leaders of expansion, such as the United Kingdom or Sweden. In 
contrast, laggards were able to catch up relatively quickly once the limiting 
conditions were removed. The results also suggest that universalisation of 
the upper secondary sector was faster than universalisation of primary or 
lower secondary schooling. A proxy of enrolment with literacy acquisition 
found that the typical country in the post-war 20th century took between 35 
and 80 years to make the transition from 10% net primary enrolment to 
90%.3 
It is possible to derive several lessons about the consequences of 
educational expansion. As enrolment rates exceed 80%, we observe two 
trends. First, the demand for part-time secondary or post-secondary non-
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tertiary education in Slovakia and the Czech Republic declines and the 
demand for flexible forms of more prestigious tertiary education rises.4 The 
demand for post-secondary education 
thus shifts almost exclusively to the 
tertiary level. It is possible to hypothesise 
that this shift occurs as a result of a 
combination of two factors: elimination 
of the quotas on the number of students in tertiary education, and a better 
signalling function of tertiary education as opposed to post-secondary non-
tertiary education. Second, the generalisation of the upper secondary 
schooling seems to have spilled over to the bachelor studies. For example, 
in Germany, specialisation occurs only at the Masters or PhD level.5 Both of 
these findings suggest that it is reasonable to assume that students will be 
staying on in education for longer and longer.  
We observe a similar trend at the tertiary level: expansion of tertiary 
education in Europe occurred hand-in-hand with a redistribution of 
students across different fields of study. A growing number of studies have 
examined returns to investment in education. For example, in OECD 
countries, returns to an additional year of tertiary education are on average 
above 8% and range from 4% to 15% across different countries.6 However, 
looking at average values is not satisfactory.  
Our research7 therefore asks a simple question: Is it worth studying 
engineering or art? To answer this question, we calculated the net present 
value of university studies for five European countries. The reference 
populations were the cohort of graduates in 2000 in France and Italy and 
the 2002-03 cohort in Hungary, Poland 
and Slovenia. It was found that with the 
exception of Italy, private investment in 
education largely repays itself after five 
years. However, the field of study is a 
source of inequality within the group of higher education graduates: both 
the resources needed during university and the returns five years later 
depend on the field of study. Surprisingly, it is not the science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics (STEM) faculties that ensure the highest 
return on investment. Rather, social sciences graduates enjoy the highest 
returns. Graduates of art, humanities and education enjoy the lowest net 
present value. These findings suggest that the expansion of enrolment in 
fields of study such as economics, business or law is driven by a rational 
choice. This is particularly true in central and eastern European countries. 
Gender is an additional source of heterogeneity: being a woman and 
Generalisation of upper 
secondary schooling spills over to 
the bachelor studies. 
Social sciences graduates enjoy 
higher returns to education than 
STEM or humanities graduates. 
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enrolling in STEM is the worst option in Italy, France, Slovenia and 
Hungary.  
Is it possible to steer students into preferred majors? The empirical 
evidence suggests that it is very difficult. Policy-makers in communist 
Czechoslovakia were able to effectively direct the expansion of secondary 
education into vocational tracks, thanks to the combination of a highly 
centralised education system and a system of administrative quotas on the 
number of students advanced to general upper secondary tracks.8 In the 
post-communist period, the ability of policy-makers to manage expansion 
was undermined by the emergence of quasi-markets. Private institutions 
were more than happy to meet the demand not met by public providers of 
education. The surge in student enrolment in private education is 
characteristic also of the tertiary level. Regionally, it was concentrated in 
the part of Europe where the establishment of private higher educational 
institutions was prevented for several decades, namely central and eastern 
Europe. One of the major forces that has contributed to the expansion of 
private higher education in Europe has been the continuous and strong 
expansion of this sector globally.9 
The rapid expansion of private education and the willingness to bear 
some or all of the costs of higher education suggests that tuition fees are a 
poor instrument to entice students to redistribute towards science majors. 
Using the data on all US public four-year colleges and universities from 
1991 to 2006, Hemelt and Marcotte show that a $100 increase in tuition fees 
would lead to a decline in enrolment of about 
0.25%, with larger effects at research 
universities.10 The weak response of 
enrolment to increases in tuition fees is 
probably the result of a weak impact of 
tuition fees on the rate of return to education. A degree from the most 
expensive colleges translates into the highest premia in the labour market. 
For example, the median starting salary for graduates of ‘Ivy League’ 
schools is 32% higher than that of liberal arts college graduates – and at ten 
or more years into graduates' working lives, the spread is 34%.11 
7.2 Is later tracking a necessary and a sufficient condition for 
equality of educational opportunities? 
Our findings support the view that although elite, mass and universal 
access to education are sequential stages of educational expansion, they do 
Higher tuition fees fail to 
redistribute students 
towards science majors. 
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not inevitably replace one another. The research documents examples of 
elite forms of education stubbornly surviving at the mass and universal 
stages, such as elite grammar schools in the United Kingdom, Gymnasia in 
Germany, and multi-year gymnasia in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
These examples suggest that expansion, if not accompanied by policies 
aimed at greater equality of educational opportunities, will perpetuate 
social stratification despite greater participation in upper secondary 
schooling.  
Two types of educational policies are 
linked to equality of educational 
opportunities, in other words, the 
decoupling of educational success from 
family background: 1) later tracking, and 2) 
early childhood education. There is a 
growing body of literature suggesting that the earlier students are tracked, 
the more their family background will have an impact on their student 
performance. In highly stratified educational systems – characterised by 
early and irreversible assignment of students to a number of tracks – the 
future of the child may thus be decided as early as the age of ten. 
Consequently, there has been a strong push, associated most visibly with 
the OECD, for a policy change towards later tracking, especially with its 
legitimacy buttressed by the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA). Our research adds to this debate by examining the 
association between within-school  and equality of educational 
opportunities for differently performing students, regardless of their 
academic performance. 
We study the issue at the country level for four OECD countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Hungary and Finland) that we selected on the basis of 
how conditional PISA performance distributions react to ability grouping.12 
Figure 7.1 reveals very different results for the countries concerned, both in 
average results and results for low and 
high performers. In Belgium, low 
performers are more strongly subject to 
inequality effects of within-school 
ability grouping, whereas in Austria 
the high performers are more subjected to these inequality effects. In 
Hungary, we find that within-school ability grouping is positively 
correlated with equality, and more so for the high performers. In Finland, 
within-school ability grouping does not appear to have a significant 
relation with equality. In other words, the effects of tracking are so deeply 
Later tracking and early 
childhood education might 
enhance the equality of 
educational opportunities. 
In reality, the effects of tracking are 
mitigated by other characteristics 
of the education system. 
136  LET’S GET TO WORK! THE FUTURE OF LABOUR IN EUROPE 
 
mitigated by other characteristics of the education system that policy-
makers should avoid global generalisations and focus on specific country 
situations. 
Figure 7.1 Effect of socioeconomic gradient for children of different abilities in 
Austria, Belgium, Finland and Hungary 
   
   
Source: Beblavý et al. (2012, p. 30).  
One of the key policy puzzles is why countries adopt or do not adopt 
pro-equality educational policies.13 This type of research focuses on the 
policy process, which introduced various elements of less selective (or 
comprehensive) schooling, such as later age at which children are selected 
to follow various tracks, elimination of dead-end educational pathways or 
increased mobility between tracks. Our research relies on a comparative 
case study of five European countries with varying degrees of success in 
introducing less-selective educational systems in the period following 
World War II: success (Sweden), failure (Germany), formal implementation 
of the reform and informal transfer of selection to the private schooling 
sector (United Kingdom), success followed by reversal (Czechoslovakia), 
and success associated with increased dropout rates (Spain). 
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There has been a gradual improvement in the equality of educational 
opportunities in the post-World War II period; educational systems today 
are less selective than they were 60 
years ago. Nevertheless, there are still 
significant differences between 
countries, or rather between various 
educational models. A general 
preference towards selection is still 
strong within the German educational model, which favours early selection 
of students into academic and vocational tracks. The movement towards 
increased equality of educational opportunities has been accompanied by a 
counter-movement which is attempting to re-introduce earlier selection 
along the lines of increased efficiency. The importance of competition as the 
main driver of educational quality has been promoted under the umbrella 
of neo-liberalism and gained prominence in the national discourses of 
countries that were facing an economic downturn or financial crisis, such as 
Sweden in the 1990s.  
What are the main drivers of the movement towards either earlier or 
later selection? Our study differentiates between two types of factor, which 
are roughly equivalent to extraordinary circumstances versus business as 
usual.14 Extraordinary circumstances, or critical junctures, represent events 
that are beyond policy control. Typical examples include an economic crisis 
or a regime change. They open ‘windows of opportunity’,15 which may or 
may not be used by policy entrepreneurs in an attempt to translate these 
external shocks into policy change. The above-mentioned reorganisation of 
education systems along neoliberal lines is an example of a shift in the 
‘policy paradigm’16 in the face of widespread perception of policy failure. 
External shocks are difficult or impossible to predict. From a policy 
perspective, it is therefore more interesting to study the policy process 
during ordinary times. We document three factors that enabled the 
introduction of less-selective schooling. First, left-leaning parties tended to 
be more in favour of less-selective schooling than the right-leaning political 
parties. The election of a strong, leftist government enabled the 
‘comprehensivisation’ of educational systems in post-World War II Sweden 
and post-Franco Spain.17 The Labour Party initiated the process of the 
reorganisation of the education system towards less-selective schooling in 
the United Kingdom. The Communist Party in Czechoslovakia introduced 
‘unified school ‘ up to the age of 15 within one year of the coup d’état in 
1948.18 
Educational systems today are less 
selective than they were 60 years 
ago, but significant differences 
among countries persist. 
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Second, in our study19 we document that the dissemination of 
research has an impact on the prevailing beliefs about human intelligence 
and about the link between the age of tracking and educational 
performance. For that purpose, international circulation of pedagogical 
knowledge and models in three broad waves was examined in the research. 
At the beginning of the 20th century, the educational discourse was 
dominated by the ideas of the progressivist movement, which quickly 
spread to the rest of the world. Comprehensive schooling at the secondary 
level was introduced for the first time in the United States. A direct 
influence of the progressivist movement was documented in three out of 
five case studies (Germany, Sweden and Czechoslovakia). However, with 
the single exception of Sweden, these ideas did not translate into policy 
change despite several decades of research dissemination, the rise of 
reformists to decision-making positions, or experiences with experimental 
schools. Furthermore, whereas reform attempts inspired by the 
progressivist movement in Germany or Czechoslovakia culminated in the 
period prior to the World War II or immediately afterwards, the Swedish 
reform stretched from the 1950s to the 1960s. 
In the post-World War II period, the prevailing beliefs about 
intelligence changed. Traditionally, it was believed that there are various 
types of intelligence suited for various types of education. Bright pupils 
should be educated separately from slower students, with this separation 
benefitting both groups. We observe these beliefs in the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Czechoslovakia and Germany. The British tripartite system rested 
on the widely held belief, propagated by the educational psychologist Cyril 
Burt, that intelligence was an innate mental ability that could be evaluated 
through intelligence tests, and which had a strong relationship with social 
class.20 These ideas were reflected in the White Paper that preceded the 
1944 Education Act: “all children should receive the type of education for 
which they are best adapted.”21 The change in sentiment came with a 
paradigm shift in the field of psychology at the end of the 1950s. The 
prevailing theories of innate intelligence were discredited and an emphasis 
was placed on social factors. This perspective found resonance in 
subsequent official reports, including the landmark Robbins and Newsom 
reports which claimed that all children had an equal opportunity to 
‘develop intelligence ‘.22 Thus, the distilling of a new orthodoxy – the 
psychology of intelligence – coupled with mounting evidence on the 
unsatisfactory operation of the tripartite system created the setting for the 
reforms aiming to abolish tracking. 
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Both the German and the German-influenced Czechoslovakian 
education models rested on the belief that weak students could make the 
strong weaker and thereby reduce quality.23 These ideas can be traced back 
to the philosopher Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859), a founding father 
of the Gymnasium. The dominating beliefs changed in the 1970s when the 
‘Copernican education rebound’ (Kopernikanische Bildungswende) took place: 
the belief in an innate predestination for the different school types was 
replaced by the belief in a universal ability to be educated. This is the 
climate in which the idea arose of the comprehensive Gemeinschaftsschule.  
Most recently, the PISA programme of the OECD has shown an 
unprecedented impact on the national educational discourses. In Germany, 
the PISA shock influenced educational discourse and led to a wide-ranging 
reform agenda; shifted the curriculum development process towards 
principles such as outcome control, competence orientation or external 
assessment; and strengthened the role of empirical research in academic 
discourse. Similarly, in the Czech Republic, the results of the first PISA 
testing debunked the myth that Czech students were above average and 
reinforced the belief that educational policy should address the problem of 
early tracking.24 The strategic White Paper published shortly afterwards 
therefore called for the introduction of mechanisms such that the 
educational system does not further reproduce existing inequalities. These 
developments were mirrored in Slovakia, where the subsequent right-
leaning and the left-leaning Ministers of Education endorsed the OECD’s 
recommendations to reduce early stratification in the education system. In 
response, the Slovak cabinet decided to introduce quotas on the number of 
children allowed to enrol in elite multi-year secondary schools.  
Finally, the shift in the prevailing beliefs about intelligence is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for the policy change towards less-
selective schooling. The convergence towards the international model or 
the best practice advocated by international organisations such as the 
OECD or UNESCO is problematic in countries with strong national 
academic traditions. For example, the strong tradition of the German 
Gymnasium works as an obstacle to the reorganisation of secondary 
schooling. 
However, the implementation of reform aimed at less-selective 
schooling is also complicated by other factors, notably the stable social and 
political balance of forces: parents with high socio-economic status and 
teachers from elite academic tracks vehemently oppose the 
comprehensivisation of education. Their typical defence strategy is to 
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reframe the issue of later tracking as socialist or detrimental to the 
development of gifted children. It is therefore crucial for policy-makers to 
avoid the capture of the public discourse by opponents of the reform. An 
example of a successful strategy was the framing of comprehensive 
schooling as a means for the mobilisation of the country’s resources and the 
pathway to wealth creation by the UK Labour Party in the 1960s. 
Based on the above, it is possible 
to identify two broad trends that are 
likely to affect future levels of equality 
of educational opportunities. First, 
there has been a gradual shift towards 
greater equality of educational 
opportunities during the past century. Continuing advocacy of later 
tracking by international organisations, such as the OECD or UNESCO, 
will create incentives for governments to converge towards ‘best practice’. 
However, the impetus is weaker in countries with strong academic 
traditions. Furthermore, the case of Czechoslovakia illustrates that policies 
based on later tracking are not irreversible.  
Second, the continuing privatisation of educational systems will work 
as a counterforce to the above trend. As a result of the neoliberal 
revolution, the monopoly of the state as the provider of education has been 
eroded and we are witnessing an increasing privatisation of the public 
sphere. Free school choice may undermine efforts to increase equality of 
educational opportunities, because if “schools and children are free to seek 
each other out: with some caveats, this leads to perfect segregation by child 
quality”.25 In England, sorting by ability and by income is more prevalent, 
with more choices beyond attending the school determined by place of 
residence. In Sweden, school choice not only raised differences between 
schools and school areas in relation to ability, but also to social and 
immigrant status.  
7.3 Job polarisation based on the skill content of tasks is 
happening in Europe 
During the first decade of this century, occupational polarisation based on 
skills emerged across Europe, with rising demand at the upper and lower 
ends of the occupational skills distribution. The share of elementary 
occupations in total employment increased from 8.7% in 2000 to 9.6% in 
2008. These findings were also supported by our research,26 in which we 
Strong academic traditions and 
continuing privatisation are the 
main obstacles for the shift 
towards later tracking. 
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analysed labour demand and supply with respect to skills and tasks and 
attempted to anticipate what types of skills mismatch EU countries will 
encounter over the next decade.  
Figure 7.2 illustrates the job 
polarisation phenomenon in the EU-27 
between 2000 and 2010. We would normally 
expect demand for workers to rise as the skill 
content of these occupations increases in a 
linear fashion. Instead the picture is U-shaped, as predicted by job 
polarisation, which is the result of an approximate 20% increase in the 
demand for low-skilled and high-profile occupations between 2000 and 
2010, and a 4.5% decrease in the demand for middle-skilled occupations. 
This polarisation occurred in 17 out of 27 EU countries.27  
Figure 7.2 Job polarisation in the EU-27, 2000-10 
 
Source: Maselli (2012, p. 23).  
Figure 7.3 depicts the match between labour demand and labour 
supply. The share of middle-skilled occupations in total employment is 
50.4%, and the share of the labour supply with a secondary degree is 48.2%. 
However, the trends for these are to move in opposite directions: the latter 
has grown by 13.2%, while the former has declined by 4.5%. The share of 
low-skilled workers is small (22.2%) and rapidly decreasing (-15.2%), most 
probably due to a phasing-out of the older and less educated generation 
from the labour force. The percentage of low-skilled occupations increased 
by 18.4%, resulting in a 9.8% share of these types of jobs in the economy. 
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One-third of the total labour force is highly educated, and the size of this 
group grew by 44.9% over the period 2000-10. Meanwhile, demand for 
these workers grew more modestly (23%), but still accounted for 39.8% of 
total employment. However, one should bear in mind that there are 
significant differences between countries (see Table 7.1).  
Figure 7.3 Demand and supply of work with respect to skills/tasks in the EU-27, 
2000-10 
 
Source: Maselli (2012, p. 26). 
Table 7.1 Static and dynamic match between the labour demand and labour supply 
by country 
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The literature identifies several possible drivers of polarisation: skill-
biased technological change, educational expansion, growth of the service 
sector, trade liberalisation, employer preferences and organisational 
change.28 CEDEFOP attributes the occupation polarisation in Europe to 
three factors: macroeconomic and structural changes (between sectors), the 
demand-driven increase in specific service activities (e.g. private 
households) and the increasing labour supply of non-national workers. 
CEDEFOP suggests that the relative increase in elementary occupations is 
bound to persist in the near future because of the continuous shift towards 
a tertiary-based economy,29 and forecasts that by 2020 there will be job 
opportunities in all occupations but their distribution will be uneven. New 
jobs will be concentrated in higher and lower skill-level jobs, with slower 
growth in middle occupations.30 
Job polarisation is a key contributor to inequality. The concentration 
of wage growth among high-skilled workers, combined with 
disproportionate job growth at the upper and lower ends of the skill 
distribution, has resulted in a more unequal economic environment in the 
United States.31 The literature on educational expansion suggests that with 
a general extension of education, the demand for less-educated workers 
declines. As the low-skilled become a minority, they are perceived as 
increasingly incapable: while educational attainment acts as a signal for the 
applicants’ productivity and their ability to learn, the lack of it acts as a 
signal for failure. This phenomenon has been termed stigmatisation by 
negative selection,32 and was confirmed empirically by showing that in 
countries with a low share of low-educated workers (e.g. in Norway or 
Switzerland), the unemployment risk of the low-skilled (defined as 
ISCED0/1/2) is highest. Conversely, in countries with high shares of low-
skilled workers (e.g. Portugal or Spain), the unemployment risk of this 
group is low. In conclusion, the job market opportunities of the low-skilled 
depend crucially on employers’ beliefs and perceptions about the 
relationship between applicants’ education and their future productivity. It 
is therefore reasonable to assume that with the expanding education sector, 
we will see a continuing replacement of the low-skilled by the medium-
skilled.  
For the medium-skilled, this means that they might temporarily 
assume positions for which they are overqualified. Over-education and 
mismatches in the labour market receive a great deal of policy attention. 
However, Ramos et al.33 argue that even when qualified workers are unable 
to find suitable jobs, they are still more productive at the aggregate level 
than their unqualified counterparts. This implies that there is a good case 
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for public investment in education and its further expansion, even though a 
number of recent studies fail to provide favourable evidence regarding the 
link between human capital and growth. They warn that regions might not 
benefit directly from their investment in education in the context of high 
geographical mobility. 
The final lesson to be derived is that the skills content of low-skilled 
jobs has increased, leading to the phenomenon of ‘upskilling’.34 The 
characterisation ‘low-skilled’ should therefore be viewed as a fluid concept, 
whose definition depends on the context. Job polarisation may therefore be 
a misleading concept, because ‘low-skilled’ workers are present in a wide 
range of jobs. 
7.4 The surprisingly demanding nature of ‘low-skilled’ jobs 
Our research identifies the competences and characteristics demanded in 
the labour market in selected low- and medium-skilled occupations. The 
research was conducted in the context of continuing high unemployment 
across the developed world and a debate about what role skills and 
upskilling can play in alleviating this problem. The focus on the lower-
skilled segment was motivated by several factors: their generally lower 
employment rates; reports of skill polarisation towards high- and low-
skilled occupations, accompanied by a process of displacement of the low-
skilled by more educated workers; as well as the rising skill requirements 
and task complexity within all occupational categories and skill levels. 
To this end, we analysed labour demand at the micro level by 
studying the content of job adverts to identify specific skills and 
characteristics that are demanded for selected low- and medium-skilled 
occupations in four countries: the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland and 
Slovakia.35 Our work is innovative in exploring data from online job 
adverts and quantifying different skills, personal attributes and 
characteristics. It shows that online portals can potentially become a very 
useful source of information about the content of demand and for 
improving generally weak statistics on vacancies generated through other 
sources. We contribute to those works that emphasise the need to analyse 
labour market demand at the micro level and use job adverts as a source of 
information about the employer’s demand. The implications of our work 
spill over to a number of areas and contexts. 36 
The analysis of online job adverts suggests that the specific skill-set 
demanded in service occupations differs from other, mainly industry-
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connected, jobs in the greater focus given to non-cognitive social skills and 
personal characteristics. There is a great variation in the content of skill 
demand across the analysed labour 
markets. For example, Danish employers 
focus on non-cognitive skills – such as 
customer approach, precision, loyalty, 
flexibility, empathy and the ability to 
communicate – whereas in the Czech Republic, employers appear to give 
priority to formal qualifications and diplomas. The amount of information 
available on the job portal Profesia.sk allowed us to dig deep into the 
labour demand and led us to discover that employers in the Slovak labour 
market are quite demanding. Language abilities are required to a large 
extent across a majority of occupations, including those where a low-level 
of education is expected, such as chambermaid and cleaner. Among non-
cognitive personal skills, being responsible and flexible are the most 
pronounced characteristics. Among social skills, the ability to communicate 
is the most requested across occupations, on average.  
As far as formal qualifications are concerned, Slovak employers now 
tend to require an upper secondary education even for jobs that are marked 
as ‘elementary’ in the International Classification of Occupation (ISCO). 
Overall, our research indicates that the term ‘low-skilled jobs’ might be a 
misnomer, both with regard to the actual skills required as well as the 
formal educational credentials demanded. In a number of new occupations, 
such as courier, caretaker or au pair, employers requested a complete 
secondary education (four-year general or specialised with a leaving 
examination). This suggests that demand in the labour market might have 
adapted to the supply, which continues to be better and better educated. 
The review of the literature and the analysis of the data allowed us to 
clearly understand that ‘low-skilled’ does not only mean low-educated. We 
have suggested that ‘low-skilled’ is not a static state but a dynamic 
process.37 In the past, we observed the de-skilling of some occupations, 
such as accounting, and the upskilling of others, such as journalism. We 
conceptualise ‘low-skilled’ as a process rather than just regarding it as a 
status characterising workers alone.38 Such an approach enables us to cast 
doubt over the existing conceptualisations of who is ‘low-skilled’, which 
typically do not move beyond the measurement of the low-skilled through 
the lowest attained level of qualification (ISCED 0-2). Such a 
conceptualisation ignores the heterogeneity of the low-skilled. To overcome 
these deficiencies, we propose an alternative typology. In addition to the 
typically included ‘low-educated’, the typology includes categories of 
The specificity of skill 
requirements differs 
considerably across countries. 
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workers who might be formally well-educated, experienced and trained, 
but have been drawn into becoming low-skilled as an outcome of structural 
forces or institutional barriers. Examples include people with obsolete 
skills, displaced workers or ‘temporarily low-skilled’ migrant workers. The 
proposed categories are then used to empirically test the quantitative 
differences across the EU countries. The aim is to understand how the low-
skilled as a group differ internally and how structural processes and 
individual characteristics interact in various ways in the dynamic labour 
market. 
We find that formal qualification levels are valued differently in 
different labour markets. This conclusion arises from the fact that while low 
(ISCED 0-2) and medium (ISCED 3-4) qualifications are substitutes in 
employment across the EU countries, the low- (ISCO 9) and middle-skilled 
(ISCO 4-8) occupations do not retain this property across the EU countries. 
This implies that people with the same educational level are employed in 
occupations with different skills requirements across the EU labour 
markets. 
As shown in Figures 7.4 and 7.5, 
competition for jobs takes place within 
the age cohorts across different levels 
of formal education, and not between 
age cohorts. Among young workers, 
competition for jobs takes place 
between the medium-educated and low-educated, while among older 
workers, the medium-skilled compete with highly educated workers in the 
same age groups. Contrary to the literature and general policy discourse, 
we found that it is the young workers who tend to suffer more in the 
labour market. Specifically, the young are always at greater risk of 
unemployment than the old, regardless of their qualification level.  
  
Competition for jobs takes place 
within the age cohorts across 
different levels of formal education, 
and not between age cohorts. 
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Figure 7.4 Relative unemployment in the EU member states 
Panel A: Relative unemployment of young age group Y15-24 
 
 
Panel B: Relative unemployment of old age group Y50-59 
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Panel C: Unemployment of young (15-24) versus old (50-59) cohort 
 
Source: Kureková, Haita and Beblavý (2013a, p. 62). 
In most countries, the elementary occupations (ISCO 9) appear to 
shrink more than the middle-skilled occupations (ISCO 4-8), but this is 
linked to the overall shrinkage in the labour demand of the country. This is 
in contrast to the literature, which argues for the presence of skill 
polarisation and a decline in middle-level occupations. We interpret our 
finding as suggesting that a displacement of the employed in elementary 
occupations into unemployment by workers from the upper-skilled 
occupations is taking place.  
With respect to skill obsolescence, we analyse unemployment and 
inactivity rates of the cohort of 35-39 years of age in 1995 (i.e. 50-54 years 
old in 2010) to provide a dynamic view. As shown in Figure 7.5, the given 
age cohort not only becomes less employable as it advances in age, but a 
large share of its members drops out of the labour market into inactivity by 
the end of their working life. The sharpest changes are found in Romania, 
Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Slovakia, which experienced a rampant 
structural change and reformed their economic systems from socialist into 
market economies.  
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Figure 7.5 Labour market status in the EU: Old vs. prime age 
Panel A: Unemployment (%) 
 
Panel B: Inactivity (%) 
 
Source: Kureková, Haita and Beblavý (2013a, p. 79).  
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At the subjective level, however, skills obsolescence (measured as the 
need for further training in order to be able to perform job tasks) is 
reported more by young people than by older workers. Equal shares in all 
generations perceive themselves to have skills enabling them to perform 
more demanding tasks. This should not be seen as contradictory to the 
earlier finding, as older workers might be out of the labour market (and 
therefore not captured in the survey) while, with respect to the youth, it 
signals a lack of experience or practical skills rather than skills obsolescence 
as such.  
Detachment from the labour market (defined as being unemployed 
for four years or longer) resembles the structure of the overall working 
population in a given country. This implies that the issue of which labour 
market segment is most affected by detachment is influenced by the overall 
educational structure of population, which justifies our proposition to go 
beyond the ISCED 0-2 measure in empirical investigations of ‘low-skilled’. 
7.5 Back to school? How people upskill during their lives 
differs across Europe 
Our research39 also explored different aspects of lifelong learning, i.e. adult 
on-the-job or informal training and formal training leading to an increase in 
ISCED. We wanted to examine: 1) whether lifelong learning differs across 
age cohorts; and 2) whether adult learning takes place through ‘going back 
to school’ (ISCED level upskilling) and/or only through training. To 
answer these questions, we constructed synthetic panels based on the 
European Labour Force Survey 2000-2010 waves for 27 European countries.  
The results imply that older-age cohorts are less likely to participate 
in training. However, this effect is less significant for going back to school. 
The probability of obtaining a higher education degree after 20 years of age 
sharply decreases with age. However, this does not hold true for lower 
ISCED levels: obtaining an upper 
secondary degree is more common 
for people with greater on-the-job 
experience. Furthermore, lifelong 
learning is also determined by 
individual characteristics. Whereas 
men and immigrants are more likely to obtain an upper secondary degree 
in their adult life, natives are more likely to achieve tertiary educational 
achievement. Contrary to the existing literature, our results imply that 
Men and immigrants are more likely 
to obtain an upper secondary degree 
in their adult life; natives are more 
likely to pursue higher education. 
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higher-educated individuals tend to participate less in training than those 
in other educational ranges.  
Although individual characteristics – such as age, gender, 
educational level and professional activity – account for a large part of 
country heterogeneity, the preference of training over formal ISCED 
upgrading and vice versa suggests that these individual characteristics are 
influenced by the institutional setting. When we grouped countries by level 
of upskilling either through training or formal ISCED upgrade, we found 
that – relative to the base country, Austria – three types of country 
emerged: those that score highly on both dimensions, and those that score 
highly on one dimension but not the other (see Figure 7.6). 
Figure 7.6 Training and ISCED upskilling: A comparison of European countries 
with Austria 
 
Source: Beblavý, Thum and Potjagailo (2013c, p. 26). 
Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands score highly on the 
training dimension, but poorly on ISCED upskilling. This may be a result of 
educational levels that are already high or training that does not lead to a 
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degree that upgrades the ISCED level. Relatively high levels of upskilling 
but low levels of training can be found in the post-communist ‘Visegrad 
Four’ countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), Romania 
and Italy. This suggests that a formal degree is highly valued in the labour 
market, so that people are willing to make this ‘lumpy’ investment.  
These inter-country differences should be kept in mind by both EU 
and national policy-makers. In the countries of central Europe, a focus on 
quality and accessibility of upper secondary and higher education appears 
also to be the most effective lifelong learning policy, whereas in the 
Scandinavian countries, the focus should be on employers and the training 
they provide. 
These patterns of upskilling also have implications for equality. Firms 
tend to invest in training of those workers whose training leads to the 
highest increase in productivity, i.e. managers and skilled workers.40 The 
position of low-skilled, older or immigrant workers will therefore be more 
favourable in countries with a tradition of publicly funded lifelong and 
adult learning. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that with the 
expansion of tertiary education and the growing competition from 
educated younger cohorts, older cohorts and/or less-educated workers will 
seek further education to remain competitive in the labour market. 
7.6 Moderate convergence accompanied by an impetus for 
polarisation 
There are undoubtedly powerful forces pushing for more polarisation, 
particularly in the labour market. In most European countries, the 
destruction or lower growth of routine, middle-skill jobs can be observed. 
This also has important implications for the low-skilled, as the displaced 
middle-skilled individuals are more likely to compete with them and push 
them out. As employers adjust job content and requirements to this fact, 
and the population undergoes a gradual upskilling, nominally ‘low-skilled’ 
jobs can be surprisingly demanding. However, the demands can be 
manifested in very different forms, and the skill-intensity of a position and 
its formal educational requirements are often far apart.  
This leads to reassessment of what a skill is and how people acquire 
it. We have demonstrated that there is increasing complexity in what 
constitutes a ‘low-skilled’ person and how well (or poorly) he or she fares 
in the labour market. The accelerating upskilling of populations in 
developed countries points to a not-too-distant future in which higher 
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education will be somewhere between a mass and a universal 
phenomenon. At the same time, the importance of experience is likely to 
grow, with implications for the prospects of labour market entrants. 
How policy-makers handle these developments and contribute to 
more rather than less equality of opportunity is a question to which there 
are no easy answers. Polarisation is likely to increase socio-economic 
inequalities within societies along ethnic, gender and age lines. Our 
research has confirmed that early childhood education plays an important 
role, and it also appears to be increasingly uncontested as a policy 
prescription. However, the other frequently emphasised remedy – less 
selection in secondary education, particularly later division of children into 
separate tracks – is more problematic. Its effectiveness depends on the 
country in question and the target group, while education systems are 
extremely difficult to shift even on a long-term basis. A different, more 
nuanced warning to policy-makers is delivered in our research on returns 
to higher education by field of study, which showed hidden rationality in 
how students choose their major. It is always tempting to assume people do 
not know what they are doing, but that assumption should always be 
carefully checked. European policies also need to be mindful of different 
ways in which national systems deal with upskilling. 
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8. THE ROLE OF THE STATE: REFORM 
PRESSURES AND WELFARE REFORM 
TOWARDS SOCIAL INVESTMENT* 
tates have evolved over time in response to a multitude of challenges 
and diverging socio-economic situations. The emergence of the post-
industrial economy and the societal change that brought about new 
social risks has created the necessity for another recalibration of the welfare 
state.1 Central to this new agenda is an emphasis on policies that aim at 
‘preparing‘ rather than ‘repairing‘.2 The rationale behind this approach is 
the idea that preventive services prevent larger economic and social costs 
arising in the future. This so-called ‘social investment’ perspective therefore 
aims to “strengthen people’s skills and capacities and support them to 
participate fully in employment and social life” (European Commission, 
undated). The key areas of interest include education, quality childcare, 
training, job-search assistance and rehabilitation.  
The scale of social investment required is challenged by the economic 
crisis and the demographic shift. In the wake of the crisis, European 
economies are struggling with high unemployment and poverty levels, as 
well as fiscal pressures. At the same time, aging populations and shrinking 
working-age populations pose a threat to the sustainability of social 
security systems. It remains to be seen whether the long-run social 
challenges will be sacrificed for the short-term goals of deficit and debt 
reduction in the aftermath of the financial crisis.3  
                                                   
* Verena Dräbing is the author of chapter 8, which is based on work conducted in 
work package 5 (Work life balance and welfare transformation) of the NEUJOBS 
project by Anton Hemerijck, Moira Nelson, Menno Soentken, Barbara Vis, Anne 
Gauthier, Bent Greve, Giovanna Vallanti, Angela Cipollone and Eleonora 
Patacchini. Verena is a PhD candidate at the VU University Amsterdam.  
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The question that arises is whether or not welfare states are opting for 
social investment. This chapter contributes to recent research in that it 
offers a detailed overview of general investment trends over time. In order 
to answer the question of whether there is a shift to social investment, the 
chapter first gives a short overview of welfare state changes prior to the 
timeframe of investigation and then introduces the concept of social 
investment. As a second step, the chapter considers change more 
empirically – indicators on social investment expenditure are compared to 
other social expenditure and changes in different policy fields are traced. 
Then, it briefly addresses the topic of how investment in family policies 
matters. The conclusion sums up the findings on policy developments and 
offers an outlook on how social investment might matter in the future. 
8.1 The evolution of European welfare states 
Research often points to several phases of welfare state development.4 With 
the end of World War II, a new era of increasing social expenditure 
emerged, providing unemployment benefits, pension benefits, survivor 
and disability benefits, public healthcare and an expansion of publicly 
provided education. The predominant focus was on the male-breadwinner 
model, where women stayed at home to care for children and elderly 
family members. The dominant economic paradigm of this phase was 
Keynesianism, which regards the state as a crucial actor for economic 
growth. According to Keynesian ideas, state investment boosts the 
economy in times of recession to buffer economic cycles. Thus, the state 
focuses on job creation via public investment while at the same time 
providing benefits for those in need.5 
With the onset of the oil shocks in the 1970s, this model came under 
pressure. Surging unemployment rates, inflation and public debt, 
combined with increasing criticism of the rigid labour market and the 
strong role of trade unions, led to the rise of neo-liberalism as the dominant 
economic paradigm. Contrary to Keynesianism, neo-liberalism is in favour 
of a limited role for the state. The free market is supposed to provide 
wealth, which automatically materialises if barriers are removed. 
Privatisation, flexibility of the labour market and retrenchment of public 
spending have been the result. The market and the family are supposed to 
replace the welfare state in the provision of welfare. Examples of policies 
include private pension schemes and tuition fees for education.6  
In the early 1990s, a new set of challenges created increasing pressure 
for the European welfare states. The rise of post-industrial capitalist 
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societies has brought about major social changes, so-called new ‘social 
risks’.7 Among these social risks are risks related to changes in family 
structure and gender roles: a higher prevalence of single-parenthood and 
frail relatives as well as difficulties in reconciling work and care. In 
addition, the shift from an industrial to a service economy rendered some 
skills obsolete and subsequently resulted in the dismissal of employees. 
The need for low-skilled workers decreased, creating a new risk group of 
workers with low and superfluous skills. Changes in the labour market 
structure contributed to the risk of insufficient social coverage, where 
employees with temporary and flexible contracts fall through the social 
net.8 Apart from the rise of new social risks, ageing societies increased the 
pressure on the welfare state while at the same time raising the question of 
how economic productivity levels can be retained while the workforce 
shrinks. The resulting debate on how much welfare is affordable and which 
productivity-increasing measures are available sparked the rise of the 
social investment debate.9 
8.2 Social investment as a source of socio-economic 
development 
The underlying assumption of social investment is that welfare spending 
on certain policies can contribute to economic development. Contrary to 
earlier policy paradigms, social investment does not regard welfare 
expenditure as a burden on the state finances per se (neo-liberalism) or as 
solely a measure to buffer cyclical economic development (Keynesianism), 
but as a necessary investment in future socio-economic development. Its 
core goals are to equip citizens with the capacity to help themselves across 
their lifetime and to reduce their risk of neediness. Secondary expected 
outcomes of social investment are an increase in the workforce, a positive 
impact on economic growth, a reduction of intergenerational transmission 
of poverty and a greater ability to reconcile work and care.10 The selected 
tools are consequently not just benefit payments, but the provision of 
services and access to support. The image of the welfare state is shifted 
from a safety net or a burden on state finances to an investor in human 
capital, a facilitator of human development and a service provider.11 In 
short, the main differences between a social investment welfare state and a 
welfare state oriented towards passive spending can be summarised up as 
follows:12 
1. A focus on societal development. Social investment addresses the long-
term problem of aging societies by focusing on the need to increase 
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the productivity of the workforce and to reconcile work and care to 
finance pension schemes. The main tools are childcare provision, re-
skilling and the promotion of flexible jobs. 
2. A focus on human development and making citizens capable of caring for 
themselves. Social investment recognises that unemployment might 
not only result from a temporary lack of work, but also from a lack of 
skills demanded by the labour market. Therefore, instead of focusing 
merely on benefit payment, it tries to actively support employability, 
invest in human capital development and prevent skill depletion of 
the unemployed. 
3. A focus on long-term reduction of neediness instead of short-term 
mitigation. While passive transfer payments focus on short-term goals, 
social investment is a long-term strategy aiming at human capital 
development from an early age. The ultimate aim is to diminish the 
risk of poverty and increase an individual’s chances throughout life.  
8.3 Social investment in three types of welfare states 
Path-dependency theory is often used to analyse change in the welfare 
state. It emphasises the role of existing institutions and investments that 
render departure from previous policy paths unlikely, as it is easier and 
less costly to implement change in line with existing structures. Therefore, 
change in the welfare state is assumed to be incremental rather than radical 
and induced by outside pressures.13  
Among the pressures that might result in change in the welfare state 
are not just the new social risks; Hemerijck (2013) pinpoints four existing 
challenges. First, globalisation augments competition in trade and taxes, 
shifts the macroeconomic focus towards austerity, increases financial 
interdependence and consequently frames the political discourse. The 
second challenge is the rise of new social risks caused by the emergence of 
post-industrial labour markets and a shift in gender roles and family 
structures. Third, the legacy of social insurance commitments to a growing 
group of elderly represents an increasing financial strain. Fourth, European 
integration reduces the leeway for domestic socio-economic policy-making. 
Given path-dependence theory and the existence of these pressures, we 
would expect that a move towards social investment might be slow and 
stepwise, and only add up over time to a real shift.  
Given the differences across Europe in terms of spending levels, the 
question is whether one or several types of social investment exist. The 
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literature at least distinguishes a more ‘third-way’ type of investment and a 
more social-democratic type of investment, with the latter combining 
services and generous benefits while the former focuses more on activation 
and services and less on benefit provision.14 This chapter keeps this 
distinction in mind and thus does not equate social investment with one 
welfare regime. 
To enable a comparison, the welfare regime approach distinguishes 
welfare states according to their investment patterns, with the distinction 
generally made according to levels of de-commodification, generosity and 
stratification.15 Esping-Andersen 
differentiates three types: the social-
democratic, the conservative and the 
liberal regime.16 Other authors propose 
an additional southern regime or 
discuss the difficulties of integrating the newer EU member states into this 
categorisation.17 Similar to Hemerijck (2013), to compare developments 
across social models, this chapter categorises countries into the social-
democratic, Christian-democratic, liberal and southern regimes with a 
residual category for the post-communist countries in order to better 
account for diversity.18   
The time frame considered is 1997 to 2009. As the financial and the 
European sovereign debt crises had a severe impact on government 
finances, 2007 is used as an indicator for the investment levels prior to the 
onset of the crisis. It is clear that the crisis has dramatically influenced the 
financial situation of governments, but it is too early to estimate the long-
term impact on social spending, especially as detailed data are only 
available up to 2009. 
8.4 Measuring social investment 
There are several approaches to the measurement of social investment.19 
This chapter focuses on overall expenditure on ‘capacitating’ policies as 
well as the per capita expenditure per policy field, because together they 
give an encompassing view. The overall indicator is calculated by summing 
up the different sub-indicators given in Table 8.1. Capacitating spending 
here refers to policies with a clear social investment focus. Care services for 
the elderly and children are included as they facilitate female employment. 
For family policies, it is debatable which policies to include. Services and 
leave policies are often seen as important for female employment,20 while 
child allowances are more controversial and are therefore counted as 
European welfare states differ in 
their degree of de-commodification, 
generosity and stratification.  
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compensating spending. Expenditure on education and active labour 
market policies are included due to their clear focus on human capital 
development, as well as public research funding. Incapacity-related 
benefits in kind are included as they comprise, among others, rehabilitation 
services. 
This chapter compares spending on 
‘capacitation’ with spending on 
compensation. The aim is to show how 
much social expenditure is directed 
towards benefits and how much is spent 
on services and work and family 
reconciliation. Other authors would call 
this distinction “old” and “new” spending, 
referring to traditional welfare policies and policies addressing new social 
risks.21 This chapter prefers the terms “compensating” and “capacitating”, 
as this is more in line with social investment ideas where different types of 
social investment might exist – one that combines high levels of both 
compensating and capacitating spending, and one that might focus more 
on only capacitating expenditure.22 Compensating spending concerns 
policies that clearly aim at income replacement, such as benefits to cover 
unemployment, old age, incapacity, survivors and family allowances, as 
well as other cash benefits on families.  
In order to compare expenditure levels across countries, expenditure 
is often measured as a percentage of GDP.23 However, percentage of GDP 
does not give any information about the level of expenditure per person 
and is affected by sudden fluctuations in GDP. Therefore, additional 
information on per person expenditure by policy fields is provided later on. 
Table 8.1 Measurement of capacitating social spending and compensating social 
spending 
Measurement capacitating social 
spending 
Data source 
Active labour market policies (ALMP) 
expenditure as % of GDP 
Family policy expenditure as % of GDP, 
except for family allowances and other 
benefits 
Total public expenditure on education as 
% of GDP 
OECD Social Expenditure 
database 
OECD Social Expenditure 
database 
 
OECD Education at a glance 
OECD Research and 
Spending on compensation is 
associated with income 
replacement, whereas 
capacitating spending is 
directed towards services and 
work and family reconciliation. 
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Public expenditure on research and 
development as % of GDP 
Old-age: Expenditure on residential care 
as % of GDP 
Incapacity: Benefits in kind as % of GDP 
Development Statistics 
OECD Social Expenditure 
database 
OECD Social Expenditure 
database 
Measurement compensating social 
spending 
Data source 
Expenditure on unemployment as % of 
GDP 
Family allowances and other cash 
benefits as % of GDP 
Old-age expenditure excluding 
residential care as % of GDP 
Incapacity expenditure excluding 
benefits in kind as % of GDP 
Expenditure on survivors as % of GDP 
OECD Social Expenditure 
database 
OECD Social Expenditure 
database 
OECD Social Expenditure 
database 
OECD Social Expenditure 
database 
OECD Social Expenditure 
database 
8.5 Overall trends in welfare expenditure 
In general, several investment patterns are visible: the social-democratic 
regime has the highest capacitating and medium-to-high compensating 
expenditure levels; the Christian-democratic regime has a strong focus on 
compensating expenditure and medium capacitating expenditure levels; 
the liberal regime starts from low expenditure levels on both policy types 
and has increased its expenditure in general over time; the southern regime 
has medium levels of compensating expenditure and rather low 
capacitating investment levels; the former communist countries exhibit 
considerable variation in their investments, with Poland and Hungary 
lying in between the southern and Christian-democratic regimes and other 
countries exhibiting generally lower social expenditure levels. 
As can be seen in Figure 8.1, the social-democratic regime exhibits the 
highest levels of capacitating spending in 
1997, 2007 and 2009. In addition, the 
regime exhibits moderate-to-high levels of 
compensating spending, although 
compensating spending decreased between 
1997 and 2007. Nelson shows in a couple of case studies that Sweden 
started early by expanding reforms focused on capacitating policies 
Overall welfare expenditure 
trends show an increase in 
social investment expenditure.  
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combined with generous benefits.24 Reforms in recent years have shifted 
the focus in Sweden more to childcare services and investment in 
education, while reducing the generosity of benefits. However, the country 
still scores high in international comparisons. Denmark, on the other hand, 
started its investment in the 1980s and 1990s. Here, the focus has been on 
increasing active labour market policies (ALMPs), for instance, in 
subsidising employment, education and retraining for the unemployed. 
Family policy reforms have included an extension of parental leave and 
efforts to increase the quality of daycare and possibilities to reconcile work 
and care. Thus, it is clear that while the Nordic countries face less pressure 
to reform, they have already been investing in social investment for 
decades, albeit in a policy mix that emphasises the combination of generous 
compensating spending with high capacitating spending. 
Figure 8.1 Compensating spending vs. capacitating spending in 1997, 2007 and 
2009: Social-democratic regime 
 
Source: Own calculations based on OECD SOCX, OECD education at a glance, OECD 
research spending. 
Countries under the Christian-democratic regime (Figure 8.2) show in 
general high compensating spending and moderate capacitating spending. 
Within the Christian-democratic regime, the Netherlands represents an 
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outlier with much lower levels of compensating expenditure and a strong 
decrease in compensating expenditure between 1997 and 2007. The effect of 
the financial crisis is also visible for the Christian-democratic regime 
through an increase in compensating and capacitating spending between 
2007 and 2009. While for some countries such as Germany, higher 
investment in family policies plays a role, decreasing GDP might also play 
a role. Spending is measured as a percentage of output, therefore keeping 
absolute spending at previous levels might increase the share of GDP spent 
on certain policies in case of recession.  
Figure 8.2 Compensating spending vs. capacitating spending in 1997, 2007 and 
2009: Christian-democratic regime 
 
Source: Own calculations based on OECD SOCX, OECD education at a glance, OECD 
research spending. 
Dutch reforms in activation focused more on training provision, job 
offers and guidance from the sixth month of unemployment onwards. In 
addition, job search requirements for the elderly unemployed were 
introduced. Disability policies were reformed, reducing replacement rates 
for partially disabled while providing more possibilities for training. Dutch 
reforms of family policy focused on the right to take leave, implementing 
the EU directive for parental leave, increasing access to childcare and 
subsidising childcare attendance. Germany’s development can be 
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explained by a major reform of labour market policies, including active 
labour market policies, reform of unemployment benefits, job creation and 
in-work benefits. In addition, family policy has been expanded with a focus 
on increasing access to childcare. The reform of the parental allowance 
scheme copied the Swedish model with a 67% replacement rate for 12 
months and a limit of €1,800.25 
The liberal welfare regime (Figure 8.3) has comparably low 
compensating spending levels and moderate capacitating spending. With 
the onset of the financial crisis, spending increased for both types of 
policies. Case studies show that the UK and Ireland expanded their 
activation policies in combination with a strong focus on implementing 
conditions and sanctions.26 In both countries, the labour market policies 
promoted making work pay through in-work benefits while family policy 
expansion has taken place in early childhood care and education, as well as 
parental leave schemes. In the UK, a special focus was on child poverty. 
Figure 8.3 Compensating spending vs. capacitating spending in 1997, 2007 and 
2009: Liberal regime 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD SOCX, OECD education at a glance, OECD 
research spending. 
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The southern welfare regime (Figure 8.4) exhibits comparably low 
capacitating spending and high compensating expenditure levels, with 
quite some fluctuation. For instance, Italy has rather high compensating 
spending (16-18.7% of GDP), while Portugal steadily increased its 
compensating expenditure from 11% of GDP in 1997 to 16.3% in 2009. Up 
to 2007, Spain slightly increased its capacitating spending, with the highest 
increase taking place after the crisis (although this might be an artefact due 
to decreasing GDP). Reforms in Spain between 1997 and 2007 focused on 
extending parental leave and making leave more flexible with the 
possibility for men to also participate in leave schemes.27 On the labour 
market, the focus was on improving the situation for flexible and 
temporary workers and implementing conditioning and activation 
measures for the unemployed.28 Italy focused more on increasing benefits 
on unemployment and family, though in 2000 the Berlusconi government 
switched to a stronger emphasis on family and community networks and 
less state funding for social services and family policy.29 
Figure 8.4 Compensating spending vs. capacitating spending in 1997, 2007 and 
2009: Southern regime 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD SOCX, OECD education at a glance, OECD 
research spending. 
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The new EU member states show low levels of capacitating 
expenditure, comparable to the southern regime, and low-to-medium 
levels of compensating spending. General expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP has increased for both policy types since the crisis. In terms of policy 
reforms, the new EU member states have to be considered in light of the 
transition from communism to capitalism and democracy. Many countries 
faced recession in the early 1990s and moved towards liberalisation, 
privatisation and retrenchment (especially of family policies at first), but 
have slowly put family policies back onto the agenda in recent years due to 
declining fertility rates.30 
Figure 8.5 Compensating spending vs. capacitating spending in 1997, 2007 and 
2009: New EU member states 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD SOCX, OECD education at a glance, OECD 
research spending. 
8.6 In which policy fields did most changes take place?  
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kind on old age and family and cash benefits 
CZ_97
CZ_07
CZ_09
ET_09
HU_07
HU_09
PL_07
PL_09
SK_07
SK_09
SL_09
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
5 6 7 8 9 10
C
om
pe
ns
at
in
g 
Sp
en
di
ng
, %
 o
f G
D
P
Capacitating Spending, % of GDP
Investment in family 
policy, especially childcare, 
has been on the rise.  
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on family policies. If capacitating policies (incapacity-related benefits in 
kind, active labour market policies, benefits in kind on old age and family) 
are considered, in-kind spending on families stands out as the policy field 
with the biggest expansion in expenditure across all welfare regimes. Only 
a few countries have increased their expenditure more in other policy 
fields, including Denmark and Sweden, which focused on incapacity 
related benefits in kind between 1997 and 2007, and Austria, which 
increased expenditure on active labour market policies in the same period. 
In most European countries, increasing investments in family policy 
have led to an increase in expenditure on daycare and home-help services 
(see Table 8.3). Apart from this trend, considerable differences exist in the 
family policy mixes across welfare regimes. Concerning the influence of the 
crisis on investment, we observe that only a few countries retrenched on 
capacitating spending between 2007 and 2009.   
8.7 Patterns in family policy by welfare regimes 
The social-democratic countries have continued their capacitating 
investment. In social-democratic regimes, in-kind expenditure on family 
policies increased the most between 1997 and 2009 in Iceland, followed by 
Sweden, Norway and Finland. However, Iceland started from much lower 
spending levels than the rest of the Nordic countries. After 2007, all the 
Nordic countries continued to increase their expenditure on family 
services, especially Norway. However, for the period 1997 to 2007, family 
cash benefits were cut back to nearly the same extent as family services 
were increased in Norway. This is only the case in Norway, and only for 
this period. Iceland, Sweden and Denmark increased their spending in the 
same period and following the onset of the financial crisis, only Sweden 
exhibits a slight downward trend in family cash benefit expenditure. 
Within the social-democratic regime, there is a stronger tendency towards 
high investment in daycare and home-help services, and family and 
parental leave, compared to investments in other policies.  
The Christian-democratic regime is characterised by increasing 
investment in care facilities. Christian-democratic welfare states – except 
for Austria and Germany – increased their in-kind expenditure on family 
policies significantly between 1997 and 2007 (see Table 8.2).  
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Table 8.2 Change in expenditure per head at constant (2000) PPP-adjusted US dollars 
  Incapacity-related 
benefits in kind 
Active labour market 
programmes 
Old age benefits  
in kind 
Family benefits          
in kind 
Family cash benefits 
  1997-2007 2007-2009 1997-2007 2007-2009 1997-2007 2007-2009 1997-2007 2007-2009 1997-2007 2007-2009 
Denmark 175.6 53 -42.8 66.4 -40.1 65.9 61.3 37.7 51.5 7.1 
Finland 115.6 32.9 -48.4 -9.8 120.8 38.3 111.7 43.2 -16.6 12.6 
Iceland 85.6 -8.9 3.8 -5.4 -246.9 2.4 607.7 31.4 176.3 20.6 
Norway -49.1 -72.9 -78.5 -47.8 85.9 108.3 184.6 126.3 -187.9 10.4 
Sweden 372.6 13.1 -165.8 -19.5 161.9 11.7 195.9 47.2 150 -10.9 
            
Austria 55.3 26.2 109.5 53.1 69.1 30.9 30.9 36.1 93 47.6 
Belgium -96.6 19.1 89.1 60.2 27.3 6.5 258.5 20.8 -46.6 10.5 
France -62.2 0.9 -30.2 3.2 45.2 10.1 204.9 5.4 -12.1 12.4 
Germany 19.1 24.2 -61.9 71 0.4 0.5 19.2 38.3 -8.3 9.5 
Netherlands 74.7 10.1 -18.8 31.7 130.3 28 376.8 -163.1 -24 58.5 
            
Ireland 29.6 10.1 -77.2 54.1 70.5 29.7 211.6 58.8 449.7 245.1 
United Kingdom 57.4 12.4 17.9 -3.1 47.4 2 290.8 27.9 251.2 82.7 
            
Greece 10.7 -0.1 -16 14.2 4.1 -0.7 50.5 -2.2 62.5 75.9 
Italy -4.4 5.1 30.4 -13.1 7.3 5.4 185.8 -1.2 70.1 21.6 
Portugal 3.9 2.9 19.8 50.9 8.4 15.2 75.1 4.2 53.9 52.8 
Spain 36.2 8.1 143.8 7.1 88.3 44.3 174.5 26.1 90.5 29.4 
            
Czech Republic -15 -1.2 41.9 -8.5 -1.1 2.1 94.3 25.3 82.5 -58.5 
Hungary  -3 -6.4 33.1  -6.5  -6.4  5.5 
Poland -23.8 1.5 28.3 26.5  0.4  10.1 33 1.3 
Slovak Republic 13.9 49.1 -32.8 0.6 33.1 -0.1 69.1 12.5 33.1 33.2 
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Table 8.3 Spending per capita on family policies in 1997, 2007 and 2009 at constant (2000) prices and constant (2000) PPs ($) 
 Family - Daycare / 
Home-help services 
Family - Other 
benefits in kind 
Family - Family 
allowances 
Family - Maternity 
and parental leave 
Family - Other cash 
benefits 
 1997 2007 2009 1997 2007 2009 1997 2007 2009 1997 2007 2009 1997 2007 2009 
Denmark 608.6 633.6 661.9 33.7 70 79.4 299.1 330.5 332.7 173.7 193.7 198.6    
Finland 263.1 301.6 328.8 67.1 140.2 156.2 308.9 258.3 250.6 178.2 208 224.4 17.8 22.1 26 
Iceland 225.6 664.3 695.4 86.7 255.7 256 288.6 271.4 278.1 112.8 265.6 274.3 32.8 73.5 78.8 
Norway 327.6 453.4 565.9 184.7 243.6 257.3 463.3 299.8 288.5 258 275.3 300.1 111 69.2 66.1 
Sweden 446.6 625.8 670.4 30.5 47.2 49.8 197 268.7 249.5 145.3 240.7 251.4 41.2 24.3 21.8 
                
Austria 116.3 146.7 183.1 12 12.5 12.2 499.7 691.5 735.1 148.9 48 51.6 11.3 13.5 13.7 
Belgium 22.8 269.9 279.5 38.7 50.1 61.3 523.5 509.9 516.3 48.9 59.5 63 44.7 1.1 1.7 
France 188.1 377.2 376.8 109.2 125 130.8 309 309.2 321.4 103.8 91.1 90.8 0.4 0.8 1.4 
Germany 104.4 114.5 140.6 95.2 104.3 116.5 226.7 239.4 236.9 60.7 65 73 46.4 21.2 25 
Luxembourg 234.4 278.7 294.6  75.5 74.1 855.1 1330.2 1755.1 289.2 296.1 319.5 3 375.6 355.6 
Netherlands 127.9 504.7 341.6    252.7 221.1 279.3 0 0 0 0 7.7 7.8 
                
Ireland 41.5 249 306.9 1.3 5.4 6.3 265.1 559.7 676.5 17.8 58.6 78.5 263.2 377.5 486 
United Kingdom 0.9 348.7 364.5 124.6 67.6 79.7 230.4 258.6 272.4 18.1 124.5 116.8 210.3 326.9 403.6 
                
Greece 27.3 33.8 32.3 31.7 75.7 74.9 106.3 113.9 139.5 15 26.6 41.1 10.8 54.1 89.9 
Italy 25.8 190.9 186.2 16.3 37 40.5 96 119.4 115.1 30.3 55.9 57.2 4.2 25.3 50 
Portugal 3.2 77.2 81.6 16 17.2 17 75.7 94.5 135.1 16.7 55.2 66.2 17.2 13.7 15 
Spain 9.9 164.5 177.5 30.2 50.1 63.2 32.4 51.3 55.2 26.5 69.4 96.5 9.8 38.5 36.9 
                
Czech Republic 8.7 103.2 127 12.3 12.1 13.5 109.2 67.2 29.4 88.5 241.1 231.8 65.8 37.8 26.4 
Hungary  134.1 131.1  102.9 99.5  302.3 293.8  154.2 162.3  19.9 25.7 
Poland  45.3 55.4    54.1 67.1 51.1 28.8 42.3 56.1 10.3 17 20.4 
Slovak Republic 9.2 80 90.1 1.8 0 2.4 167.5 182.8 203.6 93 98.6 111.7 0.9 13.1 12.4 
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database, extracted December 2013. 
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Their cash expenditure on families decreased to a much lesser degree. 
For Germany and Austria, it is clear that they embarked on this trend later, 
as the increase in their investment in family policies in kind between 2007 
and 2009 is higher than the increase between 1997 and 2007. The 
Netherlands is the only country in the sample with a significant decrease in 
spending on benefits in kind on family policy between 2007 and 2009. 
Does this change follow a social investment logic? It should be noted 
that while Christian-democratic countries are increasingly investing in 
childcare services, they are doing so without giving up their traditional 
high investment in family allowances, which still receive the majority of 
funds in all of these countries except for France and the Netherlands (see 
Table 8.3). Between 2007 and 2009, investment in cash benefits on family 
policies increased in all Christian-democratic countries, and in Austria and 
the Netherlands even more than investment in kind. Yet, expansion of 
daycare and home-help services had already taken place since 1997 in some 
countries, such as France and the Netherlands. 
In the Liberal regime, it is clear that the surge in investment in 
services is part of a wider trend for increasing investment in family 
policies. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, increases in expenditure on family 
benefits in kind were accompanied by an increase in family expenditure in 
cash between 1997 and 2007. They increased their investment in daycare 
and home-help services from very low expenditure levels (between $0.90 
and $41.50 per head) to medium levels (between $306.90 and $364.50). 
Ireland has also focused much more on family allowances. Expenditure on 
other cash benefits is highest in the 
liberal regime compared to other 
regimes (e.g. $486 per head in Ireland 
in 2009). Reforms in the UK have 
focused in particular on child 
poverty,31 so this development might 
be in line with a stronger focus on 
social investment and especially child 
development. 
In the southern European countries, expenditure on family policy has 
been rising, although it has traditionally been low due to their focus on 
family networks and less state involvement for providing care. The 
southern regime shows an upward trend in in-kind and cash expenditure 
on families between 1997 and 2007. Except for Greece, this trend is stronger 
for in-kind than for cash transfers, and is especially pronounced in Italy 
Investments in different types of 
family policy still vary 
considerably between countries 
with a strong focus on childcare, 
and countries with a stronger focus 
on child allowances.   
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and Spain. Italy and Spain also increased considerably their expenditure on 
daycare and home-help services (Italy from $25.80 in 1997 to $186.20 in 
2009). However, they departed from rather low levels and their 
expenditure therefore still remains rather low in the overall comparison. 
Between 2007 and 2009, Italy and especially Greece slightly decreased their 
in-kind expenditure while they kept on increasing their expenditure on 
cash benefits. In Portugal and Spain, expenditure on in-kind and cash 
benefits increased further between 2007 and 2009, with cash benefits 
increasing more than in-kind benefits. 
The new EU member states are a rather heterogeneous group. 
Hungary exhibits much higher expenditure on families with a focus on 
family allowances and maternity and parental leave payments, while 
Poland spends considerably less and the Czech Republic focuses much 
more on maternity and parental leave as well as daycare and home-help 
services. The Czech Republic and Slovakia augmented both in-kind and 
cash benefits expenditure on families between 1997 and 2007, but with a 
stronger focus on in-kind expenditure. Both countries continued to increase 
their in-kind expenditure between 2007 and 2009, and Slovakia increased 
its cash transfer expenditure even more, while the Czech Republic started 
to retrench on cash benefits.  
Although family policy investment has been on the rise, the 
investment patterns differ considerably across Europe. Based on survey 
data, Danish citizens are much more able to combine work and care than 
citizens in the Czech Republic, Germany or the UK. Family-friendly 
environments in particular play a role, as well as childcare facilities.32 The 
ability to combine work and care has a significant impact on female labour 
market participation; the presence of children under the age of four reduces 
female labour market participation, while mothers’ labour market 
participation slowly increases when the child starts school.33 Married 
women with children are more often employed in flexible part-time jobs 
than other groups, as these jobs are more easily combined with care 
responsibilities.34 In social-democratic countries, which have a long 
tradition in investment in childcare and leave schemes, the negative impact 
of having a young child on mothers’ labour market participation has been 
decreasing significantly, while for continental and southern Europe this 
decreasing trend is less pronounced.35 The OECD also stresses the poverty-
reducing effect of female employment as well as the positive correlation 
between high fertility and high female employment.36  
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What role do social policies play? Job guarantees for mothers on leave 
increase women’s labour market attachment.37 Maternity and paternity 
leave schemes also play an important role in young women’s labour market 
attachment, and are especially important for medium and higher educated 
women.38 The OECD points out that while many developed countries have 
witnessed a decrease in fertility, the developed countries with high fertility 
rates are those with high availability of childcare for 0-3 years and other 
policies that contribute to the reconciliation of work and care.39  
8.8 Persistent disparities in active labour market policies 
expenditure  
If levels of active labour market expenditure per head are considered (see 
Table 8.4), the social-democratic regime has the highest expenditure, 
followed by the Christian-democratic regime. Yet within the social-
democratic regime large differences persist, with Finland and Norway 
spending much less than Denmark and Sweden. The Netherlands and 
Belgium stand out with expenditure levels more comparable to Sweden 
than to other Christian-democratic countries. Ireland’s expenditure is more 
than double that of the UK and within the southern regime, expenditure in 
Spain was more than four times higher than in Greece in 2009. In addition, 
trends over time show considerable increases in expenditure in Portugal, 
Spain and Poland. In the social-democratic regime, a trend towards less 
expenditure is visible, while in continental Europe spending fluctuates 
between 1997, 2007 and 2009.  
Table 8.4 shows that the Nordic 
countries exhibited a downward trend 
before the crisis, except for Iceland. Spain, 
Austria and Belgium increased their 
expenditure in the same period, while 
Germany, Czech Republic and France 
decreased theirs. Sweden is the country with the most pronounced 
decrease in expenditure on active labour market policies. The downward 
trend in ALMP expenditure continues after the crisis in the Nordic 
countries, except for Denmark. The UK, Italy and the Czech Republic also 
exhibit a slight downward trend in expenditure. Ireland and the 
Netherlands, which retrenched their ALMP expenditure before the crisis, 
reverse these trends in the following period while Belgium, Portugal and 
Austria continue their upward trend in spending. 
Most continental and Nordic 
welfare regimes show a trend 
towards convergence in 
ALMP expenditure levels.  
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In terms of a move towards social investment, it is clear that for active 
labour market policies, the Christian-democratic regime has been catching 
up while the social-democratic regime has been scaling down, and Spain, 
Portugal, Austria and Belgium have increased their absolute spending 
tremendously. However, it has to be kept in mind that the measurement is 
spending per capita in terms of population and not unemployed. As 
Scandinavian countries have comparably lower unemployment rates than 
Ireland or Spain, their expenditure per unemployed might still be 
comparably high. 
Table 8.4 Spending on active labour market policies per capita, 
at constant (2000) prices and constant (2000) PPPs($) 
  1997 2007 2009 
Denmark 503.1 460.3 526.7 
Finland 333.2 284.8 275 
Norway 342.8 264.3 216.5 
Sweden 557.9 392.1 372.6 
     
Austria 126.8 236.3 289.4 
Belgium 309.7 398.8 459 
France 311.5 281.3 284.5 
Germany 281.5 219.6 290.6 
Netherlands 433.4 414.6 446.3 
     
Ireland 351.7 274.5 328.6 
United Kingdom 91.6 109.5 106.4 
     
Greece 58.8 42.8 57 
Italy 107.9 138.3 125.2 
Portugal 90.7 110.5 161.4 
Spain 92.5 236.3 243.4 
     
Czech Republic 17 58.9 50.4 
Hungary 63.6 57.2 90.3 
Poland 51.2 79.5 106 
Slovak Republic 79.2 46.4 47 
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database, extracted December 2013. 
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8.9 Trends in other capacitating policies 
Incapacity-related in-kind expenditure (see Table 8.2) increased the most in the 
social-democratic regime (except for Norway) between 1997 and 2007. 
After 2007, Norway and Iceland retrenched their investments, while 
Denmark in particular continued the expansion of its expenditure. While 
Belgium and France retrenched in 1997-2007 and slightly reversed their 
expenditure trends in 2007-2009, the Netherlands and Austria in particular 
increased their expenditure between 1997 and 2007. After the crisis, the 
Christian-democratic regime maintained its spending levels or even 
increased them by more than previously, as was the case in Germany. The 
Anglo-Saxon countries show an upward trend for both periods; within the 
southern regime, decreases and increases are comparably low except for 
Spain, which increased its expenditure between 1997 and 2007. Poland and 
the Czech Republic decreased their incapacity-related in-kind expenditure 
between 1997 and 2007, while Slovakia strengthened its upward trend in 
2007-2009. 
Old age in-kind expenditure (see Table 8.2) increased the most in 
Sweden, the Netherlands and Finland between 1997 and 2007, followed by 
Spain, Norway and Ireland, while Iceland and Denmark show an opposite 
trend. Between 2007 and 2009, Norway and Denmark expanded the most, 
while the positive trend also remains in other countries such as Finland, 
Austria, the Netherlands, Ireland and Spain. Within their regimes, 
Germany represents an outlier with little change in expenditure, while 
Spain is exceptional for the southern regime due to its very pronounced 
upward trend. 
Public expenditure on education per student is highest in the social-
democratic regime, followed by the Christian-democratic regime and then 
the liberal and southern regimes (see Table 8.5). The new member states are 
very heterogeneous. In most countries, expenditure per student as a 
percentage of GDP has continuously increased, the exceptions being 
Norway and Estonia. Within the regimes, one observes that Iceland has 
much lower expenditure levels than the rest of the social-democratic 
regimes, while Portugal stands out in the southern regimes with much 
higher levels (29.2% in 2009). 
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Table 8.5 Total public educational expenditure per pupil 
as a percentage of GDP per capita, all levels* 
 1998 2007 2009 2010 
Denmark 36.0 31.0 34.8  
Finland  25.0 29.6 29.7 
Iceland 22.9 24.8 26.3  
Norway 30.5 25.4 28.3 26.6 
Sweden 28.8 28.0 31.4 30.0 
     
Austria 30.1 26.4 29.4 29.3 
Belgium  26.7 29.3  
France 24.4 24.2 25.8  
Netherlands 22.0 23.3 26.0 26.0 
     
United Kingdom  21.9 25.2 25.7  
     
Italy 24.3 22.8 25.5 24.5 
Portugal  26.2 29.2  
Spain 19.1 21.7 24.7 23.8 
     
Czech Republic 17.3 20.2 22.1 21.5 
Estonia 25.1 20.0 27.2 25.8 
Hungary 20.5 24.7 24.7 23.6 
Latvia 28.6 22.0 27.0 25.3 
Lithuania  18.9 23.8 23.3 
Poland 19.6 21.4 23.3 23.9 
Slovakia  16.1 19.0 20.1 
Slovenia  24.9 28.2 28.4 
* 1997 had too much missing data to be included. 
Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics, 2013. 
8.10 Is there a shift in social investment? 
To sum up, while European welfare states differ considerably in their 
policy mixes as well as in their welfare expenditure levels, one can observe 
a tendency towards an increase in social investment expenditure on 
families, active labour market policy and education. However, a clear 
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divide across countries is also apparent. Eastern European and southern 
European welfare states continue to spend much less on social investment 
per capita. While Nordic countries have been the forerunners of social 
investment, Christian-democratic countries, and to some extent Anglo-
Saxon countries, have been catching up.  
It is clear that investment in family 
policies is on the rise, especially in childcare 
services, but regime patterns mostly still 
persist. Consequently, a slow but general 
shift towards a stronger reconciliation of 
work and care is taking place, although the 
overall levels of investment are still lower in 
southern Europe and some eastern European welfare states. In addition, 
investment in active labour market policy in countries with traditionally 
little or no activation, such as Spain and Austria, has been increasing. The 
move towards social investment is slow and varies by regime in the degree 
of the combination of capacitating policies and compensating expenditure, 
as well as in the speed and the initial level of investment. Southern and 
former communist countries in particular lag far behind. 
The gap in social investment levels might be problematic, as there is 
plenty of evidence suggesting positive effects of social investment. For 
example, policies supporting the reconciliation of work and care seem to be 
improving female employment rates.40 Greater access to childcare services 
and a family-friendly atmosphere are highlighted by parents in the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Germany and the UK as being important for the ability 
to reconcile work and care.41 If the premise that social investment 
contributes to growth is correct, a lack of investment might also represent a 
barrier to future growth and development. Social-democratic countries are 
less in debt and have higher fertility levels; they fare better than many 
other European countries. The contribution of social expenditure and the 
policy mix should not be underestimated or even disregarded when 
reforms to tackle the crisis are considered. 
 
 
 
Nordic countries are the 
forerunners of social 
investment, southern and 
central and eastern European 
countries are the laggards. 
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9. LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS IN 
EUROPE: DIFFERENCES, 
DEVELOPMENTS, CONSEQUENCES AND 
REFORMS* 
overnments devise various labour market institutions to enhance 
the functioning of the labour market or to correct and overcome 
negative consequences that the labour market may have. One of the 
reasons is that, as is the case with all markets, the market for labour may 
not function as efficiently as predicted in neoclassical economics. As a 
result, many countries and economic sectors observe longer or shorter 
periods of high unemployment. In addition, all kinds of other mismatches 
can occur, for example if people work more or less hours than they would 
like, if they are unable to find jobs for which they are qualified, or if 
displacement takes place. The occurrence of these outcomes and the desire 
to prevent their consequences can result in government intervention in the 
labour market. Besides these considerations of market failure, normative 
and ideological forces may play a role, meaning that the public can be in 
favour of the government always taking a strong role in the labour market. 
Researchers investigating labour market institutions can focus on 
different aspects of the labour market. To begin with, they can look at the 
outcomes or at the policies contributing to these outcomes, or both. With 
regard to the outcomes, full employment may be regarded as the ultimate 
goal of the labour market and if this is achieved, one may conclude that the 
labour market is functioning efficiently. Others who focus on government 
policies are more interested in learning how governments can contribute to 
                                                   
* Chapter 9 was written by Ferry Koster, Associate Professor at the Erasmus 
University in Rotterdam, and Olaf van Vliet, Assistant Professor at the Leiden 
University. 
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achieving full employment. This chapter examines how governments 
intervene in the labour market and the consequences of this intervention.  
9.1 Labour market institutions: Employment, income and 
labour market protection 
There are several approaches to defining labour market institutions. First, 
one can take a very broad approach in which the labour market is viewed 
as an institution, that is, a coordination mechanism aimed at matching 
labour supply and demand. By taking such a starting point, questions arise 
about the foundation of the labour market. This approach is too broad for 
understanding the actions that governments take to correct market failures. 
Taking instead government intervention in the labour market as our point 
of departure, there is a second choice to be made, again between a broader 
or a more specific understanding of labour market institutions as forms of 
government intervention. In the broadest sense, the institutions include any 
form of government intervention related to the labour market. According 
to this definition, wage-setting and the regulation of working conditions 
are also considered labour market institutions. To arrive at a more useful 
definition, however, one needs to have a somewhat less-inclusive 
conceptualisation and to only focus on the institutions aimed at dealing 
with the negative outcomes of the labour market process and those 
intended to enhance the efficiency of the market.  
Based on these considerations, we distinguish three kinds of labour 
market institutions, each intended to deal with a specific form of market 
inefficiency. The three labour market institutions of interest are hence 
distinguished on the basis of their intended function or policy goal:  
1. Reducing the risk of unemployment. This set of institutions includes 
the policies and regulations that increase the security of workers. 
2. Preventing income loss. These institutions contribute to the income 
security of workers, in the sense that they guarantee an income in the 
event of unemployment. 
3. Enhancing labour market transitions. A final set of institutional 
arrangements aims at increasing the chances that someone finds 
employment after unemployment (or assisting the transition from 
inactivity to activity more broadly). 
The three aspects of labour market institutions – employment 
protection, income protection and enabling labour market transitions –form 
the core of discussions on the functioning of labour markets. And, as a 
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result, many well-developed indicators are available that have been 
debated and tested at length, meaning that there is quite some consensus 
about their applicability. In the following, the most recent versions of these 
existing measures are presented and examined to provide an overview of 
the differences between countries and the changes that have occurred over 
the last 10 to 20 years.  
Box 9.1 Labour market institutions 
Employment protection: EPL 
The level of employment protection in a country is usually measured with 
the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indicator developed by the 
OECD, which measures “… the procedures and costs involved in dismissing 
individuals or groups of workers and the procedures involved in hiring 
workers on fixed-term or temporary work agency contracts”.1 Hence, 
information is available for two groups of workers: those with regular 
contracts and those having temporary contracts. 
Income protection: URR 
The institutions securing the income of workers have been measured in 
several ways. A common approach focuses on the generosity of the 
unemployment benefits in a country - or more specifically, the ratio between 
an individual’s income and the replacement income if that individual 
becomes unemployed. Since unemployment replacement rates (URRs) can 
differ across occupational groups and household situations, several of these 
indicators are developed. For the present analysis, a recently constructed 
database is examined.2  
Labour market policies: LMP 
Governments can take different kinds of actions to assist the unemployed to 
find work. Here the analysis is based on the indicators provided by 
EUROSTAT.3 This measure includes spending on several labour market 
policies, such as 1) labour market services, 2) training, 3) job rotation and 
job-sharing, 4) employment incentives, 5) supported employment and 
rehabilitation, 6) direct job creation, 7) start-up incentives, 8) out-of-work 
income maintenance and support and 9) early retirement. 
Actual unemployment, labour market transitions and other labour 
market outcomes are not the main topics addressed here, having been 
examined elsewhere.4 Only the link between protection and innovation will 
be discussed in more detail in this chapter. The focus is not on the 
outcomes of the institutions, but rather on whether countries differ with 
188  LET’S GET TO WORK! THE FUTURE OF LABOUR IN EUROPE 
 
regard to the use of these institutions and the extent to which their use has 
changed over time. Besides discussing the institutions separately, we 
examine their interrelationship. This means that the analysis relates to more 
general labour market models, such as approaches to transitional labour 
markets or flexicurity.5 
Finally, it should also be noted that labour market institutions 
concern the policies devised by governments and aimed at employees and 
workers, either by protecting them or by assisting them in the job-matching 
process. In addition, the preferences and behaviour of these actors may be 
affected if labour market institutions are established, which in turn can lead 
to additional adoption processes. Such side effects are not considered in the 
present analysis, as this chapter is restricted to the purposively designed 
government institutions. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, some 
specific questions regarding labour market institutions are explored: 1) Do 
western and eastern European countries differ regarding labour market 
institutions? 2) What are the consequences of labour market institutions for 
employment in innovation industries? 3) What role do active labour market 
policies play in processes of labour market reforms? We then present an 
overview of the most recent country differences and trends in EPL, URR, 
and LMPs, in order to shed light on how these institutions have developed 
and may develop in the near future.  
9.2 Modest convergence between western and eastern 
European countries 
One central question in general debates about social policies in the EU is 
whether the policies of individual countries are diverging from or 
converging into a single European Social Model.6 Regarding labour market 
institutions, the question is whether the 
labour market institutions of central 
and eastern European (CEE) countries 
are becoming more similar to those in 
western European countries as a result 
of Europeanisation.7 Clearly, it should 
be noted at the outset of such analyses that there is some doubt over 
whether the western European countries have converged into a single 
model; this may only partly be the case as national models remain 
relatively stable across time due to national differences, path-dependency 
While the social policies of EU 
countries have converged 
somewhat, we cannot speak of a 
single European Social Model.   
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and so on. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the labour market 
institutions have become somewhat more alike across time. 
First, country descriptions show that benefit systems are insurance-
based and characterised by defined benefits (implying a promised specified 
monthly income) in the CEE countries.8 Furthermore, the variation in the 
country profiles makes it impossible to state there is anything like a single 
labour market model for CEE countries. Rather, these countries show 
similar differences to those usually found across western European 
countries. Hence, just like the diversity in welfare state typologies and 
regimes in western European countries, the CEE countries can be classified 
according to different welfare state models. In other words, national-level 
characteristics remain important in understanding national labour market 
institutions.  
A closer look at developments over time, based on quantitative data, 
allows us to investigate whether there have been changes in these models 
with regard to the labour market institutions.9 Tables 9.1 and 9.2 provide 
insights into the answer to that question. They show the coefficient of 
variation10 for EPL, active labour market policies (ALMP) and URRs, for 
three time periods – 1990, 2000 and 2009.  
Table 9.1 Convergence of employment protection legislation and active labour 
market policies 
 EPL ALMP as % GDP 
 1990 2000 2009 1990 2000 2009 
Mean 25 countries 2.2 1.9 1.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 
Coefficient of variation 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 
Mean EU-18 countries 2.4 2.2 2.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 
Coefficient of variation 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.5 
Notes:  
Around 1990 =average 1990-93; around 2000 = average 1998-2001; around 2009 = 
average 2006-09.  
25 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. 
EU-18 countries = Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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Table 9.1 only enables a comparison of EU and non-EU countries. It 
shows that there has been a decrease in variation in both sets of countries. 
Hence, there may have been some sort of Europeanisation in EPL and 
ALMP, but this trend cannot be distinguished from a wider development 
of convergence of these labour market institutions.  
Focusing on URRs allows us to make a broader comparison than is 
possible with the EPL and ALMP indicators, by separating the effects for a 
large set of countries and distinguishing between western European and 
CEE countries. Table 9.2 shows that if all countries are taken into account, 
there has been an overall trend towards convergence. Zooming in on the 
EU countries, it is clear that this trend has been somewhat stronger within 
the EU (the overall decrease in variation is two times higher in this subset 
compared to the change in all countries). This means that the URRs of EU 
countries became more alike in the period between 1990 and 2009. 
Furthermore, the variation dropped more strongly in the CEE countries 
than the western European countries. Within this subset of countries, the 
least variation is found. 
Table 9.2 Convergence of unemployment replacement rates (single and couple) 
 Single person One-earner couple 
with two children 
  1990 2000 2009 1990 2000 2009 
Mean 34 countries 0.57 0.54 0.53 0.65 0.63 0.62 
Coefficient of variation 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.24 0.21 0.20 
Mean 27 EU 0.58 0.54 0.53 0.64 0.62 0.61 
Coefficient of variation 0.34 0.32 0.28 0.27 0.22 0.20 
Mean 15 West-EU 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.66 0.66 0.66 
Coefficient of variation 0.35 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.18 0.16 
Mean 10 CEE-EU 0.54 0.51 0.51 0.59 0.55 0.53 
Coefficient of variation 0.33 0.28 0.24 0.29 0.25 0.19 
Note: Around 1990 =average 1990-93; 2000 = average 1998-2001; around 2009 = 
average 2006-09. See Appendix A for more data years.  
Sources: Adopted from van Vliet et al. (2012). Unemployment replacement rates 
dataset among 34 welfare states 1971-2009 (van Vliet and Caminada, 2012) 
The research presented above leads to a nuanced answer to the 
question of the extent to which the labour market institutions in western 
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European and CEE countries have converged. While the quantitative data 
show patterns of convergence and lead to the conclusion that the labour 
market institutions of these countries have become more alike, the 
qualitative analysis underlines that national differences between these 
countries still exist. Furthermore, the quantitative analysis also shows that 
national differences matter in understanding labour market institutions. 
This means that the countries may have grown closer to each other in some 
regards, but that national circumstances still have a strong impact on them. 
Hence, there is little evidence of a single European Social Model of labour 
market institutions of the member states. 
9.3 Do labour market institutions influence innovation? 
Another relevant issue – both for social policies and scientific research – 
concerns the question of how labour market institutions relate to the 
innovativeness of countries. Two positions can be taken in this debate. On 
the one hand, it can be argued that labour market institutions hinder the 
development of innovations, for example because they decrease flexibility 
in the labour market and take away incentives for improvement. On the 
other hand, it can be argued that labour market institutions provide a 
secure environment in which innovations can flourish, for example because 
the consequences of failure are less severe and employers and employees 
are able to invest in human capital. 
Murphy, Siedschlag and McQuinn suggest that EPL and innovation 
intensity are negatively related to each other.11 In countries where EPL is 
stricter, the overall level of innovation is lower. Furthermore, the overall 
effect of EPL is different if the indicator is decomposed into the EPL for 
regular workers (EPLR) and the EPL for temporary workers (EPLT).12 
While the first indicator is not related 
to innovation intensity, the second is. 
This means that employment 
protection of regular workers does not 
explain the innovation intensity of 
industries, but that the employment of temporary workers does. This, in 
turn, seems to indicate that countries where companies have more external 
flexibility, meaning that they can more easily hire and fire temporary 
workers, are more innovative. Second, it turns out that the levels of EPL 
matter, but not the changes in EPL. This seems to indicate that countries 
that have increased or decreased their levels of employment protection 
have not gained or lost in terms of innovativeness. Over and above the 
There is little evidence that labour 
market institutions increase the 
innovativeness of countries.  
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effects of EPL on innovation intensity, the extent and duration of 
unemployment benefits led to lower innovation intensity in industries with 
a higher job reallocation propensity, while higher coordination and higher 
centralisation of wage-setting led to higher innovation intensity in the same 
group of industries. 
In contrast, Beblavý, Drahokoupil, Myant, Kureková and Domonkos, 
in their case studies of the automotive and software industries in CEE 
countries, show that labour market institutions were relatively unimportant 
in relation to the innovations within these two industries.13 Other factors, 
like past experience, the availability of financial resources and access to 
networks, matter more in that regard. This is, however, not to say that 
labour market institutions do not have an impact on innovation at all. This 
is evidenced, for example, by the notion that the acquisition of human 
capital, which may be enhanced by labour market institutions, plays a role. 
Nevertheless, the main conclusion of this qualitative study is that more 
employment protection does not necessarily lead to improvements in term 
of innovation. 
The differences between the results of the studies by Murphy et al. 
and Beblavý et al. are – at least to some extent – due to different research 
designs and the selection of different countries. However, there is at least 
one conclusion that they have in common: innovativeness is not enhanced 
or improved by labour market institutions. And, more strongly, there may 
even be a negative relationship between EPL and innovation. So, while 
there may be all kinds of reasons for introducing such institutions, 
increased innovativeness does not seem to fit that list. 
9.4 Are unemployment benefits and job protection 
substitutes? 
The interrelationships between different labour market policy instruments 
are important for policy reforms. A single labour market policy instrument 
is embedded in a large number of welfare state institutions in a country. 
These interrelationships have been taken into account in the welfare regime 
literature, in which welfare states are regarded and conceptualised as 
configurations of various policy instruments.14 However, in the 
quantitative comparative political economy literature, welfare state 
institutions are generally treated as isolated policy instruments. When it 
comes to unemployment benefits, EPL and active labour market policies 
(ALMPs) are particularly relevant. Unemployment benefits and 
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employment protection are often considered as substitutes in terms of 
providing income protection to employees.15 Hence, when EPL decreases, it 
can be expected that unemployment benefits become more generous.  
The trade-off between 
unemployment benefits and EPL is the 
main axis of the flexicurity model of 
the EU. At the EU level, the concept of 
flexicurity is integrated in the 
European Employment Strategy, which is aimed at increasing employment 
and reducing unemployment. The main characteristic of flexicurity is that it 
is intended to overcome the tensions between labour market flexibility on 
the one hand and the provision of social security for workers on the other.16 
Flexibility and security are viewed as complementary. The flexicurity 
model builds on the combination of flexible labour markets, generous 
unemployment benefits and a strong emphasis on activation. Flexible 
labour markets can be seen as beneficial for job creation, especially during 
periods of recovery after a recession, but they generally imply lower levels 
of economic security. Welfare state programmes, such as unemployment 
benefit schemes, provide economic security, but they can have adverse 
effects, such as longer unemployment spells and thus higher public 
expenditure and less mobility in the labour market. Furthermore, ALMPs 
such as labour market training, services of employment agencies and 
subsidised employment are aimed at increasing labour market 
participation and at reducing the adverse effects of generous 
unemployment benefit schemes.  
Flexicurity is presented as a package of policy reforms for the labour 
market. Lower levels of employment protection for employees are 
compensated by more generous unemployment benefits and with high 
efforts on ALMPs.17 Such reform packages could be successful, as they can 
be expected to overcome the opposition from employees.18 Hence, we test 
the hypotheses that the strictness of EPL is negatively related to the 
generosity of unemployment benefit schemes and that efforts on ALMPs 
are positively related to the generosity of unemployment protection.  
To examine the role of ALMPs and EPL in unemployment benefit 
reform, we ran pooled time series regression analyses.19 The models 
include conventional political economy variables, such as measures for 
political parties, corporatism and globalisation. The results are presented in 
Table 9.3.  
There is a trade-off between 
unemployment benefits and 
employment protection legislation.  
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Table 9.3 Fixed effects regressions of net unemployment benefit replacement rates, 
1990-2009 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 18-EU 
countries 
18-EU 
countries 
18-EU 
countries 
Left government (t-1) x  -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** 
   Unemployment rate (t-1) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Left government (t-1) 0.076*** 0.083*** 0.077*** 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.023) 
Right government (t-1) x  -0.005** -0.007*** -0.004* 
   Unemployment rate (t-1) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Right government (t-1) 0.057** 0.072*** 0.048** 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.024) 
Corporatism (t-1) -0.034 0.154 -0.158 
 (1.058) (1.191) (1.100) 
Capital mobility (t-1) -0.035*** -0.051*** -0.045*** 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.015) 
Trade openness (t-1) -0.054* -0.072** -0.043 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) 
Unemployment rate (t-1) 0.210 0.267 0.208 
 (0.164) (0.190) (0.177) 
GDP per capita (x 10-2) (t-1) -0.024 -0.017 -0.008 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.021) 
Age dependency ratio (t-1) 0.538*** 0.662*** 0.560*** 
 (0.154) (0.132) (0.167) 
EPL (t-1)  -3.357***  -3.758*** 
 (1.293)  (1.337) 
ALMP expenditure (t-1)  2.477** 0.190 
  (1.232) (1.036) 
Constant 53.742*** 38.385*** 48.585*** 
 (12.520) (11.720) (13.945) 
    
Rho 0.651 0.599 0.632 
N x T 303 293 285 
Adj. R-Squared 0.909 0.910 0.913 
Notes: Unstandardised coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; 
Prais-Winsten transformation [AR (1) disturbances]. 
LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE  195 
 
Each regression includes country and year dummies (not shown here). 
EU-18 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Source: Adopted from van Vliet et al. (2012).   
As expected, the strictness of EPL is negatively associated with the 
generosity of unemployment benefit schemes, and ALMP expenditures are 
positively related to unemployment protection. However, the result for 
ALMP expenditure does not hold when EPL and ALMP expenditure are 
both included. The results suggest that EPL and unemployment benefits 
can be considered substitutes. This provides support for the idea behind 
the flexicurity model, i.e. that lower levels of EPL for employees can be 
compensated with more generous unemployment benefits.  
9.5 Labour market regulation: Recent trends 
As the previous sections show, labour market institutions may have a 
certain impact on the functioning of labour markets. Hence, zooming in on 
cross-national differences as well as developments across time can provide 
information on how these institutions and their outcomes may develop. 
9.5.1 Employment protection 
Country differences 
We first investigate the level of employment protection using the 
Employment Protection Legislation Index. The indicator is based on 18 
items, which are converted into an index ranging from 0 to 6 (higher scores 
indicate stricter regulation). As Figure 9.1 shows, the average level of 
employment protection for regular and temporary workers varies 
considerably across Europe. Furthermore, from Figure 9.1 it can be seen 
that countries scoring high on protection of regular workers are not 
necessarily the ones in which the protection of temporary workers is also 
high. According to the figure, the employment protection of regular 
workers is high in Portugal, the Czech Republic and the Netherlands, and 
low in Switzerland, Ireland and the UK. With regard to the employment 
protection of temporary workers, Portugal, the Czech Republic and the 
Netherlands have a far lower score compared to the other countries, while 
Switzerland, Ireland and the UK are also among the low-scoring countries 
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on EPL for temporary workers. Belgium and Luxembourg stand out, as the 
employment protection of regular workers is below average while EPL for 
temporary workers is high in these two countries. Finally, it should be 
noted that in most countries the EPL of temporary workers is lower than 
the EPL of regular workers, but there are some exceptions such as Greece, 
where the average EPL for regular workers is 2.70 and 3.63 for temporary 
workers. 
Figure 9.1 Employment protection legislation 
 
Source: OECD (2013). 
Time trends 
By presenting the changes in EPL for regular workers between 1995 and 
2003 for a selection of countries, Figure 9.2 illustrates some of the core 
developments that took place in that period. In addition to showing that 
EPL levels tend to remain stable for longer periods of time, the figure also 
indicates that if there are changes, they are in a downward direction. The 
clearest example of this trend is found in the two countries with the highest 
average level of EPL for regular workers. In 1995, the EPL of Portugal was 
4.58, but this dropped to 3.18 by 2013. Likewise, the EPL for regular 
workers decreased in the Czech Republic from 3.31 in 1995 to 2.92. In other 
countries, like Belgium for example, the strictness of EPL remained the 
same.  
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Figure 9.2 Employment protection legislation for regular workers, 
trend 1995-2013 
 
Source: OECD (2013). 
In Figure 9.3, the trends are presented for temporary workers. It can 
be concluded from the figure that the EPL for temporary workers also 
decreased in the period between 1995 and 
2013. For example, in the 1990s the EPL 
for temporary workers was comparatively 
high in Greece (around 4.75). By 2013, this 
figure had decreased to 2.25, also meaning 
that the difference in EPL between regular workers and temporary workers 
disappeared in that country. Italy and Belgium followed a similar path: in 
Italy, EPL for temporary workers dropped from 4.75 in 1995 to 2.00 in 2013; 
in Belgium it fell from 4.63 to 2.38 in the same period. A clear example of a 
country moving in the opposite direction is Poland. In the 1990s, the EPL 
for temporary workers in Poland was 0.75, and by 2013 this dimension of 
the EPL had increased to 1.75. 
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Figure 9.3 Employment protection legislation of temporary workers, 
trend 1995-2013 
 
Source: OECD (2013). 
The two EPL indicators show that the level of employment protection 
varies considerably across European countries. Furthermore, some 
countries tend to put more emphasis on the protection of regular workers 
and others more on protecting temporary workers. As the trends show, 
these are not communicating vessels, in the sense that if protection of 
regular workers goes down, temporary workers will have higher 
employment protection, and vice versa. On the contrary, the trends show 
that apart from the stable patterns and some exceptions, there has been a 
decline of employment protection in those countries with the highest levels 
of EPL in the 1990s. 
9.5.2 Unemployment benefits 
Country differences 
Next, we turn to the level of unemployment benefits, measured by 
unemployment replacement rates (URR). Although there are different ways 
of measuring this indicator (for example, a distinction is made between net 
and gross replacement rates), a comparison of the URRs provided by van 
Vliet and Caminada shows that the rank order of these measures is quite 
stable.20 Because the ordering of the countries is largely the same, only one 
indicator is used to get an impression of how the countries score on this 
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dimension. Since URRs may vary across different household types, the 
results are presented for single workers and couples with two children. 
Overall, one-earner couples with two children have higher URRs than 
single workers. The data are shown in Figure 9.4.  
Figure 9.4 Net unemployment replacement rates (average production worker), 
2009 
 
Source: van Vliet and Caminada (2012). 
Time trends 
Figures 9.5 and 9.6 show the developments over time for the different URR 
indicators for a selection of countries. The figures show that in some 
countries there is considerable stability of URRs 
across time, the main example being 
Luxembourg where URRs remained high for 
the whole period investigated. The Czech 
Republic is also among the countries with little changes in URRs. 
Furthermore, there are some countries in which URRs have increased 
sharply. For example, the URR tripled in Estonia between 1995 and 2000, 
and stayed at that level afterwards. A further notable pattern is found in 
Sweden, where URRs were amongst the highest in the 1990s, then declined 
before returning to the highest level again at the beginning of the 2000s, 
only to decline after that again.  
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Figure 9.5 URRs for average production worker (single), 1995-2009 
 
Source: van Vliet and Caminada (2012). 
 
Figure 9.6 URRs for average production worker (couple), 1995-2009 
 
Source: van Vliet and Caminada (2012). 
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9.5.3 Labour market policies 
Country differences 
Looking at Figure 9.7, it is clear that government spending on labour 
market policies varies considerably across the European countries. Several 
countries spend around 0.5% of GDP on such policies (Romania, Lithuania, 
Malta, Czech Republic and Estonia), while other countries spend about six 
times as much (Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark).  
Figure 9.7 Spending on labour market policies as a % of GDP, average 1998-2011 
 
Source: Eurostat (2013). 
Time trends  
If we turn to the time trends of labour market policies, some noteworthy 
patterns emerge, as Figure 9.8 shows for a number of countries. From the 
beginning of the 2000s, those countries 
spending the most on labour market policies 
started to spend less. This is evidenced by 
the patterns that Finland, Sweden and 
Denmark show, for example. At the same 
time, the countries spending less began spending more, which is the case 
with Luxembourg and Norway, for example. As a result, the countries 
came closer to each other around 2007. As the economic crisis hit, spending 
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on labour market policies started to increase in all countries again. Because 
the countries that had the highest levels of spending spent comparatively 
less, the countries have diverged somewhat. Nevertheless, immediately 
after 2008, spending on labour market policies started to decline in almost 
every country. 
Figure 9.8 Spending on labour market policies as a % of GDP, 1998-2011 
 
Source: Eurostat (2013). 
9.6 Decline in spending on protection reversed by the crisis 
The labour market institutions of EU countries have witnessed considerable 
changes. Most of these trends are in the direction of decreasing levels of 
protection and of spending on social arrangements, apart from the relative 
stability that is also found in some countries. However, one particular trend 
that stands out concerns the development of labour market policies. While 
spending on these arrangements also decreased for a while, they increased 
as the economic and financial crises hit Europe and the world. Whether this 
recent upsurge is permanent or temporary is hard to tell yet from the data. 
Addressing this issue requires a longer timeframe – that extends into the 
future – than can be investigated here. 
With regard to policy recommendations, only a few conclusions can 
be drawn from the analysis. To evaluate the functioning of the labour 
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market institutions and to formulate policy advice would require focusing 
more on their outcomes, while the emphasis in this chapter is on the 
development of labour market 
institutions. Extending the analysis 
would allow us to say more about the 
resilience of welfare states, for example.21 
It is likely that changes in labour market 
institutions can have an impact on the 
behaviour of individuals and 
companies.22 However, as Koster and Fleischmann show in their multi-
level analyses of 13 European countries, these conclusions are far from 
unambiguous as some policy goals are not met through the use of labour 
market institutions, while at the same time the application of the labour 
market institutions can have consequences for parts of the labour market 
other than those targeted.23 Hence, the most valuable policy advice that can 
be formulated in that regard is that policy-makers should be aware that 
there is a complex relationship between labour market institutions and the 
labour market behaviour of individuals (and companies). Therefore, they 
should monitor closely what is happening in the labour market and 
whether labour market institutions are adapting, either in the direction of 
more spending and protection or in the other direction.  
There is at least one area in which labour market institutions seem to 
have an unequivocal outcome, namely with regard to the impact that 
employment protection legislation has on innovation intensity in countries. 
Here we see that labour market institutions do not support innovation and 
may even hinder it. In that regard, the observed trend towards lower levels 
of employment protection may be a step towards more innovative 
behaviour of European companies. However, whether this prediction will 
hold will only be seen in the future, once the impact of labour market 
reforms is more visible.  
Overall, it can be concluded that the efficiency and impact of labour 
market institutions, and hence the advice for policy-makers, crucially 
depends on which outcomes are preferred. While extending labour market 
institutions may have desired consequences in one domain, they may lead 
to unwanted consequences in others. As a result, continuing research into 
these complexities will be required to monitor labour market 
developments. This particularly holds for the reforms that are being 
undertaken in a large number of countries; these may support both social 
and economic goals, but to what extent and why needs to be continuously 
investigated. 
Given the mixed findings with 
regard to labour market 
institutions, constant 
monitoring of policies and 
outcomes is required. 
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10. THE FUTURE OF LABOUR IN EUROPE: 
KEY MESSAGES FOR POLICY-MAKERS* 
he Hollywood mogul, Sam Goldwyn, is renowned for having 
claimed “I never make predictions, especially about the future”. It 
can sometimes seem as though elected politicians, so often focused 
on the next election, are equally uninterested in longer-term outcomes, 
preferring to concentrate on what will appeal to voters today. Yet, as the 
NEUJOBS project takes as its starting point, European economies and 
societies face daunting long-run challenges that will require all levels of 
government to formulate and implement policies to facilitate the 
transformations needed to respond to these challenges. 
The aim of this chapter is to draw together the findings presented in 
the preceding chapters and to explore their ramifications for policy-makers 
at the EU and national level. It starts by examining these daunting 
challenges and discussing the conditions that might lead to the sort of 
paradigm change implicit in the NEUJOBS project. The following sections 
explore the policy implications of the NEUJOBS research on, respectively, 
the evolving market for jobs, energy and climate change, labour markets, 
skills and the welfare state. In each of these sections, key messages for both 
EU and national policy-makers are summarised. Section 6 looks at EU 
policies and the long-run policy agenda. 
10.1 The principal policy challenges 
The transitions examined in this book will occur on timescales measured in 
decades rather than months or years, but there is also an inexorable logic to 
them, which means that they need to be addressed. For example, even Sam 
                                                   
* Iain Begg, Professorial Research Fellow at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science, is the author of chapter 10. 
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Goldwyn would be obliged to recognise that predictions of ageing of the 
population are about as robust as it is possible to be. Europeans are not 
only living longer, but will have to respond to the straightforward 
arithmetic that without change, a relatively smaller working-age 
population will have to provide for a larger cohort of the elderly. The 
impact of carbon emissions on climate change is broadly accepted and, 
despite the apparent ability of fossil fuels to defy gravity by continuing to 
find new sources of supply, a substantial shift to renewables is 
unavoidable, even if when it happens is hard to gauge. Societal changes 
tend to occur slowly and often without great fanfare, but it needs only a 
moment’s reflection to consider how much has changed over a couple of 
decades in, for example, attitudes towards equality or social inclusion. 
In some respects, the policy imperatives associated with the 
NEUJOBS transitions explained in the introductory chapter are well 
known. Europe needs to accelerate adaptation to a new energy model, to 
boost its labour supply, to equip workers with the skills demanded by the 
jobs of the future and to facilitate the further societal transformations 
required, including rethinking its approach to the welfare state. A broad 
understanding of what needs to be done is not, however, the same as 
knowing how to do it or how to build support for what, in some cases, will 
be politically difficult policy measures.  
10.1.1 The ‘crisis’ and its aftermath 
Although the focus of the NEUJOBS research has been on transformations 
with long-term consequences, a perspective that would normally be 
expected to abstract from cyclical trends in the economy, the duration and 
intensity of the crisis affecting the EU over the period 2008-13 arguably 
now have to be considered as sources of an additional transition to post-
crisis. There have been substantial, even dramatic, changes in the 
circumstances of some member states, with profound effects on the labour 
market,1 while others seem to have emerged largely unscathed. Just as 
many of the countries of central and eastern Europe had to effect a huge 
transition during the 1990s, the crisis has made it clear that several of the 
countries of southern Europe now have to undertake wide-ranging 
reforms.  
Without concerted action, the legacy of the crisis could be a decline in 
growth potential, while the progress of the previous decade in boosting 
employment rates has been brutally reversed. Yet contrary to perceptions, 
the pace of governance reform has been considerable, both at the EU level2 
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and in some of the countries that were worst affected by the crisis.3 The 
architecture of economic governance has been reshaped, giving greater 
powers to the EU level to monitor and steer member state macroeconomic 
policies, backed up by a more credible threat of financial sanctions. There is 
a permanent rescue fund in the shape of the European Stability Mechanism, 
and following the agreement at the end of 2013 on further steps towards 
banking union, some progress on dealing with the toxic interaction 
between banking problems and public finances. But other proposals from 
the Commission,4 aimed at putting in place a ‘genuine economic and 
monetary union’, are still on the drawing board, with the result that 
vulnerabilities remain. 
At the national level, despite inauspicious macroeconomic conditions, 
the reforms introduced during the crisis are already altering the economic 
and social fabric, even if there is as yet little sign of progress in outcome 
indicators such as employment or GDP. The danger for these economies is 
that they become subject to a vicious cycle in which stagnation begets low 
investment and divergences in economic performance become accentuated. 
There is a parallel danger of reluctance to accept the urgency of reform, 
leading to delayed action. At the same time, ‘reform fatigue’ has set in with 
evident social and political tensions. 
By the beginning of 2013, dealing with the social dimension of the 
crisis had manifestly moved up the policy agenda. In part, this was because 
of greater clarity about the longer-term consequences and legacies of the 
negative shocks that have afflicted the Union since 2008, as well as about 
some of the difficult policy choices and compromises that will have to be 
confronted. There was also a growing recognition that too little attention 
had been devoted to the social and distributive aspects of governance.  
The aphorism that a crisis is too good to waste has been widely used 
since 2008 and it is undeniable that it has led to unprecedented policy 
activism. According to the Lisbon Council in its December 2013 “Euro plus 
monitor” assessments, Greece continues to make significant adjustment in 
the four areas examined – external, fiscal, labour cost and ‘reform drive’ – 
and is adjudged to be the EU economy doing most to deal with its 
shortcomings, followed by Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Slovakia.5 Perhaps 
counter-intuitively, the Lisbon Council rankings place the most successful 
economies (including Sweden, Finland and Germany) at the bottom. This 
apparent paradox can be reconciled by looking at the Lisbon Council’s 
Fundamental Health Indicator, which places Cyprus, Portugal and Italy at 
210  LET’S GET TO WORK! THE FUTURE OF LABOUR IN EUROPE 
 
the wrong end of the table, but records a tangible improvement for Greece 
from its last place in 2012. 
10.1.2 Is a paradigm shift on the horizon? 
Underlying the policy efforts to secure recovery is a broader policy 
question about whether the sorts of transitions investigated by the 
NEUJOBS project will lead to a major paradigm shift akin to that seen 
when the post-war Keynesian model was eclipsed in the late 1970s. In a 
widely quoted analysis, Hall6 argued that paradigm change is a “social 
learning” process in which three distinct types of change can occur, in 
ascending order of significance: in stage 1, policy settings are changed; in 
stage 2, the policy instruments are altered; and in stage 3, the policy goals 
themselves are transformed. He previously wrote of the conjunctions 
needed to achieve change emanating from new ideas, again identifying 
three: the economic ideas being attractive to policy-makers; the 
bureaucracy being able to translate the ideas into policies; and the scope for 
building a coalition of interests able to make change happen.  
Commenting on the whether the crisis of recent years may induce a 
paradigm change, Hall observes that “today, some of the preconditions for 
another major shift of policy are in place and perhaps presage a new era”.7 
There is a widespread sense of grievance in much of Europe and North 
America about rising levels of income inequality, intensified in some 
countries by high levels of unemployment and stagnant incomes. However, 
what is noticeable about much of the discussion on whether there will be a 
shift away from the market-orientated paradigm, dominant since the early 
1980s, is that the terms of debate are about inequality and fiscal 
sustainability (especially around the implications of ageing), but only 
tangentially about the socio-ecological dimension.  
10.1.3 Key messages for policy-makers 
At the EU level 
 The crisis will have a legacy that is likely to mean that for the EU as a 
whole, pre-crisis patterns of growth are unlikely to be restored. 
 The EU will be characterised by greater diversity in socio-economic 
‘performance’, implying that attempts to develop common policy 
solutions will have to be better attuned to such differences. 
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At the national level 
 Extensive governance reforms introduced at the EU level have 
created new expectations around policy coordination that will 
circumscribe national room for manoeuvre. 
 The policy solutions to the challenges of long-run transformations 
are, in many respects, very obvious, if politically highly challenging, 
as will be seen in subsequent sections. 
 Public resources face extended pressures, which entail increasing 
savings today (by reducing both government and private-sector debt) 
while also building up funds for future costs associated with ageing 
and with an energy transformation. Governments will have to be 
resolute in maintaining budgets for long-run investments. 
10.2 Where the jobs will be 
Some of the long-run changes in labour demand will be shaped by the 
socio-ecological transitions currently underway. Projections of population 
and of labour supply and demand are inevitably subject to considerable 
uncertainty, but the work reported in chapter 2 provides a valuable starting 
point for analysing what EU policies will have to accommodate. 
For policy-makers, a dilemma is how far to go in building what is 
expected from transitions into the aims and instruments of different 
processes of governance. At the EU level, these processes function on at 
least four different time scales: 
 Annually, comprising the cycle around the European semester and 
the country-specific recommendations. 
 The five-year mandates of the College of Commissioners and the 
European Parliament. 
 The decennial time span of the principal economic development 
strategies – first Lisbon and now Europe 2020 – although subject to 
intermediate revisions. 
 An indefinite perspective for the sustainable development strategy 
(SDS), even though it has shorter planning horizons. 
The seven-year span of the EU budget, embodied in the Multi-annual 
Financial Framework, sits between the second and third, while more 
specific strategies for, for example, energy or environmental action overlap 
with the third and fourth. 
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An obvious point of departure is that the long-term transformations 
of the socio-ecological transition (SET) should emanate from the indefinite 
SDS, suggesting that it should set out key strategic orientations consistent 
with such transformations. Such an approach would establish thematic 
priorities at the EU level, which could then be required elements of all 
other initiatives in much the same as the single market is in virtually all 
economic policy initiatives today. 
10.2.1 Scenarios 
The assumptions and relationships behind the projections presented in 
chapter 2 for the ‘friendly’ and ‘tough’ scenarios highlight many of the 
areas in which timely and appropriate policy action can be expected to 
make a significant difference to outcomes. While the numbers attached to 
the projections have to be interpreted with considerable caution, not least 
because they assume that there will not be a substantial policy response, 
the differences between the scenarios show what is at stake.  
A decline in EU labour supply is projected under both the ‘friendly’ 
and ‘tough’ scenarios, with only a handful of exceptions among the 
member states. Under the ‘tough’ scenario, the decrease, not surprisingly, is 
larger. Although overall population is expected to continue rising, the 
explanation is its age profile. This carries the obvious policy implication 
that a concentration on skills and on the employment rate will be required 
to offset the head count loss in maintaining the output from labour. 
Upward pressure on wages is probable and would be expected to widen 
the gap between skilled and unskilled. The intriguing finding that the 
increase in wages is likely to offset at least part of the negative effect on the 
income tax base from a lower number of taxpayers is important for policy. 
It implies that fears for the sustainability of welfare systems may be 
unjustified. However, if global competition results in a downward pressure 
on wages, these relatively favourable interpretations may not be realisable.  
Common features of the two scenarios include: 
 More heavily constrained public finances will constrain spending on 
social investment and could reduce employment in non-market 
services.  
 Private services sectors will be where the greatest job creation takes 
place. 
 A sizeable increase in employment in construction is explained partly 
by investment in renovating housing, linked to energy savings. 
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 In the decade prior to the crisis, the tradables sectors (using the 
definition put forward in chapter 3) shed just under four million jobs 
in the EU, while jobs in non-tradables grew by 27 million, one third in 
the non-market services and two thirds in the various private services 
and construction sectors considered to be non-tradable.  
 Job losses in tradables have been observed in most member states, 
whereas all saw job creation in non-tradables. 
There is a clear distinction between high- and low-skilled 
occupations. Jobs have consistently been lost in low-skilled occupations in 
the tradables sector, but high-skilled workers fare better. Low-skilled 
workers are better protected in the non-tradables sector, but are more at 
risk than in the past. It is in the highly skilled occupations in non-tradables 
that the main net job creation occurs, especially after 2020 when the pre-
crisis trend is restored. These projections are based solely on the 
qualifications of workers rather than the tasks they undertake, and other 
evidence suggests that non-routine tasks in low-skilled occupations may 
have better prospects, as will the highly skilled working in areas requiring 
application of knowledge. 
Policy issues that arise include the likelihood of under-utilisation of 
skills, and the difficult question of how much investment in human capital 
can be justified and what form the investment should take. There is an 
apparent paradox that although high-skilled non-tradables is the major 
source of employment growth, the unemployment rate in this area could 
increase. The projections use a broad-brush approach, which cannot readily 
signal whether it is better to favour lifelong learning or perseverance with 
the more intensive efforts to increase tertiary education. But if the issue is 
examined purely from the perspective of employability (as opposed to 
other, entirely reasonable, rationales for education such as social or cultural 
aims), there is likely to be an awkward debate about how much to invest in 
building up human capital that is then under-used. 
Overall, the ‘tough’ scenario signals the magnitude of the challenges 
policy-makers have to face by 2030 if decidedly negative trends are to be 
arrested. The dangers of self-reinforcing processes are acute. A shrinking 
labour supply lowers growth potential and, by accentuating the squeeze on 
public finances, would mean that by 2030 total public consumption is over 
15% lower than in the ‘friendly’ scenario. This reduction substantially 
reduces the scope for employment creation in publicly funded care 
services, which would detract from the response to ageing of the 
population.   
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10.2.2 Key messages for policy-makers 
At the EU level 
 The contrast between the ‘friendly’ and ‘tough’ scenarios offers clues 
to the domains in which appropriate policy action can render the 
‘friendly’ more likely than the ‘tough’. However, the many subtle 
links between effects have to be taken into account. 
 While there is a place for common EU policies, differentiated labour 
supply policies will be needed, although with the shared objective of 
ensuring that the number of economically active persons is 
maximised. This implies that, in formulating future strategies and 
coordination mechanisms, the EU will have to be less top-down in its 
guidelines, targets and recommendations.  
 Given the uncertain timing of different effects, a strategic approach 
will require timely interventions based on the identification of 
milestones. 
At the national level 
 Policies towards labour supply will have to take account of the 
different determinants highlighted in the NEUJOBS analyses. 
 The effect of the interplay between labour supply and growth on 
wages can be expected to have substantial, if not always predictable, 
distributive consequences that will need to be reflected in tax 
systems. 
 Because of decreased public consumption, foreseen to be more 
pronounced in the ‘tough’ scenario because of lower public revenues 
(despite some respite from rises in wages that would increase the 
yield in some member states – such as Germany – from income 
taxes), there are likely to be fewer public jobs, including in the social 
services of general interest. 
 To the extent that private provision replaces public provision of 
certain social services, there will be equity challenges for 
governments to confront, as well as whether or not the jobs are 
created. 
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10.3 Energy policy in anticipation of a socio-ecological 
transition 
From a policy perspective, the awkward reality of meeting the challenges 
of climate change and the exhaustion of resources such as fossil fuels is that 
it is very difficult to reconcile the certainty that something will have to be 
done, at some stage, with the knowledge that it is a something that today’s 
leaders can neglect or postpone indefinitely without really incurring a 
political cost. Moreover, as the analysis in chapter 2 makes clear, the 
uncertainty about the timing of a socio-ecological transition raises a 
number of questions about the sequencing of the transition and the 
incidence over time of different sorts of impacts.  
Clearly, fossil fuel use will not stop overnight; indeed, the advent of 
fracking and the switch from oil towards gas to satisfy various forms of 
energy demand is itself a transition of some consequence and may possibly 
be a socio-ecological transition in its own right. Equally, the increasingly 
toxic atmospheric conditions in emerging economies (notably China, now 
the world’s biggest emitter of CO2) will provide an impetus towards 
acceleration of the search for alternatives to fossil fuels. For the EU, which 
has tried to take a lead in curbing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, these 
dilemmas are accentuated by often contrary attitudes and actions in other 
parts of the world, and a narrative that suggests that if the EU unilaterally 
raises energy prices or embarks on a huge investment effort it will inflict 
competitive damage on itself in global markets.  
There are intriguing and complex views in the SET literature 
summarised in chapter 4 on the nature of work and on how a transition 
from fossil fuels will affect jobs. Even the basic question of whether energy 
substitutes for labour or facilitates its more intensive use (as occurred in the 
coal regime, but not in the oil regime) cannot be convincingly resolved. 
However, there can be little doubt, based on historical analysis, that a 
socio-ecological transition will have a profoundly disruptive effect on 
established patterns of work and life. In this regard, much of the current 
debate around ‘green’ jobs, usually discussed in relation to the possible 
emergence in the short term of new sectors of activity associated with 
environmental policies, is tangential to the probable long-run 
consequences. 
In Figure 4.5 of chapter 4, the authors set out what they describe as an 
“admittedly highly speculative” set of predictions about what a transition 
away from fossil fuels will entail, especially for employment. A parallel 
speculation on what these predictions might imply for policy is warranted, 
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focusing especially on what would be a decisive break with the past rather 
than the extension of an existing trend. 
Starting with the changes in the energy market, a switch to 
renewables and the increase in the share of electricity in final demand are, 
in many respects, two sides of the same coin. They will require a large 
investment effort, both to construct the production facilities and to develop 
the associated distribution facilities. It follows that there is likely to be an 
extended period of increased demand for construction and related jobs – 
one definition of ‘green’ jobs. However, the Fischer-Kowalski and Haas 
analysis, though by no means dismissive of such green jobs, points to more 
profound changes. They argue that the higher energy prices that they judge 
to be inevitable could reverse the substitution of human energy by 
mechanical energy, leading to more jobs requiring physical input. 
Higher energy prices have a number of other likely implications. A 
first is income distribution, which may be adversely affected by a trend that 
is likely to aggravate fuel poverty. Energy demand is relatively income 
inelastic, so that higher prices will consume a bigger share of the budgets of 
poor households. There are obvious policy options in subsidies and tax 
policies. In Europe, fuel for motor vehicles is highly taxed (in contrast to, 
notably, North America) and there are more piecemeal arrangements for 
lead-in tariffs or other forms of cross-subsidy for renewables. Electric cars 
already receive favourable tax treatment, as do low emission vehicles in 
several member states, but as Fischer-Kowalski and Haas emphasise, there 
may be a countervailing need to increase taxes on resources to allow for 
reduced taxes on labour. 
If, as they argue, there is wage convergence between the poorer and 
richer parts of the world, there may be some return of activities previously 
outsourced to low-wage countries, and perhaps a greater priority to 
recycling and repair, rather than the throw-away consumer society of the 
recent decades. Given an ageing population, there will also be a need for 
what they describe as “empathy’” jobs in the care sector. There are, 
however, striking imponderables in the analysis around the future trend of 
other private services and the likely impact of new bio-technologies and 
next-generation ICT. 
Hao and van Ark, in an intriguing investigation of the knowledge 
economy that is expected to grow relatively in coming decades, find that 
energy intensity is lower when there is higher investment in the intangibles 
(such as design, software within ICT, branding or organisational 
innovation).8 By contrast, higher investment in physical capital is 
THE FUTURE OF LABOUR IN EUROPE: KEY MESSAGES FOR POLICY-MAKERS  217 
 
associated with an increase in the energy intensity of the economy. While 
not entirely surprising, since the ‘softer’ investments rely on brain-power 
rather than physical power, a policy implication is that the very definition 
of investment as gross fixed capital investment needs rethinking. Alongside 
the continuing shift towards services that tend, in any case, to be less 
energy intensive, these findings suggest – but as the authors stress, do not 
prove – that the shift to the knowledge economy is part of a changing 
pattern of energy use. They also reiterate a point raised in chapter 3 of this 
book, namely that the changing global value chain, in which more of the 
energy-intensive stages of production are undertaken by emerging 
economies, means that the energy demand is diverted rather than reduced. 
But there is also a macroeconomic dimension to energy provision that 
could affect jobs. The dramatic increase in domestic gas production in the 
US is not only having significant geo-political effects, but has also resulted 
in lower prices, which, in turn, feed into effects on competitiveness. 
Although there is disagreement about whether the calculations take 
sufficient account of indirect energy costs (and the resulting emissions), 
burning gas is thermally more efficient,9 as can be seen from Table 10.1. It 
is, therefore, plausible that the fossil fuel era will be substantially extended, 
even if the long-term logic remains that it must end. Already, there are 
indications that the European policy response is both to try to emulate the 
US in developing fracking and to water down ambitions for energy 
transformation targets for the 2030 horizon. 
Table 10.1 Carbon dioxide emissions per kilowatt/hour of electricity generated 
(grams/KwH), average 2008-10 
 Coal and peat Oil Natural gas TOTAL 
World 971 779 450 573 
EU27, of which: 920 709 361 442 
    Highest  1266 (BE) 1100 (CZ) 435 (FR) 1059 (EE) 
    Lowest  658 (DK) 456 (FI) 211 (SE) 22 (SE) 
US 907 709 405 528 
Source: International Energy Agency (2012). 
10.3.1 The evolving EU policy position 
The Climate Change White Paper launched on 22 January 2014 exposes 
some of the tensions at the heart of policy-making on climate change and 
energy-use transformation.10 Two significant proposals are to end the 
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insistence on GHG reductions from the transport sector after 2020 and to 
move from national targets for GHG to a single EU-wide target.  
Transport has been subject to the fuel quality directive, which would 
have favoured supposedly cleaner options such as biofuels. Some 
environmental NGOs argue that biofuels are of dubious value because they 
have a damaging effect on CO2 absorption (not to mention bio-diversity) 
through clearance of rain forests or other habitats to provide land for the 
fuel crops. Even so, the danger is that what could be a significant industry 
will be undermined by uncertainty about the EU’s future policy stance. 
According to Epure, the trade association of the renewable ethanol 
industry, the industry currently supports 70,000 jobs (including indirect 
jobs), a figure that could grow to 200,000 by 2020, many of which are in 
poorer rural areas. If EU policy undermines incentives for producers, these 
jobs could be at risk. As explained by its Secretary General, Rob Vierhout:11 
The Commission has failed in its first test to provide a clear signal 
to investors that there will be a clear policy framework for 
sustainable biofuels in Europe after 2020. This proposal is short-
sighted; the only winner will be the fossil fuel industry.  
While such claims always have to be looked at with care to separate 
fact from sectoral interests, the wider policy question is how policy should 
deal with the undoubted tensions. Much of the drive for fracking is to tap 
into a fuel source that, while manifestly still emitting GHG, does so on a 
lower scale and will be conducive to improved European competitiveness 
because it is a less costly alternative. 
As the rapid increase in US gas production from fracking shows, any 
long-range policy position is affected by the unexpected, including the 
sudden German rejection of nuclear power after Fukushima. In this vein, a 
NEUJOBS report by Behrens et al. draws attention to the sheer uncertainty 
around two of the main potential influences on the EU energy market, 
nuclear generation of electricity and the prospects for carbon capture and 
storage.12 Nevertheless, they are clear that reducing GHG emissions by 20% 
by 2020 and by up to 80% by 2050 is feasible “using currently known 
technologies”. This is a finding with important policy consequences, 
because it puts the onus on policy-makers to consider whether the (often 
difficult) policy choices needed should be made, but debunks suggestions 
that they are unrealistic.  
A frequently heard message from business is that regulatory and 
policy certainty is essential to justify some of the very long-range 
investment projects that will be required. They also emphasise that cutting 
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demand from energy uses for which the limits of decarbonisation are close 
to being reached is essential for the overall targets to be attainable. From a 
policy perspective, incentives will have to be aligned appropriately by 
finding price mechanisms that stimulate savings and regulatory 
interventions – whether in the form of standards or controls – that deter 
energy-intensive processes. 
Behrens et al. also note pronounced differences between eastern and 
western Europe that invite policy responses. Some are already in the 
pipeline through the amendments to the regulations for Cohesion Policy, 
but as with other instruments of governance (including the possibility of a 
contractual approach between the member-state and the EU level), the case 
for creative forms of conditionality will strengthen. 
10.3.2 Key messages for policy-makers 
At the EU level 
 A switch away from fossil fuels will eventually happen and will have 
profound ramifications for consumption, production, employment 
and many facets of the organisation of society.  
 However, the timing of different stages of the transition is 
unpredictable and the scope for policy actors to steer the process is 
uncertain, not least because some effects will happen irrespective of 
policy input. In the Rumsfeld lexicon, it is an ‘unknown known’, yet 
also one for which many elements are reasonably well known and for 
which many of the consequences can be anticipated. 
 Long-term energy transformations should be central to a revamped 
Sustainable Development Strategy, applicable over an indefinite time 
horizon, which should set out key strategic orientations consistent 
with such transformations.  
 Such an approach would establish thematic priorities at the EU level, 
which could then become required transversal elements of all other 
policy initiatives, in much the same as the single market is in virtually 
every economic policy initiative today. 
 Although a paradigm shift is probably occurring, it will be slow and 
subject to uncertainty about what will result. A key inference from 
the ‘tough’ scenario is that it restricts the options for the EU, with 
only the sustainability transformation option offering favourable 
outcomes. 
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At the national level 
 Policy decisions will have to be made concerning both the mitigation 
of, and adaptation to, the effects of climate change and energy, as 
well as the balance between the two approaches and the sequencing 
of policy responses. 
 New distributive challenges will derive from rising energy prices and 
from the need to invest in ecologically sustainable forms of transport 
and housing, but will need to be mediated at national level. 
 Regulatory certainty greatly increases the willingness of business to 
invest in long-term projects, including transformative ones. 
10.4 Influences on the labour market 
While some of the longer-term consequences of a socio-ecological transition 
are bound to be more speculative, there are other influences on the labour 
market that could have effects in the medium term. Even here, however, 
surprises cannot be discounted. 
10.4.1 Workplace innovation 
The information brought together in chapter 6 on workplace innovation 
suggests that wide ranging evolutionary changes are taking place, but also 
that there are great disparities among the member states for which relevant 
statistics can be found. Not surprisingly, it is the Nordic countries that are 
in the lead in many of the innovations and, in a disappointingly familiar 
dichotomy, the southern European countries that show the lowest 
propensity for workplace innovation. 
Two distinct, but connected policy issues arise. The first is how, 
assuming the policy direction taken by the lead countries is a desirable one, 
to ensure greater diffusion of the practices in question to the laggards. The 
second is whether there are particular workplace innovations that ought to 
be given priority, for example in the targets and policy packages associated 
with EU strategies (notably Europe 2020 or the Euro Plus Pact). The 
particularly skewed picture for teleworking reveals a nine-fold difference 
between the countries with the lowest rates (Italy and Bulgaria) and 
Denmark, where 36% of workers telecommute at least some of the time. 
Slovenia and the Baltic countries stand out as exceptions. As a practice with 
considerable potential to curb transport-associated energy use, the finding 
that the overall EU rate of telecommuting was just 12% in 2010 raises an 
intriguing policy question of whether it is a trend that may accelerate or 
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one that will fail to do so. The research reveals a further twist to this puzzle, 
namely why, despite the advances in enabling technologies, there was so 
little change in the decade from 2000 to 2010. 
Workplace innovation can contribute both to job satisfaction and, 
thus, to job quality from the perspective of the worker, as well as to 
productivity, making it also attractive to employers. However, it is not all 
one-way traffic, as some workplace innovations place added pressures on 
workers, adding to stress or insecurity. Telecommuting, for instance, has 
been found to increase hours worked, disrupting the work-life balance. 
The public sector in many countries is a laggard, yet as public 
administrations come under ever-increasing pressure to deliver better 
value for money, there are opportunities for it to lead. In many countries 
today, shortcomings in public administration are being identified as more 
than just profligacy, suggesting that more intense reform of management 
practices may be demanded. Moreover, the public sector has the ability to 
experiment. An example of a well-conceived means of doing so is the 
TEKES programme in Finland, described in chapter 6. 
What are the regulatory barriers to workplace innovation and are 
they being addressed? Some forms of regulation could make it harder to 
adopt more innovative approaches, especially if there is a strongly 
entrenched view on issues such as hours of work. The phrase ‘atypical’ is 
commonly used to describe labour contracts or working arrangements that 
depart from a national norm, whether it is the standard working week, 
holiday and sick pay entitlement, or some other aspect of working 
conditions. It has to be recalled, however, that such standards are 
themselves the result of complex settlements and that breaking away from 
them will be contentious. Policy-makers therefore have to reconcile a 
difficult tension between innovation and damaging disruption when 
contemplating changes to labour market regulation. 
10.4.2 Labour market institutions  
Among the crucial objectives that an ideal set-up of labour market 
institution should ensure are good matching between labour supply and 
demand, resilience in maintaining employment levels (especially in periods 
of weak aggregate demand), the capacity to accommodate new entrants, 
protecting wage income, and inclusiveness. However, in assessing the 
policy impact of competing configurations of the different facets of labour 
market governance, it quickly becomes evident that some of the more 
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simplistic readings of the link from particular arrangements to outcomes 
are poorly conceptualised.  
For example, mismatches occur for a variety of reasons and are not 
always amenable to solutions for migrants; similarly, the unemployment 
rate, whether in total or for target groups in the labour force, is not the only 
relevant test of whether the institutional mix has the right aims in a system 
in transition. These aims are, in part, captured in measures such as EPL 
(employment protection legislation related to preserving employment), the 
replacement rate of unemployment benefit, and job promoting and 
activation policies, but a deeper understanding is required to steer policy in 
the right directions. The material presented in chapter 9 focuses on the 
workings of the institutional arrangements and looks at the various 
dimensions separately, not their interrelationships. To this extent, it is not 
orientated towards outcomes, although this is an obvious policy concern. 
Among the policy conclusions that can be inferred from the evidence 
reviewed, the following are noteworthy: 
 There is a general downward trend in EPL, although Poland is an 
exception, but this raises questions of whether it matters. 
 The nature of EPL is critical and is not necessarily captured by single 
measures. There are large variations in the extent to which protection 
is afforded to temporary as opposed to permanent workers. 
 Unemployment replacement rates vary hugely, differing by a factor 
of four for single workers, but have tended to be quite stable over 
time – arguably reflecting the long-run social settlements in each 
member state. 
 Trends in labour market policy spending are varied, with some of 
those spending most seeing a decline during the 2000s. This has to be 
seen in the context of unemployment and labour market turnover 
rates, as well as (more recently) the pressures on public finances. 
 The lack of evidence of a convergence towards a single model is 
hardly surprising and it may be a chimera to expect it. Even within 
the CEE, where most systems are insurance-based, they are 
characterised by extensive national differences that make a simple 
categorisation implausible. 
There is some support for the proposition that tougher EPL is 
inimical to innovation, although there is a need to consider what the 
mechanisms are, and not just rely on aggregate correlation. More detailed 
findings suggest that EPL is at most a second-order factor in relation to 
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innovation and thus that a crude policy prescription of easing rigidities in 
the labour market is unlikely to be fruitful. Nevertheless, there is some 
evidence that the wrong sorts of labour market institutions deter 
innovation; this may not be very surprising, but even negative policy 
implications have value in identifying what to avoid. 
To the extent that replacement rates and EPL are substitutes, a policy 
issue arises around which is the preferable route. This concerns social risk 
management and recalls the policy debates of the early 2000s about the 
‘costs of non-social policy’ in which it was argued that simplistic cuts in 
social provisions would often have damaging indirect consequences that 
negated the presumed benefits. Questions for policy-makers include 
whether the evolution of the flexicurity model takes sufficient note of these 
considerations and whether the policy prescriptions advanced at the EU 
level suit the exigencies and institutional mix of different member states.  
10.4.3 Job quality  
Job quality has been a persistent, though often rather oblique component of 
successive iterations of EU employment strategies since coming to 
prominence at the Essen European Council in 1994. It has been both a 
horizontal objective and one that has been the subject of specific guidelines 
or policy measures. A consistent finding is that where it is job quantity or 
quality, the former tends to win. 
Yet as Kovács argues in chapter 5, labour law does not directly 
involve itself in job quality. What the research stresses is the often slow 
pace of change and the fact that it is path-dependent. Reforming 
governments from one end of the political spectrum may make far-reaching 
changes, but if they are succeeded by an opposition from the other end of 
the spectrum, the inclination may be more to mitigate the reforms at the 
margins, rather than reverse them. 
There is considerable ambiguity around what is meant by job quality, 
with a range of expressions employed almost as synonyms in many 
member states. This ambiguity has two opposed implications for policy. On 
the one hand, it allows a fair degree of interpretation to be introduced, 
enabling policy-makers to tailor policy measures as well as the terms used 
in national debates to respect national sensitivities. On the other, it can 
mean that an ostensibly common EU policy or approach to employment 
principles can be undermined, although it may be that even if this happens, 
it does not matter much. Where language can matter is when it pushes 
policy-making systematically in one direction rather than another, as may 
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be the case in the balance between flexibility and security, as suggested in 
chapter 5. 
Some forms of flexibility do confer greater rather than lesser security 
on the individual, for example by fitting better with the needs of the 
employer. Choices around working conditions, acquisition of skills or 
opportunities for self-fulfilment are means by which security for the 
individual is enhanced in what can appear to be ‘flexibilisation’. Security 
can, in these circumstances, enhance work-life balance. 
10.4.4 Key messages for policy-makers 
At the EU level 
 The EU level can fulfil a vital cognitive role by identifying and 
diffusing good practices and facilitating the refinement of innovative 
or experimental policy approaches. 
 In its governance processes, notably the annual cycle around the 
European semester and the country-specific recommendations, the 
Commission and the Council should give more emphasis to medium- 
and long-run objectives for labour market institutions, including by 
proposing milestones for their evolution. 
 Workplace innovation has the potential to unlock latent productivity 
and can also contribute by raising employment rates, but has 
sometimes been inhibited by concerns about ‘atypical’ work, which 
should be allayed. 
 The narrative around terms such as job quality has to be carefully 
framed to enlist support from social partners and other stakeholders. 
At the national level 
 Careful recalibration of the regulation of the labour market can 
ensure that it supports rather than inhibits business and public sector 
innovation, but the choices have to reflect the distinctive institutions 
and preferences of member states. 
 The public sector, both directly as an employer and indirectly 
(notably through its procurement function), can establish standards 
and promote workplace innovation. 
 Tax systems and ancillary policies such as transport can be used to 
encourage new working arrangements. 
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10.5 Skills demand 
The varied nature of jobs thought of as low-skilled raises a range of policy 
issues. Some such jobs are quite demanding in the sense of requiring a 
range of non-cognitive skills, a finding that has a bearing on what 
education systems can or should offer. As a result of polarising tendencies 
in the labour market, more qualified candidates often compete with those 
with only lower qualifications, increasing the likelihood of mismatch, while 
possibly also having an adverse effect on social mobility. One issue raised 
was that this requires attention to be paid to the performance of 
educational systems, possibly including monitoring them as part of the 
scorecards used for the macroeconomic imbalances procedure. National 
differences include yawning gaps in basic ICT skills and capabilities. 
The EU lags behind the US in productivity, arguably because of 
inadequate innovation or and slow integration of ICT.13 While the gap is a 
cause for concern, there are ‘catch-up’ opportunities in enhancing levels of 
productivity. However, the projections also point to a possible slowing of 
the creation of service sector jobs in the countries that are obliged to rein in 
debt (whether private or public) to the greatest extent, mainly in southern 
Europe. Indeed, under both scenarios, the share of the industrial sector in 
the economy is projected to rise. This trend may further limit the demand 
for lower-skilled workers who are already facing a loss of job opportunities 
from the pressures of globalisation in tradables sectors.  
Particularly for the high-skilled, a major policy challenge will be to 
ensure that there is sufficient demand to accommodate the rising supply of 
skilled workers. At the same time, sufficiently far-sighted policies have to 
be put in place to anticipate new or growing demands for particular skills. 
A tricky question is whether existing categorisations based largely on 
qualification levels capture what is needed. As the results of a survey 
conducted by the OECD of adult skills, as part of its Programme for the 
International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), show, there are 
“serious skills gaps in Europe’s labour force”, as a consequence of which 
future growth and competitiveness are at risk.14 Among the more worrying 
of the PIAAC findings for the EU countries covered is the relatively high 
proportion of the EU workforce that is insufficiently equipped with the ICT 
skills needed to “match the needs of today’s changing labour markets”. The 
report notes that such skills are often the subject of continuing education 
and training, making the outcome more problematic. The diversity in 
performance among EU member states is highlighted.  
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While skills are prominent in the Europe 2020 strategy and can be 
expected to remain so as the new Commission takes office later in 2014, 
some of the insights from the NEUJOBS research point to a need for careful 
rethinking of how the skills agenda is taken forward. An obvious, if under-
appreciated, policy issue is how to reconcile quantitative targets for skill 
enhancement with qualitative changes in the mix of skills. 
10.5.1 Is education the answer? 
The obvious policy solution to a skills deficit is to increase investment in 
education and to ensure that it is better targeted, although such targeting 
has to take account of demand. In this regard, Haita et al. find that “the 
skill-mix demand is very diverse across the countries analysed, implying 
that there is no universal ‘European’ demand and that domestic institutions 
and structures affect how demand for workers in the low- and medium-
skilled segments of the labour market is formulated”.15 Even so, they 
observe that in service occupations employers look for what they refer to as 
non-cognitive social skills and personal characteristics, but that these 
requirements are often in addition to formal educational qualifications 
depending on the national context. To the authors’ surprise, Danish 
employers place much less emphasis on formal education and cognitive 
skills than do Czech or Irish employers. Their explanation is that Danish 
employers especially value flexibility, and may have become used to a 
labour market in which ‘flexicurity’ principles have become well 
entrenched.  
10.5.2 Key messages for policy-makers 
At the EU level 
 Despite the shortcomings of existing means of coordinating standards 
and qualifications across the EU, the objectives remain valid and 
should be a priority for EU policy. 
 The skills gaps revealed by the PIAAC survey are disturbing for a 
European economy with ambitions to become increasingly 
specialised in knowledge-intensive activities. 
 In the current climate of fiscal austerity, one policy option is the 
privatisation of some social services of general interest. NEUJOBS 
research suggests that a possible result of increased private provision 
of these services could be a downgrading of the skills demanded in 
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the sector. If this happens, there are risks of a decline in the quality of 
services. 
At the national level 
 Although human capital enhancement is, rightly, recognised as 
essential for future competitiveness, there needs to be a national 
debate about the education model and the other goals of education 
systems, such as equality. 
 Lifelong learning and an enhancement of the scale and quality of 
tertiary education have to be reinforced, especially in those member 
states exposed by the research findings as having deficiencies. 
 The implications of a hollowing out of the middle of the skills 
distribution are likely to be profound and will require large-scale 
rethinking of the role of public policy in facilitating transitions to new 
occupations. 
 A specific concern may be the emergence (and how to forestall it) of 
low skills equilibria in which employers only demand low skills in 
certain industries or localities and the resulting effects on worker 
flexibility and mobility. 
10.6 The evolving welfare state 
The social investment turn in welfare policies can be seen as a response to 
the threats to the financial sustainability of social protection systems that 
weigh too heavily on public finances, but also to the need to rebalance 
work and welfare in a way that is economically sustainable. In some 
respects, it is certainties rather than uncertainties that are driving welfare 
reform, especially demographic trends. Longevity and a reduced fertility 
rate reshape the age profile of the population, rendering pay-as-you-go 
arithmetic less sustainable. But there are also uncertainties surrounding, on 
the one hand, the outlook for altering the employment rates of hitherto 
under-employed segments of society, and the receptiveness of Europeans 
to immigration as a means of boosting the working-age population on the 
other. 
10.6.1 Social investment 
Social investment can be interpreted both as a means of identifying what 
should be prominent in the mix of policy measures and as a policy 
paradigm. The latter implies a rather different stance on what the welfare 
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state’s core philosophy is, moving it away from an emphasis on 
redistribution or insurance against various social risks towards investment 
in human and social capital. Within this philosophy, some measures, for 
example most active labour market policies, are readily identifiable as 
forms of investment, while some which might be classified as having other 
societal objectives can also be seen as investment; Esping-Andersen 
portrays family policies in this way.16 
The analysis by Dräbing in chapter 6 posits three key differences 
between the social investment approach and what she calls ‘passive welfare 
states’, which can be interpreted from a policy standpoint. The first, a focus 
on societal development, has the clear policy message that dealing with 
fundamental challenges such as ageing of the population requires a mix of 
policies to increase productivity and employment rates, especially in 
segments of the population where economic activity is low. Policy 
intervention can facilitate this by countering bottlenecks or by rendering 
social protection systems more supportive of, for example, work-life 
balance. Second is a focus on human development and endowing 
individuals with greater capabilities to enable them to enhance their 
employability in a changing labour market. The third strand of social 
investment is a focus on diminishing long-term need for support from the 
welfare state instead of short-term mitigation of risks and needs. Here the 
policy challenge is to find ways of breaking cycles of deprivation or 
exclusion in such a way as to reduce the probability of poverty while 
improving life chances. 
For welfare systems in flux and faced with spending constraints, 
these three facets of social investment link to a range of potential policy 
orientations: 
 Passive income support is not enough and needs to be complemented 
by active measures to foster connections to the labour market and 
social inclusion. 
 The erosion of skills in periods of recession or weak demand needs to 
be prevented. 
 Welfare systems must be adaptable to new social risks. 
New sources of risk or pressure on the welfare state include the 
interplay between changing household structures and the role of the family 
in countering social problems. 
The trend identified by Dräbing is towards increased expenditure on 
what she calls capacitating welfare spending relative to compensating 
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outlays. However, she also cites evidence that a change is occurring within 
the two categories: Sweden, for example has increased spending on 
childcare services. These findings highlight the fact that change in welfare 
states is the norm.  
The investment focus can be seen as consistent with the contention 
that employment is the best route out of poverty, with human capital as the 
key variable. In its idealised form, as explained by Taylor-Gooby, the social 
investment approach to welfare can bring together economic and social 
objectives in a self-reinforcing manner.17 However, social investment is a 
political as well as a policy challenge, according to Vandenbroucke, 
Hemerijck and Palier.18 In calling for a ‘social investment pact’, they argue 
that effective social investment for the long term needs to be accompanied 
by short-term fiscal consolidation, stressing the importance of finding 
solutions for the unskilled who have the fewest employment opportunities. 
While not denying the importance of wage moderation and policies to 
boost competitiveness, they advocate a more complete policy approach that 
is centred on boosting human capital and social inclusion. In this regard, it 
is important to recognise the key role that the corporate sector can play in 
supporting training systems. Some of the largest companies in Europe play 
a vital role in this respect through their support for apprenticeships. 
One phenomenon is that although there some broad changes are 
taking place, such as the increase in childcare provision, countries differ 
markedly in whether or not this is at the expense of existing benefits 
(notably family benefits). Active labour market policy (ALMP) outlays are 
subject to huge disparities, as shown by the expenditure data assembled by 
Dräbing, but public funding is only part of the equation and looking only at 
spending as a proportion of GDP is likely to mean the complementary 
contribution of appropriate incentives and supportive structures is missed. 
In policy terms this is tricky terrain, because it can be hard to draw 
boundaries between solidarity and self-help or between entitlements and 
responsibilities. 
A direct causal link between a social investment approach and 
‘better’ socioeconomic outcomes would be hard to prove, and the analysis 
in chapter 8 makes no such claim. It is, however, worth reflecting on how a 
social investment paradigm can become a basis for success. The policy 
approach encompasses more than just the adoption of specific policies that 
have ‘investment’ rather than ‘passive support’ characteristics, because it 
also relies on the building of trust and of other appropriate social and 
institutional features. In some of the Nordic countries, the foundations of 
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contemporary social investment were constructed many decades ago – 
consider the Rehn-Meidner model in Sweden – and have become defining 
and, importantly, broadly accepted elements of national societies. They are 
far from static, and can evolve quite radically if reforming governments 
come to power or if particular features of the system lose support.  
10.6.2 Whatever happened to flexicurity? 
In 2007, following publication of a Commission communication, the 
European Council endorsed the four strands of the flexicurity model as a 
basis for the development of national systems. These were: 
 Promoting greater flexibility in labour market regulation, notably by 
easing overly restrictive employment protection legislation 
 Encouraging human capital development, including through life-long 
learning 
 Adoption of active labour market policies 
 Reform of social protection systems 
Having been adopted in the ‘good times’ of 2007 when the focus of 
labour market policy was on boosting employment rates through activation 
and enhancing the quality of work, doubts rapidly surfaced about whether 
flexicurity had any relevance in a world in which unemployment had again 
become the principal challenge. In short, could flexicurity, as Tangian 
expressed it, cope with “bad weather”?19 Trade union representatives have 
long felt uneasy over flexicurity, often portraying it as a Trojan horse for 
the deregulation of labour markets.20 The security dimension of the concept 
was originally portrayed as being about protecting the worker rather than 
the job, but for the unions this conception challenged established norms 
about resisting redundancies or the closure of workplaces. 
A qualified answer is offered in work by Mandl and Celikel-Esser, 
who find enough evidence to show that flexicurity principles have 
continued to be prominent in the policies that have been developed since 
the onset of recession, and they conclude that “there is room for flexicurity 
in economically difficult times”.21 They note, however, that in most of the 
measures identified as forms of flexicurity, “the concept as such only 
implicitly deals with maintaining jobs”. In practice, this has meant 
extensive resort to measures that favour internal flexibility within 
companies and other employing organisations, rather than firing, and it is 
worth asking whether this finding points to a paradigm shift that can be 
attributed to the flexicurity model.  
THE FUTURE OF LABOUR IN EUROPE: KEY MESSAGES FOR POLICY-MAKERS  231 
 
It is, in any case, misleading to think of flexicurity as a stable model, 
and better instead to view it as a set of ideas on how to govern labour 
market relationships. Thus, in Denmark, there have been many 
developments in the policies introduced nearly 20 years ago, yet at a 
procedural level there can be little doubt that the commitment to flexicurity 
is undiminished. Among the ten Integrated Guidelines for the Europe 2020 
Strategy, number 7 can be interpreted as being a rather powerful 
restatement of flexicurity goals and the wording of the guidelines continues 
to stress wider social ambitions and not just the dismantling of labour 
market regulation. Similarly, the tone of the country-specific 
recommendations addressed to many member states reflects flexicurity 
aims. 
10.6.3 Key messages for policy-makers 
At the EU level 
 Social investment as a paradigm is expected to be at the core of an 
EU-wide policy approach to the future of the welfare state 
(Hemerijck, 2012), but will require further conceptual and practical 
development. 
 Similarly, although flexicurity remains central to the policy model, it 
will require some updating to take account of the changing labour 
market of the next 15 years, especially in offering terms and 
conditions of employment that are flexible from the perspective of the 
worker. 
 Two of the areas in which such development is most needed are 
devising policies for social integration of immigrants that reflect 
‘investment’ principles, and finding ways to ensure sufficient returns 
to social investments in segments of the labour market with low 
employment rates. The EU level is the appropriate one to develop 
shared strategies for these tasks. 
 The EU level can also take the lead in identifying and diffusing 
innovations in public administration that can diminish dependency 
on welfare support. 
At the national level 
 Social investment can mean different things in different national 
contexts, but the central importance of its ‘investment’ message has to 
be stressed and made operational in each member state. 
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 For the social transitions, likely actions include raising the retirement 
age, activating groups in the working-age population with low 
participation rates and rethinking health and care services, but these 
actions call for differentiated responses, which also reflect national 
labour market and demographic circumstances.  
 Family and work-life balance policies need to evolve to accommodate 
the changing demographic profiles, with new approaches needed to 
care for the elderly so as to reconcile increased participation with care 
obligations. 
 Tax and spending systems will need recalibration to ensure that 
appropriate incentives are in place, both to encourage individuals to 
invest in themselves and to overcome obstacles to activation. 
 Although public funding concerns are an unavoidable factor in 
reforms of social protection systems, it will be important not to 
confuse cuts in spending with value for money in making some of the 
hard choices. In particular, governments have to be prepared to 
‘spend to gain’ where there is evidence that short-term costs can 
generate long-term savings or much better outcomes. 
10.7 Policy implications: Reconciling long-run goals with 
today’s agenda 
Achieving long-run transformations when the bulk of the policy incentives 
are short term will never be easy, and is a fundamental source of 
uncertainty from a political economy perspective. Such changes need 
leadership and policy consistency, as well as targeted investment. 
Although it is unsurprising that the immediacy of crisis management has 
dominated the policy agenda since 2007, an ensuing question is whether 
there have been damaging consequences for the EU’s longer-term goals.  
At the national level one of the more intractable challenges is 
breaking down resistance to change in such a way as to make 
implementation credible. Some member states are now at a precarious 
point where the need for far-reaching reform (not least in the labour 
market) is acknowledged and pressing, but they lack the political 
consensus or administrative capability to generate a momentum for 
change. Fears of a lost generation or of an upsurge in ‘hysteresis’ cannot 
easily be dismissed, and the long-term transitions that were set in motion 
just a few years ago risk being overtaken by short-term priorities. The 
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NEUJOBS research findings in this book shed light on these issues and 
identify a number of policy options.  
10.7.1 Have long-run sustainability objectives been sidelined? 
As recently as 2006, when the EU’s Sustainable Development Strategy was 
re-launched, the social and environmental dimensions of long-run 
sustainability appeared to have become defining features of the model of 
economic development espoused by the EU. Moreover, it is prominent as a 
treaty goal: Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty sets out the fundamental goals of 
the Union, and sub-article 3 states that it “shall work for the sustainable 
development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price 
stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full 
employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment”. The fact that sustainable 
development is first in this list of socio-economic goals suggests that it is 
the encompassing one. 
 Policy message: Long-run transitions are achieved less by a handful 
of dramatic changes than by an accumulation of smaller steps. For the 
transition to occur, what matters is the direction set by policy-makers, 
even if they often have to compromise on the timing or scope of 
specific measures.  
How should sustainability be interpreted for policy purposes when 
considering the long-run transitions investigated by the NEUJOBS project? 
The environmental dimension of sustainability is perhaps the most readily 
understood by the public and politicians alike, because it is easy to explain 
how a sustainable environment could be threatened by pollution or how 
emissions affect climate change.  
 Policy message: How a socio-ecological transition will unfold and the 
policy changes needed to make progress have to be convincingly 
articulated, even if achieving progress is politically tricky and likely 
to be slow. 
Social sustainability is more elusive and often more complex to 
explain in policy terms. It is associated with watchwords such as 
opportunity and mobility, as well as the issues that are usually at the 
forefront of European discourse, notably cohesion, equality, poverty 
reduction and job quality. Equally, there are risks that, through the 
combination of external drivers of the sort examined in the NEUJOBS 
project and ill-judged policies, the social environment might degrade. Such 
degradation could be shaped by shifts in “a large number of factors, 
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including customs and traditions, culture, spirituality, interpersonal 
relations and living conditions”.22 What the evidence presented in earlier 
chapters shows is that there are both direct effects of policy interventions in 
specific fields, for example in affecting social goals such as work-life 
balance or equality, and also cumulative and indirect effects from the range 
of relevant policies. 
 Policy message: The interconnections between initiatives in areas 
such as work-life balance, skill enhancement and social inclusion are 
often poorly understood, but understanding them is vital for a 
comprehensive response. 
10.7.2 Governance at the EU and national levels 
On the face of it, the Europe 2020 slogan of smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth implies that sustainability remains central to the EU policy agenda. 
However, as Diebold observes pointedly: “The EU’s sustainability 
programs are currently paper tigers which have little influence on the 
course of current political decision-making”.23 She argues that the 
ambitions in the EU sustainable development strategy – social as well as 
environmental – were well conceived, but have simply been overtaken by 
events. 
 Policy message: In its governance processes, notably the annual cycle 
around the European semester and the country-specific 
recommendations, the Commission and the Council should give 
more emphasis to medium- and long-run objectives for labour market 
institutions, including the setting of milestones for their evolution. 
The EU lacks clout in many policy areas germane to the skills and 
societal transitions discussed in this book and it remains the case in the EU 
that most policies are predominantly reserved for national (or lower tier) 
policy-makers. Since the late 1990s, when the European Employment 
Strategy was launched, mutual learning has been one way out of this 
dilemma, under the umbrella of the open method of coordination (OMC), a 
mode of governance that has been more criticised than applauded.  
 Policy message: The cognitive, deliberative and steering impacts of 
the OMC should not be too glibly dismissed and, with some fresh 
approaches, can be a valuable policy tool. 
Inevitable disputes over burden-sharing – among member states or 
between the EU and other parts of the world, as well as between 
generations, different interests or types of households – are bound to 
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compound the difficulties. These and other political economy factors need 
to be taken into account when ambitious policy goals are established, 
because (as has been shown repeatedly in the struggle to resolve the euro 
crisis) it is typically easier to say “no” than “yes” when the latter means 
you might have to pay upfront. 
 Policy message: Socio-ecological transition is a common concern, so 
that it is vital to stress the collective costs and benefits of policy action 
and to recognise that collective long-term gains will often exceed 
short-term cost savings. An implication is that policy-makers should 
consider a collective discount rate for assessing such long-term gains. 
Being ‘pro-green’ has become part of the brand identity of the EU, so 
that even though the EU’s performance in promoting ecological 
sustainability may fall short of its aspirations, it is still a potent legitimating 
narrative.24 Yet the apparent backsliding on climate change targets, 
together with the new, harsher realities of the post-crisis context, make it 
hard to claim that it can become the defining narrative for the EU in the 
period to 2025. Similarly, in relation to societal change, established features 
of the European social model have been openly challenged, rendering it 
less persuasive as a defining policy orientation. However, many of the 
underlying SET trends are inexorable and have to feed into evolving 
European norms for a sustainable future. 
 Policy message: Many of the policy choices implicit in the NEUJOBS 
transitions will be disruptive and costly for some stakeholders, even 
though they are likely to be unavoidable. Governments and leaders 
will have to consider how to defend such choices and to adopt 
appropriate communication strategies for this purpose. 
Overall, although there is a discernible shift towards social 
investment affecting some of the policy areas on which NEUJOBS focuses, 
the diversity across Europe is striking. A resulting policy question is 
whether this matters and, if so, what should be done over a ten to fifteen 
year horizon to recast welfare states. There are EU level and national level 
answers to this question. For the EU level, social policy presents the 
dilemma that its formal competence is limited by the Treaty and nearly all 
the levers of policy are at the national (or in some cases, sub-national) level, 
so that its scope for intervention is heavily circumscribed.  
 Policy message: Social investment as a paradigm is expected to be at 
the core of an EU-wide policy approach to the future of the welfare 
state, but will require further conceptual and practical development.  
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 Policy message: As shown by the negative collective effects of 
procrastination in dealing with various effects of the crisis, closer 
policy coordination is required, leading to an uncomfortable tension 
between tiers of government. Policies that foster trust and social 
cohesion can contribute to a more effective social investment mode. 
Moreover, the agenda focusing on skills and flexicurity remains a 
significant part of the policy mix emanating at the EU level and embodied 
in the semester and Europe 2020 processes, as well as in the 
macroeconomic adjustment packages for member states receiving financial 
assistance. At times, too, the EU level can help in a somewhat 
Machiavellian sense by being blamed, allowing governments that struggle 
to overcome the objections of vested interests to play the ‘Brussels 
demands’ card. Part of the story should be about identifying good practice, 
but the scope for the EU level to promote experimentation should also be 
acknowledged. Innovative policies can emerge from local initiatives, which 
then require adaptation to work elsewhere. The EU level can be the source 
of funding for this purpose, but also has to accept that experiments can fail, 
so that some tolerance of unsuccessful policies has to be countenanced, 
rather than condemned as ‘bad’ spending. 
 Policy message: In spite of the criticisms sometimes levelled at soft 
modes of coordination in the EU, it is a governance mode that will 
remain important in diffusing good practice. However, more should 
be done to make what is discussed and analysed at the EU level 
relevant at the operational level in member states. 
A socio-ecological transition needs targets and indicators for 
monitoring progress, but also has to rethink what is being measured. The 
Stiglitz Commission made the emphatic point that “it has long been clear 
that GDP is an inadequate metric to gauge well-being over time 
particularly in its economic, environmental, and social dimensions, some 
aspects of which are often referred to as sustainability”.25 One of the key 
distinctions that the Stiglitz Commission stresses is between current well-
being and whether that well-being can be sustained over time. 
 Policy message: Fresh thought is required on the indicators and 
milestones used to monitor long-term transitions. 
10.7.3 Dealing with the political challenges 
For some of the countries examined in the NEUJOBS research, achieving 
transformations consistent with the long-run transitions at the heart of the 
project will be a daunting challenge. Where they lag behind on skills or on 
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boosting the share of renewables in energy supply, there is plainly no 
overnight fix, nor is there an easy solution to paying for the necessary 
investments. A political challenge for those governments that have low 
social investment is to examine what they forgo by not changing and thus 
to revisit the bases of their welfare states. But governments also need to be 
alert to some of the direct and indirect consequences of SET, some of which 
are distributive while others are allocative in nature. Among the many 
policy issues that emerge from earlier chapters are:  
 How to offset potential competitive vulnerabilities to rising energy 
prices or to more binding restrictions on resource use for businesses. 
 Fuel poverty and its effects on inequality could be a significant policy 
issue: there is a strong regressive effect from rising fuel prices insofar 
as they constitute unavoidable expenditure. 
 How to re-orientate the Cohesion Policy to reflect the adverse effects 
of territorial polarisation in its diverse forms. 
 Inter-country and intra country considerations linked to polarisation, 
such as young/old, dynamic/static and dependent/not, although 
there may be win-win outcomes for regions able to seize the 
opportunities for new activities. 
 Why has ICT not (or not yet) been a countervailing force? 
 How to balance and distribute labour demand and supply in an era 
where there are systematic (and polarising) influences on worker 
location. 
 What relationship should SET have to the reform of welfare 
provisions? 
In some member states – Italy being a good example – the 
combination of slow growth, over-stretched public finances and an 
extended list of structural flaws does not augur well for a shift of gear, but 
could be partly offset in two ways. First, because public policy will have to 
do more with fewer resources, careful sequencing of policy measures will 
be essential. While some structural changes incur unavoidable upfront 
costs for the public finances (pension reform being a prime example), many 
of the more acute problems require legislative or cultural changes or a new 
approach to public management. An early emphasis on such measures, 
though politically difficult, could be highly cost effective. 
A second orientation would be to favour policy interventions able to 
contribute to two (or better still, more) policy objectives. For example, 
substituting (so-called ‘Pigouvian’) environmental taxes for taxes on labour 
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eases the pressure on labour costs and helps to deter polluting behaviour. 
The advantages of such ‘double dividend’ policies may be self-evident, but 
they are rarely emphasised and often only hinted at obliquely in strategy 
documents.  
 A key policy conclusion is the unsurprising, but still important, one 
that the relationship between labour market institutions and the 
behaviour of stakeholders is complex, implying that simplistic 
policies (whether neo-liberal or the contrary) are likely to be 
unhelpful. There is also a strong risk of either unintended 
consequences or outcomes that satisfy one set of goals or normative 
considerations at the expense of another. The reform agenda 
therefore needs to be sensitive to such tensions. 
Another crucial policy conclusion is that a roadmap is vital and that 
the EU level of governance has a particular responsibility to stand as far as 
possible above the fray in this regard. Strategies such as Europe 2020, or 
those geared towards sustainable development or recasting energy policy, 
can, in principle, fulfil the required governance function. But they can only 
make a telling contribution if they are pursued robustly, seen as politically 
salient and shown to make a difference to citizens. Too often, however, the 
EU’s well-intentioned policy interventions fall short of meeting these 
criteria. This highlights the fundamental political challenge facing the EU 
and its institutions in responding to all of the NEUJOBS transitions: it has 
to show not just that it has viable answers, but that it is a relevant actor in 
pursuing them. As Hall reminds us, enabling major transformations 
requires an alignment of interests, creativity and political impetus, so that 
‘”it should not surprise us that a new paradigm has not yet emerged. Such 
processes take time.”26 There is time, but what emerges from much of the 
research reported in this book is that the clock is ticking and that timely 
policy interventions are needed. 
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